Workplace Injuries and Diseases: Prevention and Compensation - Essays in Honor of Terry Thomason by Roberts, Karen et al.
Upjohn Press Upjohn Press Collection 
8-16-2005 
Workplace Injuries and Diseases: Prevention and Compensation - 
Essays in Honor of Terry Thomason 
Karen Roberts 
Michigan State University 
John F. Burton 
Rutgers University 
Matthew M. Bodah 
University of Rhode Island 
Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_press 
 Part of the Labor Economics Commons, and the Workers' Compensation Law Commons 
Citation 
Roberts, Karen, John F. Burton Jr., and Matthew M. Bodah, eds. 2005. Workplace Injuries and Diseases: 
Prevention and Compensation - Essays in Honor of Terry Thomason. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute 
for Employment Research. 
This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org. 

Workplace Injuries 
and Diseases
Roberts.indb   1 6/7/2005   9:27:18 AM
Roberts.indb   2 6/7/2005   9:27:18 AM
Workplace Injuries 
and Diseases
Prevention and Compensation
Essays in Honor of Terry Thomason
Karen Roberts
John F. Burton Jr.
Matthew M. Bodah
Editors
2005
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Kalamazoo, Michigan
Roberts.indb   3 6/7/2005   9:27:18 AM
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Workplace injuries and diseases: prevention and compensation essays in honor of 
Terry Thomason / Karen Roberts, John F. Burton Jr., Matthew M. Bodah, editors.
     p. cm.
 Papers from a conference entitled “Workers’ Compensation: Current and Emerging 
Issues” held at the University of Rhode Island on March 27, 2004 to honor the former 
director of URI’s Schmidt Labor Research Center.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN-13: 978-0-88099-324-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
 ISBN-10: 0-88099-324-3 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Workers’ compensation—United States—Congresses. 2. Insurance, Employers’ 
liability—United States—Congresses. 3. Employers’ liability—United States—
Congresses. 4. Industrial safety—United States—Costs—Congresses. 5. Industrial 
hygiene—United States—Costs—Congresses. I. Roberts, Karen, 1949- II. Burton, 
John F. III. Bodah, Matthew M. (Matthew Michael) IV. Thomason, Terry.
 HD7103.65.U6W685 2005
 363.11'6'0973—dc22
 
2005009746
 © 2005
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007-4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are 
the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of 
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by Alcorn Publication Design.
Index prepared by Diane Worden. 
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Roberts.indb   4 6/7/2005   9:27:18 AM
vContents
Preface vii
Foreword ix
A Selected Bibliography of Terry Thomason’s Publications xiii
1 Introduction  1
  Karen Roberts
2 Economic Incentives and Workplace Safety  9 
 Terry Thomason
3 The Adequacy of Workers’ Compensation Cash Beneﬁts  37 
 Leslie I. Boden, Robert T. Reville, and Jeff Biddle
4 Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts  69 
 John F. Burton Jr.
5 Issues in Workers’ Compensation Appeals System Reform  117 
 Douglas E. Hyatt
6 Performance Measurement in Workers’ Compensation Systems 141 
 H. Allan Hunt
7 The Structure of and Incentives from Workers’ Compensation   171
 Pricing
  Karen Roberts
8 Health Care and Workers’ Compensation   199
  Cameron Mustard and Sandra Sinclair
9 How Can Behavioral Economics Inform Research on   219
 Workplace Injuries?
  Seth A. Seabury, Robert T. Reville, Hilary J. Rhodes, and
  Leslie I. Boden
Roberts.indb   5 6/7/2005   9:27:18 AM
10 Revisiting Black Lung: Can the Feds Deliver Workers’  253 
Compensation for Occupational Disease?   
  Peter S. Barth
11 Workers’ Compensation in Rhode Island: Reform through   275 
Business/Labor Cooperation 
  Matthew Carey
The Authors 285
Index     287
About the Institute 301
Roberts.indb   6 6/7/2005   9:27:18 AM
Preface
On March 27, 2004, a conference entitled “Workers’ Compensation: Cur-
rent and Emerging Issues” was held at the University of Rhode Island. The 
conference was convened in memory of Terry L. Thomason, who served as di-
rector of the university’s Schmidt Labor Research Center from the summer of 
1999 until the time of his death on April 20, 2002. The chapters in this volume 
were ﬁrst presented as papers at the conference. 
Special thanks go to all the authors who prepared papers and presentations 
for the conference, and subsequently revised their work for inclusion in this 
volume. Their hard work and dedication honors Terry Thomason’s memory. 
Thanks go as well to the conference’s additional speakers: Honorable 
George E. Healy, chief judge of the Rhode Island Workers’ Compensation 
Court; George H. Nee, secretary-treasurer of the Rhode Island AFL-CIO; and 
Sheldon Sollosy, chairman of the board, Beacon Mutual Insurance Company. 
Conference moderators Charles T. “Ted” Schmidt, Amy Tabor, and Timothy 
P. Schmidle are also thanked, as are Richard Scholl, current director of the 
Schmidt Labor Research Center; Mary Pinch, the Center’s secretary, who han-
dled conference logistics; and graduate students Andrea Cecconi and Moham-
mad Abbas Ali.
The conference could not have taken place without the generous ﬁnancial 
support of the following sponsors: Beacon Mutual Insurance Company, Julie 
Grand-Landau, the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training, Greater 
Rhode Island Industrial Relations Research Association, and the faculty of the 
Schmidt Labor Research Center.
Finally, neither the conference nor this volume would have been possible 
without the support and guidance of Terry’s wife, Julie Grand-Landau. Julie 
provided both moral and ﬁnancial support to the project from the very begin-
ning. All of us involved in this volume intend it to be a lasting tribute to Terry 
and a gift from our hearts to Julie.
Matthew M. Bodah
vii
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Foreword
This volume is dedicated to the memory of Terry Thomason, who was a 
distinguished scholar, an outstanding teacher and administrator, and a good 
friend of those who contributed chapters to this endeavor. Terry died April 
20, 2002, at his home in Newport, Rhode Island, at the age of 51. His death 
extinguished a life and career much too soon. Yet, Terry left a legacy in his 
research and his contributions to his profession, his family, and his friends that 
will persist for decades.
Born in California and raised in Alabama, Terry received an undergradu-
ate and two graduate degrees from the University of Alabama in the 1970s. He 
then worked as supervisor of personnel for the Newport News Shipbuilding 
and Dry Dock Company for almost ﬁve years, where he mastered the real-life 
lessons of labor relations. He enrolled in the Ph.D. program in Industrial Rela-
tions at Cornell University in 1984, where I met him. We worked on several 
research projects together, I served as the chair of Terry’s dissertation commit-
tee, and he became a virtual member of our family.
Terry joined the faculty of management at McGill University as an as-
sistant professor in 1988 and was promoted to associate professor in 1994. 
Although he was a relatively junior faculty member, Terry assumed much of 
the responsibility for maintaining the industrial relations program at McGill. 
Terry then became the director of the Schmidt Labor Research Center and a 
professor at the University of Rhode Island (URI) in 1999. During his brief 
tenure at URI he took the lead in revising the graduate curriculum and earned 
the admiration of his colleagues.
Active in the Industrial Relations Research Association (IRRA), Terry co-
edited a volume on disability in the workplace, contributed chapters to that and 
other IRRA research volumes, and was a member of the IRRA Editorial Com-
mittee. He was also active in the National Academy of Social Insurance, where 
he served on the Steering Committee on Workers’ Compensation and served on 
a committee that examined the adequacy of workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
Terry published more than 40 articles, chapters, books, and studies. I will 
only mention a few here in order illustrate the depth and breadth of his re-
search. He is probably best known for his research on workers’ compensation 
and related topics, which corresponds to the scope of this volume. One aspect 
of his research concerned dispute resolution and claims handling. His research 
on the New York workers’ compensation program (Thomason and Burton 
1993) found that the use of lawyers increased the probability that workers 
would settle their claims with a lump sum (rather than receive continuing cash 
ix
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beneﬁts) and that the settlements substantially reduced the amount of beneﬁt 
received by the workers. He was subsequently a coauthor of a survey of dis-
putes and dispute resolution with two contributors to this volume (Thomason, 
Hyatt, and Roberts 1998).
Another strain of Terry’s research on workers’ compensation pertained to 
the effect of experience rating on workplace safety. In theory, experience rat-
ing should encourage employers to promote safety since fewer injuries result 
in lower insurance premiums. But some scholars, including Les Boden, an-
other contributor to this volume, have expressed reservations about the effect 
of experience rating, in part because employers can reduce their insurance pre-
miums by ﬁghting claims as well as improving safety. Terry and Silvana Poz-
zebon (2002) sent a questionnaire to Quebec employers to try to separate these 
possible reactions by employers to experience rating, and found that both types 
of behavior occurred. Terry also wrote a chapter (Thomason 2003), published 
posthumously in a volume dedicated to his memory, that examined the rela-
tionships between workplace safety and experience rating and other economic 
incentives. This is an excellent overview of research in this area, including 
Terry’s own work, and is reprinted as a chapter in this volume.
Two other strains of Terry’s research on workers’ compensation are health 
care costs in workers’ compensation and comparisons of the U.S. and Canadian 
workers’ compensation programs. Silvana Pozzebon and Terry (1993) provide 
an example of the intertwining of these strains. More recently, Thomason and 
Burton (2001) documented the increasing disparity in medical costs between 
the Ontario workers’ compensation programs and the programs in the United 
States. This ﬁnding is one of the topics examined in the chapter by Cam Mus-
tard and Sandra Sinclair included in this volume.
Terry’s major contribution in recent years in workers’ compensation in-
volved the study of the effect of alternative insurance arrangements on the em-
ployers’ costs of insurance and on safety in the workplace. Although Timothy 
Schmidle and I had both written dissertations examining the determinants of 
interstate differences in the costs of workers’ compensation insurance, Terry 
considerably expanded the theoretical sophistication and rigor of the statistical 
analysis in this area in Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001). Among the 
most signiﬁcant ﬁndings is that the deregulation of the insurance market in 
most states in recent decades had been associated with a substantial (approxi-
mately 11 percent) reduction in insurance rates after controlling for a myriad 
of factors, such as the level of beneﬁts and the injury rates in the various states. 
The quality of this study was recognized when the Industrial Relations Section 
at Princeton University selected it as one of the Noteworthy Books in Industrial 
Relations and Labor Economics, 2001.
x
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Terry’s research interests included areas other than workers’ compensa-
tion. A recent volume, again published after Terry’s death and dedicated to 
him, contained a chapter (Thomason and Burton 2003) examining the changes 
in the extent of unionization in the public and private sectors. Terry was re-
sponsible for the most provocative part of the study, which examined the extent 
of privatization between 1983 and 2002 in four sectors: hospitals, urban transit, 
sanitary services, and elementary and secondary education. In all of these sec-
tors, the share of employment in the private sector increased, and in three of 
the sectors, the proportion of the total workforce (public and private) unionized 
declined. In education, the private share of employment increased modestly, 
but the unionization rate of the total workforce was stable, in part because the 
proportion of teachers in the private sector who were unionized increased.
Terry was also interested in unions and collective bargaining in Canada 
and in international comparisons. In Thomason and Pozzebon (1998), he and 
Silvana reported on a survey of union organizers in Quebec and Ontario and 
found much less evidence of management opposition to unions in these prov-
inces than other studies have found among managers in the United States. They 
attributed part of the difference to the legal environment in the two countries.
This survey, though truncated, should convey the range of interests, the 
productivity, and the quality of Terry’s research. I was fortunate to have collab-
orated with Terry on several of these studies. Originally, I was the teacher and 
Terry was the student, but over the 15 years of our association, he became the 
senior scholar and I was the learner. He became a master of abstract theory and 
modern econometrics. He also became an excellent writer who could trans-
late complicated relationships into comprehensible manuscripts. He was also 
a great collaborator, as was particularly evident in the volume on insurance ar-
rangements involving Terry, Tim Schmidle, and myself, where we each found 
our area of comparative advantage and we interacted to produce a product that 
exceeded our individual contributions. Terry also had the ability to prod his 
colleagues into moving the project along, an attribute afﬁrmed by Silvana Poz-
zebon, who reports that Terry was “inﬁnitely patient when it came to running 
regressions, [but] was less so when it came to some of the other, more ‘boring’ 
aspects of the research project . . . I suspect my perfectionist tendencies drove 
Terry crazy.”
Even if Terry may have occasionally shown exasperation with his research 
colleagues, it is hard to imagine a nicer person to work with or—of greater 
signiﬁcance—to be around outside of the workplace. One reason is that he 
always had nonwork interests that could be kindled. In 1990s, as his devotion 
to the University of Alabama football waned due to the distance between Tus-
caloosa and Montreal and the lack of Tide luster on the gridiron, he became a 
fan of the Montreal Expos. As their fortunes wilted, Terry turned to the study of 
xi
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Canadian politics for his avocation. His specialty was the separatist movement 
in Quebec. Not bad for a McGill Professor who spoke French with a southern 
accent! 
At his memorial service, both Matt Bodah and Barbara Webster described 
Terry as “a gentle spirit,” and Les Boden called him “a lovely, gentle person.” 
His death was a loss to his wife, Julie Grand-Landau, his mother, Betty (Oates) 
Thomason, his brother, Kevin Thomason, and all his friends, including the 
contributors to this volume. We are all honored to dedicate this volume to his 
memory.
John F. Burton Jr.
xii
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Introduction
Karen Roberts
Michigan State University
The chapters in this volume were originally presented at a confer-
ence to honor Terry Thomason, held at the University of Rhode Island 
in March, 2004. This volume is designed to be a tribute to Terry in 
several ways. It is about workplace safety and health and issues related 
to prevention and compensation for occupational injuries and illnesses, 
a topic to which Terry devoted much of his research life. All of the au-
thors in this volume are recognized experts on various areas of workers’ 
compensation, but more importantly had known Terry, perhaps been 
able to work with him, and admired his work. The volume is intended 
to serve as a detailed introduction to the workers’ compensation novice 
but also provide insights to those more familiar with the area. We hope 
this mirrors Terry’s own approach to his research, clear and insightful, 
but also accessible to those less familiar with workers’ compensation 
than he. The second chapter of this volume is a reprint of a book chap-
ter Terry wrote on economic incentives in workers’ compensation. This 
chapter is demonstrative of some of Terry’s best qualities as a workers’ 
compensation scholar—his instinct for the important policy and wel-
fare questions and his ability to communicate the key issues clearly to 
the reader.
Since its inception, workers’ compensation systems have wrestled 
with questions about how to best structure beneﬁts. Traditionally, there 
has been a triumvirate of criteria used to evaluate beneﬁts of work-
ers’ compensation: adequacy, equity, and efﬁciency. Chapters 3 and 4 
deal with this problem of beneﬁt structure and evaluation. In Chapter 3, 
Boden, Reville, and Biddle examine the adequacy and equity of wage 
replacement beneﬁts. They frame their discussion in terms of the trade-
off between beneﬁt adequacy and cost to discuss the nature of the data 
that would be necessary to inform the policy discussion about beneﬁt 
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levels. They begin with the topic of how to deﬁne “adequate” beneﬁts, 
citing the debate and logic behind the commonly used two-thirds of 
gross preinjury earnings. They then move on to the challenge of mea-
suring the unobservable lost earnings and describe the approaches in 
use in most of the literature. They then review the literature on ben-
eﬁt adequacy for all cases and permanent disability cases, showing that 
most studies ﬁnd that the beneﬁts fall short of adequacy norms. 
Finding that the real replacement rates tend to be inadequate, Boden, 
Reville, and Biddle then examine the question of beneﬁt equity—both 
horizontal (similar losses should receive similar beneﬁts) and vertical 
(different losses should receive beneﬁts proportional to those losses). 
They note the empirical difﬁculty of determining beneﬁt equity but do 
cite examples of useful policy data, including comparing whether or 
not cases with similar temporary beneﬁt durations receive permanent 
disability or other beneﬁts, and the examination of whether beneﬁt dif-
ferences are proportional to loss ratings in permanent partial disability 
(PPD) cases. They conclude their chapter with several policy sugges-
tions designed to improve beneﬁt levels for those at the bottom of the 
beneﬁt scale, thus at a minimum improving beneﬁt equity, and a set of 
questions that, if answered, would lead to better policy.
Permanent partial disability is the most vexatious type in workers’ 
compensation. It is by nature complex because of the variability of the 
degree of injury and the effect of injury on the ability to work. Com-
pensation for PPD is even more complex, as states vary considerably 
in their approaches to this sort of disability. In Chapter 4, John Burton 
presents a detailed discussion of the various models used in the differ-
ent states for evaluating disability and structuring beneﬁts, and then 
discusses a list of criteria that might be used to evaluate these different 
models. 
Burton begins with a presentation of a conceptual framework for 
understanding PPD that discusses the nature of permanent injuries, pos-
sible compensation schemes, and the determination of which types of 
permanent injuries should be compensated, with particular emphasis 
on whether compensation should be for the impairment or the earnings 
loss and whether noneconomic losses that do not directly affect earn-
ing capacity should be compensated. Following that, Burton describes 
how this framework is implemented by the states. He discusses three 
basic approaches: 1) the permanent impairment approach, 2) the loss of 
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earnings capacity approach, and 3) the wage loss approach. He then dis-
cusses how the states structure beneﬁts for these various deﬁnitions of 
loss. The complex set of potential PPD beneﬁt systems begs the ques-
tion Burton raises next: What criteria should be used to evaluate these 
different beneﬁt delivery systems? He presents ﬁve: 1) beneﬁt adequa-
cy, 2) beneﬁt equitability, 3) delivery system efﬁciency, 4) prevention 
and rehabilitation efﬁciency, and 5) affordability. Burton raises several 
research questions including whether or not these criteria are the right 
ones and, assuming that they are, how the different state approaches 
measure up.
The chapters on beneﬁt structure serve as a good preamble to Doug-
las Hyatt’s chapter on dispute resolution in workers’ compensation, as 
they provide ample discussion of beneﬁt features that could easily be 
disputed by the various parties. One of the initial motivations behind 
the passage of workers’ compensation insurance statutes was to elimi-
nate the need for tort as the sole remedy in determining whether and 
how much occupationally injured individuals would be compensated. 
For most cases, workers’ compensation has succeeded in that goal, but 
for a signiﬁcant minority, resorting to formal dispute resolution systems 
is necessary. In Chapter 5, Hyatt tells the story of two Canadian com-
missions charged with investigating and evaluating dispute resolution 
in workers’ compensation to illustrate why cases end up in disputed 
status and what sort of research is needed to address those causes. His 
primary argument is that stakeholder discontent with the dispute reso-
lution system cannot legitimately be seen as resulting solely from poor 
execution. Rather, he argues that difﬁculties with dispute resolution in 
workers’ compensation and periodic increases in dispute activity arise 
from multiple sources: increasing complexity of work-related injuries, 
rising worker rights as evidenced by expanding appeal rights, the in-
creasing awareness of inconsistencies in adjudicative decisions at the 
initial level, and growing use of experience rating that increases the 
sensitivity of employer costs to claims activity. 
Hyatt describes a vicious circle at the appeals level: an efﬁcient ap-
peals system motivates those at the initial hearing level to pass off the 
more difﬁcult cases to the appeals level, clogging that system and con-
verting an efﬁcient system into one that malfunctions. He suggests that 
more research is needed to better understand how many levels of dis-
pute resolution is most efﬁcient, and how alternative dispute resolution 
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or resorting to the court system might ameliorate current problems.
While interest in performance management and the development 
of good performance measures has increased in both the public and 
private sectors over the last several decades, workers’ compensation 
administrative agencies have lagged behind in this area. The two chap-
ters on beneﬁt structure and the one on dispute resolution all highlight 
the need for good information with which to identify where the work-
ers’ compensation system is succeeding, needs adjustment, or is failing. 
Chapter 6, by Allan Hunt, provides an overview and description of the 
current state of performance measurement and management informa-
tion systems in workers’ compensation. Hunt begins with a description 
of the history of performance evaluation in workers’ compensation, and 
while applauding past efforts, he notes several weaknesses, including 
inconsistent measures across states, the inclusion of some measures that 
are beyond control of the state agencies, and data that only permit com-
parison with a limited number of states. 
Noting that performance measurement is more highly developed 
in the publicly administered jurisdictions in Canada and Australia, 
Hunt demonstrates how the combination of descriptive information can 
paint a telling picture of strengths and weaknesses of a claims system 
by combining basic descriptive statistics that make interjurisdictional 
comparisons. The chapter concludes with a discussion of state-of-the-
art programs under way in both the United States and Canada. One such 
program, from the Nova Scotia Workers’ Compensation Board, shows 
a well-conceived multistep system linking organizational goals to orga-
nizational outcomes. 
Workers’ compensation is primarily designed to compensate injured 
workers during their recuperation and pay for their medical care. How-
ever, it is also often described as providing safety incentives through its 
pricing structure. In Chapter 7, Karen Roberts examines how workers’ 
compensation insurance is priced and what incentives are embedded 
in that price structure. The chapter begins with a description of how 
premium is determined. She contends that while the pricing structure 
is commonly presented as containing safety incentives to employers, 
because proﬁt-maximizing insurers rather than welfare-maximizing 
government determines the pricing structure, there is reason to ques-
tion the effectiveness of pricing as a safety-promotion tool. In the next 
two sections, Roberts examines the incentives this pricing structure is 
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intended to have on employers and the insurer perspective on pricing, 
respectively. 
Although there is evidence that experience rating may have an ef-
fect on employer safety behavior, Roberts discusses several of the weak-
nesses in the relevant research, in particular, the use of proxy measures 
for experience rating and evidence that employers may not understand 
pricing sufﬁciently well to respond to its incentives. She uses the insur-
ance literature to bolster her initial contention by showing that from the 
insurer’s perspective, the objective of pricing is to adequately cover 
expected indemnity, rather than to change employer safety behavior. In 
the ﬁnal section, Roberts reviews the literature on the effect of regulat-
ing workers’ compensation insurance pricing on employer incentives, 
in particular, how those incentives are distorted. She concludes with the 
question of whether it is sound policy to rely on the private insurance 
sector to provide workplace safety incentives.
Chapter 8 examines a contributor to cost variation—health care. 
One of the beneﬁts under workers’ compensation is full health care 
coverage for the work-related injury or illness. The vast majority of 
workers’ compensation claims are for medical care only, and in the 
United States, increases in the cost of health care are important drivers 
of overall workers’ compensation cost growth. Two Canadian research-
ers, Cameron Mustard and Sandra Sinclair, explore an observed but 
poorly understood phenomenon, speciﬁcally, that workers’ compensa-
tion health care costs are lower in Canada than in the United States 
both in terms of real dollars per claim and as a share of total premium 
costs. Mustard and Sinclair identify three factors that they argue explain 
the difference between Canadian and U.S. costs: 1) lower medical care 
prices in Canada, 2) lower rate of medical care inﬂation, and 3) higher 
intensity of health care service provision in the United States. 
Mustard and Sinclair frame their discussion by contrasting the pre-
dominant privately ﬁnanced system in the United States to the single-
payer public system in Canada. They note that the private health care 
system in the United States has a substantially higher rate of overhead, 
indicating that this market-driven system has not led to more cost-ef-
ﬁcient delivery of care; they then discuss in what ways the market in 
the United States has failed. The authors explore the possibility that 
the higher intensity leads to better health outcomes for U.S. workers, 
thus justifying the higher costs, but can ﬁnd no evidence of better U.S. 
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outcomes. Their study provides lessons about how to structure health 
care delivery and ﬁnancing in workers’ compensation as well as in the 
general health care system.
Workers’ compensation is a multidisciplinary subject, examined 
through multiple lenses: economic, legal, medical, psychological, and 
as a form of insurance. Most of the chapters in this book take a tradi-
tional economic approach. In Chapter 9, Seth Seabury, Robert Reville, 
Hilary Rhodes, and Leslie Boden examine the behavioral economics 
perspective and how it may contribute to a better understanding of 
workers’ compensation. Standard economic theory frequently relies 
on the assumption that economic actors have perfect information and 
behave rationally. In the context of occupational health and injury, be-
havioral economics departs from this assumption and focuses on how 
individuals accumulate and process information about risk and uncer-
tainty. After presenting and summarizing the research on compensating 
wage differentials, the standard economic approach, they present pros-
pect theory, a behavioral economic framework. 
Prospect theory postulates about the decision rules individuals use 
when faced with imperfect information and the systematic errors people 
appear to make in assessing risk. Speciﬁcally, Seabury and his coauthors 
examine three biases: 1) the availability bias, 2) the optimism bias, and 
3) the accumulation bias, each of which distorts individual understand-
ing of risk and subsequent behavior. Following this discussion, the au-
thors detail the nature of irrationality as presented by prospect theory, 
where individuals fail to accurately match risk to potential gains and 
losses. They then discuss the implications for prospect theory for the 
use of the standard model. Their discussion generates a wealth of ideas 
for future research. Examples include incorporating how individuals 
perceive risk, as opposed to actual risk, in determining compensating 
wage differentials, examination of how worker learning about risk af-
fects bias and decision making, and the use of risk perceptions in pro-
viding safety incentives and promoting safety. 
Most workers’ compensation programs are state-based, and al-
though they all share certain basic features, there is considerable di-
versity across states. On occasion, the policy suggestion is made that 
workers’ compensation could be more simply and fairly administered 
if it were a federal program. In Chapter 10, Peter Barth’s description of 
the Black Lung Program, a federally administered program designed 
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to provide compensation to workers with occupational disease due to 
coal dust exposure, is a cautionary tale for advocates of federalization 
of workers’ compensation. Barth’s chapter chronicles the legislative 
history of several programs collectively referred to as the Black Lung 
Program. 
Barth’s description details policy formation based on insufﬁcient 
understanding of the scope of the problem, inadequate understanding 
of the state programs with which the federal program was to eventu-
ally coordinate, and changes in federal government administrations that 
brought signiﬁcant changes in ideological perspectives on how best to 
address problems of occupational disease. Barth notes that, despite the 
long history, the problems emanating from this program are relevant 
today: the Black Lung Trust Fund is currently in serious debt, and a new 
federal occupational disease program for energy employees has just 
been created. The chapter concludes with a set of lessons learned from 
the Black Lung Program, which is of great value to policymakers.
The ﬁnal chapter in the book, Chapter 11, tells a political success 
story, one where contention in the workers’ compensation system had 
brought the state to the brink of collapse, but where vision and courage 
by stakeholders who had been adversaries turned the situation around, 
making the state system a model of cooperative problem solving. Mat-
thew Carey begins his chapter with a description of the Rhode Island 
system leading up to its 1990 crisis, when the dispute system had bogged 
down and the National Commission on Compensation Insurance had 
proposed a 132 percent increase in rates to cover expected beneﬁt and 
claims costs. Carey then goes on to describe speciﬁc reforms in the 
critical areas of the Rhode Island workers’ compensation system: im-
plementation of a pretrial conference to streamline adjudication, use of 
nonprejudicial agreements for beneﬁt payments and settlements, instal-
lation of penalties for fraud for both parties, a change in partial disabil-
ity compensation, designation of Beacon Mutual as a competitive state 
fund, and the creation of a multistakeholder advisory council. Perhaps 
the most signiﬁcant of these is the latter, as it has proved to be a forum 
for cooperative problem solving for nearly 15 years.
For a variety of reasons, workers’ compensation has been declining 
as a share of the total wage bill for over a decade. Nevertheless, ap-
proximately $50 billion worth of beneﬁts are paid annually to injured 
workers. Real costs are higher than that because of the cost of program 
Roberts.indb   7 6/7/2005   9:27:22 AM
8   Roberts
administration, disputes, and proﬁt. This volume provides an overview 
of most of the central features of workers’ compensation and some of 
the research gaps that need to be ﬁlled for this type of social insurance 
to be more efﬁciently and equitably administered. Approximately 1 in 
20 full-time equivalent workers becomes injured at work per year, so 
the need for effective disability insurance will continue. This volume is 
intended to contribute to the ongoing effort to improve workers’ com-
pensation.
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Economic Incentives 
and Workplace Safety
Terry Thomason
The problem of work injuries is a substantial one. Recent estimates 
put the cost of workers’ compensation beneﬁts paid to injured Canadian 
workers and their families at more than $6 billion annually, or nearly 1 
percent of gross domestic product. In the United States, workers’ com-
pensation beneﬁt payments amount to over $40 billion annually. And 
workers’ compensation beneﬁt payments represent only a small portion 
of the economic costs of work injuries. Work injuries also entail losses 
due to lost production, damage to plant and equipment, and the uncom-
pensated losses suffered by injured workers that are estimated to be as 
much as four times the cost of beneﬁts (Heinrich et al. 1980).
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section 
discusses the economic theory of work injuries and illnesses. Speciﬁ-
cally, this section examines employer and worker incentives for safety 
in the absence of government regulation. The chapter then discusses 
safety incentives created by different types of government regulation. 
Conclusions are drawn in the ﬁnal section.
ECONOMIC THEORY OF WORK INJURIES AND ILLNESSES
Work injuries are an unwelcome by-product of economic activity. 
In part, they are random events, but they are also, to some extent, under 
the control of workers and employers. Employers can reduce the num-
ber of workplace injuries and illnesses by investing in safer technology, 
providing workers with personal protective equipment (such as hard 
hats and safety glasses), training workers and their supervisors, etc.; 
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workers can avoid accidents by following safe work practices and by 
taking greater care on the job.
Both parties incur costs when an accident occurs. Workers’ costs 
include potential loss of income and medical expenses associated with 
treatment and rehabilitation as well as intangibles, such as pain and 
suffering and disability that reduces the ability to enjoy leisure activi-
ties. Employers’ costs include interruptions in production and damage 
to capital equipment and physical plant.
Since accident prevention also entails costs to employers and em-
ployees, public policy should encourage employers and employees to 
minimize the combined costs of accidents and accident prevention that 
are incurred by both workers and employers.1 It is possible to spend 
both too much and too little on accident prevention. Investment in ac-
cident prevention is socially efﬁcient when total costs are minimized, 
that is, when an additional dollar spent on prevention reduces accident 
costs by exactly one dollar.
As indicated, both employers and workers affect workplace health 
and safety. We can expect that—if they are rational—both actors will 
make accident prevention decisions that are privately efﬁcient. That is, 
we may expect that each will make decisions that minimize their own 
accident and accident costs individually; however, their decision mak-
ing process may not consider costs that are incurred by the other party.
However, under some conditions, it is at least arguable that em-
ployers do consider the workers’ accident costs when making invest-
ments in workplace health and safety and thus make socially efﬁcient 
decisions as well. To understand this argument, let us consider a world 
where there are two types of employers, those with safe workplaces 
and those with hazardous ones. Assume that workers employed by safe 
ﬁrms do not risk having an accident or illness while at work—i.e., the 
probability of injury or illness is zero—while one of every ten workers 
employed by hazardous ﬁrms will have an occupational accident each 
year. Let us further assume that workers are aware of the probability of 
accidents at both types of ﬁrms and that they are free to choose the type 
of ﬁrm for whom they will work.
Under these assumptions, we may expect that if everything else 
were equal—i.e., the compensation package and other terms and con-
ditions of employment—all workers would prefer employment at the 
safe ﬁrms. In order to attract workers, hazardous ﬁrms will be forced 
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to increase wages above the level paid by safe ﬁrms. In other words, 
we would expect to ﬁnd that hazardous ﬁrms pay a compensating dif-
ferential and that the magnitude of this differential will be related to 
the workers’ expected accident costs, including the cost of lost income, 
medical expenses, pain and suffering, etc.
So, for example, let us assume that the average cost of accidents 
for workers is $10,000 and that the average annual salary of workers in 
safe ﬁrms is $40,000.2 Since the probability of an accident at a hazard-
ous workplace is 0.1, then expected accident costs at that workplace are 
$1,000 (= 0.1 × $10,000). This means that hazardous employers must 
pay their employees an annual salary of $41,000 for employment at a 
hazardous ﬁrm to be equally attractive as employment at a safe ﬁrm.3 
Thus, the employer’s accident costs include the expected accident costs 
borne by workers. Importantly, employers will be able to reduce the 
compensating differential and, consequently, their accident costs, by re-
ducing the incidence of workplace accidents and illnesses.4
The economic model presented in the preceding paragraphs rests on 
a number of key assumptions, which many have questioned. In particu-
lar, the model requires that workers have complete and accurate infor-
mation with respect to the risk of injury or death and an absence of bar-
riers to worker mobility, i.e., that workers are free to move in and out of 
the labor market or between employers at relatively low cost. However, 
critics point out that it is likely that either workers do not have access 
to good information about injury risks or barriers to mobility prevent 
workers from moving to safer jobs. As a result, wage differentials due 
to the risk of injury either do not arise or they are inadequate, i.e., they 
do not fully compensate workers for the risk of injury. 
Do employers, in fact, pay a compensating differential to workers 
exposed to greater risks of injury or illness? To answer this question the 
researcher must address a number of methodological issues that are not 
easy or simple to resolve, and existing statistical evidence is decidedly 
mixed. By and large, research investigating the relationship between 
the risk of fatal injury and wages has found a risk premium, while stud-
ies examining the relationship between wages and non-fatal risks have 
not (see Viscusi 1993, for a recent review of this literature). However, 
Dorman and Hagstrom (1998) demonstrate that even fatal-risk differen-
tials are extremely sensitive to the regression speciﬁcation.
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Importantly, there is no evidence to demonstrate that the risk differ-
ential is fully compensating, even for fatal injuries. In addition, research 
suggests that, after controlling for the risk of injury and a variety of oth-
er factors affecting wages, the wage differential is substantially larger 
for unionized workers than for nonunion workers (Olson 1981; Dickens 
1984; Fairris 1992; Siebert and Wei 1994; and Sandy and Elliott 1996). 
This result, which indicates that union workers get a greater premium 
for the same level of risk, is difﬁcult to reconcile with the hypothesis 
that wage differentials compensate workers for the expected cost of ac-
cidents.5 Finally, psychological research suggests that people overes-
timate the likelihood of a low probability event and underestimate the 
likelihood of a high probability event (Viscusi 1993). This systematic 
bias implies that workers will generally demand a risk premium that is 
less than fully compensating.
Workers’ Compensation
Workers’ compensation provides cash beneﬁts to workers who are 
unable to work as the result of an occupational injury or illness as well 
as medical beneﬁts and rehabilitative services to all who are injured as 
the result of a workplace accident.
These beneﬁts have the effect of reducing accident costs for workers 
and, consequently, the risk premium paid by hazardous employers. As 
a result, we may expect that the worker’s incentive for avoiding work-
place injuries will have been reduced because their accident costs have 
been reduced by the medical and cash beneﬁts provided by the workers’ 
compensation program, a problem known as risk-bearing moral hazard 
in the insurance literature. We might also expect that workers’ com-
pensation beneﬁts would increase the workers’ willingness to expose 
themselves to greater risks on the job, but that these beneﬁts would also 
increase the likelihood that workers would report an injury that would 
have otherwise gone unreported or even falsely report a nonwork-re-
lated injury as occupational. This latter problem is known as reporting 
moral hazard. In either event, because workers’ compensation reduces 
the cost of workplace accidents for workers, we would expect it would 
also reduce the compensating wage differential. In fact, there is some 
statistical evidence indicating that as compensation becomes more gen-
erous, the risk premium for hazardous work is reduced.
Roberts.indb   12 6/7/2005   9:27:23 AM
Economic Incentives and Workplace Safety  13
Do workers’ compensation beneﬁts affect employers’ incentives to 
prevent workplace accidents? The answer depends on the way in which 
compensation beneﬁts are funded. If the employer is liable for workers’ 
compensation beneﬁts paid to his or her ﬁrm’s injured workers, then the 
employers’ incentive structure will be unchanged by the introduction of 
workers’ compensation. However, if there is no relationship between 
employer costs and worker beneﬁts, then the employer’s incentive to 
prevent accidents is reduced by workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
In Canada and the United States, workers’ compensation beneﬁts 
are funded through a payroll tax paid by employers. A two-step process 
determines tax (or assessment) rates in most provinces. In the ﬁrst step, 
industrial classiﬁcations are used to group ﬁrms who share similar risks 
of workplace injury or illness, so that banks are grouped with other 
ﬁnancial institutions, for example, food stores are grouped with similar 
retail establishments, etc. The recent historical accident record of each 
of these classiﬁcations, known as rate groups, is used to determine the 
base assessment rate for each group. The assessment rate is set so as to 
provide sufﬁcient income to fund all workers’ compensation beneﬁts 
paid to workers and any expenses associated with workers’ compensa-
tion program administration.
In the second step of the rate-making process, known as experience 
rating, the base assessment rate for some ﬁrms is adjusted to account for 
the ﬁrm’s individual safety record.6 In other words, the assessment rate 
for ﬁrms with better than average safety records (lower injury rates) is 
reduced, and the rates of ﬁrms with worse than average safety records 
(higher injury rates) are increased.
Both steps of the rate-making process should reduce the injury rate 
relative to a regime where all employers are charged an identical assess-
ment rate unrelated to the risk of injury. Variation in the base assess-
ment rate means ﬁrms in hazardous industries pay a higher base assess-
ment rate than ﬁrms in relatively safe ones, so that the cost of goods and 
services produced by ﬁrms in hazardous industries increases relative 
to a regime in which a ﬂat assessment rate is charged to all employers. 
In turn, this reduces consumption of goods and services in hazardous 
industries relative to safe ones and subsequently employment; as the 
proportion of employment in safe industries rises, the overall accident 
rate will drop.
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However, the base assessment rate is only marginally related to 
the ﬁrm’s accident experience. If the ﬁrm is not experience-rated, the 
employer does not consider workers’ compensation assessments to be 
part of the cost of accidents, since it cannot affect costs by preventing 
accidents. However, if the ﬁrm is experience-rated, then a reduction in 
the accident rate directly reduces its subsequent accident costs. Thus, 
if the ﬁrm is experience-rated, the employers’ investment in workplace 
safety will remain unchanged following the introduction of workers’ 
compensation insurance; however, if the ﬁrm is not experience-rated, 
the employer’s safety investment will decline after workers’ compensa-
tion is introduced.
Thus, workers’ compensation unambiguously reduces workers’ 
safety incentives and increases workers’ incentives to report compensa-
ble claims. Furthermore, since not all employers are experience-rated, 
the overall impact of workers’ compensation is to also reduce, on aver-
age, health and safety investments by employers.
Workers’ Compensation and Occupational Injuries: The Evidence
Since the introduction of workers’ compensation pre-dates the col-
lection of injury rate data, there are only a handful of studies that have 
attempted to directly examine this issue and those that do have pro-
duced contradictory results. Chelius (1976) found that the introduction 
of workers’ compensation programs led to a reduction in fatal accident 
rates relative to the tort regime that preceded them. However, Fishback 
(1987) reached the opposite conclusion, using a different (and arguably 
better) data set.
On the other hand, several studies have attempted to determine 
whether there is a relationship between the generosity of workers’ com-
pensation beneﬁts and the work injury rate. As indicated, economic 
theory suggests that, where workers’ compensation insurance is less 
than perfectly experience-rated, the accident rate should be positively 
related to workers’ compensation beneﬁt generosity.
A large number of studies using different methodologies and data 
sources have found the expected positive relationship between beneﬁt 
levels and injury (or workers’ compensation claim) rates. Studies of 
the U.S. workers’ compensation include Butler and Worrall (1983) and 
Chelius (1982) who examined state-level claims and injury data and 
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Hirsch et al. (1997) who used longitudinal survey data to estimate the 
impact of beneﬁt generosity on the probability that a worker would ﬁle 
a workers’ compensation claim. Canadian studies include Thomason 
and Hyatt (1997), who examined provincial injury rates and Thomason 
and Pozzebon (1995), who used data on individual workers to estimate 
claim probability. Uniformly, these studies have found that higher lev-
els of workers’ compensation beneﬁts are associated with higher injury 
or claims rates or a higher probability that a worker would initiate a 
compensation claim.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND WORKPLACE SAFETY
There are at least three approaches to the regulation of occupational 
health and safety, all of which have been adopted by policy makers in 
one form or another at one time or another. The ﬁrst—and the one most 
commonly identiﬁed as occupational health and safety regulation—in-
volves the promulgation of rules prescribing or proscribing speciﬁc 
policies and practices by employers, which are enforced through on-
site inspections and monetary penalties for infractions. The second ap-
proach comprehends systems of general safety incentives that reward 
or punish employers on the basis of safety and health outcomes rather 
than behaviors that are thought to affect those outcomes. This second 
approach is embodied in the experience rating of workers’ compensa-
tion assessments, whereby employers’ compensation costs are tied to 
their accident experience. The third approach, termed internal respon-
sibility, pervasive in Canada, is designed to improve safety and health 
conditions through workers’ empowerment and involves three principal 
elements: 1) the worker’s right to refuse to perform unsafe work; 2) the 
worker’s right to information on the nature of workplace hazards; and 
3) joint labor-management safety and health committees, which are giv-
en a mandate to oversee safety and health conditions in the workplace.
The Economics of Regulation
Occupational safety and health regulation seeks to change behav-
ior of the employer by changing the cost-beneﬁt calculus described in 
the previous section, through imposition of monetary penalties or other 
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sanctions.7 Speciﬁcally, regulatory sanctions lower accident preven-
tion costs by the expected value of the sanction.8 In other words, ﬁrms 
considering adoption of a particular safety practice must now weigh 
expected costs of the sanction that will be imposed if they fail to do so. 
Sanction costs are characterized as “expected” because, under some—if 
not all—regulatory regimes, penalties are not imposed unless a viola-
tion is detected.
There are two costs that must be considered by efﬁcient regula-
tors: the administrative costs of regulation (the cost of staff involved 
in enforcement and adjudication), and the cost of regulatory effort (the 
imposition of sanctions whose expected costs are either too great or too 
small). Sanctions are too small (large) if the costs of accident preven-
tion, including the expected savings from the avoidance of sanctions, 
are less (greater) than associated accident costs. The cost of error is 
equal to the difference between accident costs and the cost of accident 
prevention if the regulation in question is adopted and enforced. The 
goal of efﬁcient regulation is to minimize the sum of these costs.
Direct Regulation of Workplace Hazards
As indicated, direct regulation attempts to change employer be-
havior by promulgating regulations that prescribe or prohibit speciﬁc 
employer or worker practices. Regulations are enforced through work-
place inspections and penalties for noncompliance. Critics argue that 
direct regulation fails to recognize important variation across ﬁrms with 
respect to technology and other characteristics. In other words, a safety 
practice that is efﬁcient for one employer may not be efﬁcient for an-
other, so that there are potentially substantial error costs. In addition, a 
system of direct regulation in which the regulator agency responsible 
for promulgating rules is one-step removed from the workplace and is, 
therefore, slow to respond to technological change. Once again, this 
could result in substantial error costs.
Furthermore, as Dorman (1996, p. 197) notes, “Most occupational 
risks are transitory . . . Safety features mandated by law may be unavail-
able or malfunctioning from time to time, but inspectors are not likely 
to know this.” In other words, the probability of detecting noncompli-
ance is low so that the regulators must substantially increase the mag-
nitude of the sanction imposed. Finally, direct regulation is costly to 
Roberts.indb   16 6/7/2005   9:27:23 AM
Economic Incentives and Workplace Safety  17
administer. It requires an extensive bureaucracy to develop standards, 
inspect workplaces, and to resolve disputes with employers concerning 
the appropriateness of penalties.
Most research examining direct regulation is conﬁned to an exami-
nation of the effects of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(OSHA) of 1970. At best, this research has produced mixed results with 
respect to OSHA’s effectiveness, although more recent research—and, 
in some ways, methodologically superior—tends to ﬁnd results that 
support the hypothesis that direct regulation reduces injury rates. (This 
question is also taken up by Mendeloff [1979, Chapter 11], with some 
comparative discussion on the United States and Canada.)
Much of this early research involved a time-series analysis or cross-
sectional pre- and post-OSHA comparisons of aggregate injury rate data. 
By and large, these studies were unable to ﬁnd the expected reduction in 
the incidence of workplace injuries (Smith 1973; Mendeloff 1979; Cur-
rington 1986). However, Smith (1992, p. 566) notes data problems ren-
der such comparisons problematic: “Because the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act fully covers the private sector, and because before-and-
after comparisons are generally infeasible, a convincing study of the 
overall effects of the Act has not been—and may never be—done.”
Another group of studies has evaluated the impact of OSHA en-
forcement activity—that is, the effect of inspections and ﬁnes—on the 
incidence and severity of workplace injuries. Following Smith (1992), 
these studies may be classiﬁed into two categories: those using aggre-
gate industry injury rate data and those using plant level data.
Enforcement variables used in research examining industry aggre-
gate accident rates include lagged measures of the probability of inspec-
tion and the expected penalty for an OSHA violation. In general, these 
studies found little or no effect for OSHA enforcement activity. For 
example, Viscusi (1979) was unable to detect a statistically signiﬁcant 
relationship between injury rates and either inspection probability or 
the expected penalty. In a later study, Viscusi (1986) found that OSHA 
enforcement reduced the lost workday incidence rate by a modest 1.5 
to 3.6 percent, although Smith (1992) argues that this result may have 
been a statistical artifact—the product of changes in employer reporting 
behavior resulting from a change in OSHA inspection strategies.
Arguing that these lagged penalty data were as much a measure of 
employer noncompliance as a proxy for a deterrent effect, Bartel and 
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Thomas (1985) estimated a system of structural equations in which the 
probability of inspection and penalties per inspection were treated as 
endogenous. They found that while OSHA signiﬁcantly reduced em-
ployer noncompliance, there was little relationship between noncompli-
ance and the lost-time injury rate. However, these authors conclude that 
OSHA indirectly reduced accident rates by placing a greater regulatory 
burden—in the form of increased inspection probability—on ﬁrms with 
higher injury rates.
A study of industry aggregate injury rates in Quebec by Lanoie 
(1992) found a statistically signiﬁcant negative relationship between 
inspection probability and the lost-time injury rate. However, the likeli-
hood of a workplace health and safety inspection by an ofﬁcer of the 
Quebec government was positively associated with injury severity, 
measured as average number of workdays lost per injury. In addition, 
Lanoie failed to detect a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between 
probability of penalty and either frequency or severity of work inju-
ries.
Research using plant level data have generally reached more opti-
mistic conclusions about OSHA’s effectiveness, although these studies 
have also produced mixed results. Two types of studies have been con-
ducted. Earlier research compared ﬁrms that had been inspected early in 
the year with ﬁrms that had been inspected late in the year, hypothesiz-
ing that inspection effects should be more evident for the former group 
of ﬁrms than for the latter group (Smith 1979; McCaffrey 1983). Using 
data from 1973 and 1974, Smith found that 1973 inspections reduced 
injury rates by about 16 percent while 1974 inspections induced a 5 
percent reduction, although the latter relationship was not statistically 
different from zero at conventional levels. McCaffrey failed to ﬁnd a 
statistically signiﬁcant effect using data from 1976–77. As Scholz and 
Gray (1990, p. 299) note, taken together, these results suggest that “the 
easily accomplished reductions in risk that OSHA inspections could im-
pose may have already been implemented in 1976, leaving more com-
plex issues of risk reduction, less amenable to quick ﬁxes.”
As Smith (1992, p. 569) points out, because these early studies 
lacked data on citations and ﬁnes resulting from inspections, they were 
only able to measure the abatement of injuries following an inspection; 
as a result, these studies were unable to measure OSHA’s “deterrent” ef-
fect. Replicating this research, Ruser and Smith (1991) used a measure 
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of inspection probability based on the average inspection frequency for 
similar ﬁrms to estimate the deterrent effect. On the basis of this analy-
sis, they concluded that: “there is virtually no evidence of a deterrence 
effect” (p. 231).
Interestingly, recent plant-level studies, which use explicit before-
and-after comparisons of the same ﬁrms, provide evidence for a more 
sanguine assessment of direct regulation, Using a unique data set that 
allowed tracking of inspections and penalties for a large sample of in-
dividual ﬁrms over a seven year period, Scholz and Gray (1990) esti-
mated both the deterrence and abatement effects of OSHA enforcement 
activity. They found that a 10 percent increase in enforcement resulted 
in a 1 percent reduction in the accident rate, a much larger effect than 
detected in prior research, although one that the authors describe as 
“modest” (p. 302). This reduction was primarily due to a “deterrence” 
effect and, speciﬁcally, an increase in the probability of inspection, as 
opposed to an increase in the average penalty.9
Importantly, Scholz and Gray argue that their results indicate that 
economic models of occupational safety and health regulation, which 
assume that ﬁrms optimize when making safety and health choices, fail 
to account for the limited information processing capacity of manag-
ers.10 Due to their limited capacity, managers do not optimize, but often 
engage in “ﬁre-ﬁghting,” responding to problems as they become more 
signiﬁcant relative to other issues. As evidence, Scholz and Gray ﬁnd 
that an unexpected increase in the accident rate in one year will lead to 
a reduction in injuries in the next, and vice versa. In addition, they ﬁnd 
a lag between OSHA enforcement activity and a change in ﬁrm health 
and safety—a result that they claim is evidence of an organizational 
learning curve. Ruser (1985) obtained similar results.
Nonetheless, overall the extant evidence suggests that OSHA has, at 
best, resulted in a modest improvement in workplace health and safety 
in the U.S. However, advocates of direct regulation argue that these 
disappointing results are primarily due to difﬁdent administration and 
a lack of funding than to a fundamental ﬂaw in this type of regulatory 
regime. In particular, they point to two problems. First, the process of 
adopting permanent health and safety standards under OSHA is slow 
and cumbersome. Governed by the Federal Administrative Procedures 
Act, the law requires a Notice of Intended Rulemaking and a subsequent 
proposal, both of which must be published in the Federal Register. This 
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is followed by a Public Hearing and comment period where all inter-
ested parties are invited to submit comments, which the agency must 
consider before promulgating a standard.11 After they are issued, stan-
dards are subject to judicial review, and the Supreme Court has ruled 
that the agency must provide substantial evidence that the standard is 
based on a “signiﬁcant” risk. Second, agencies responsible for admin-
istering the Act are substantially underfunded, a problem exacerbated 
during the Reagan-Bush administrations. Dorman (1996, p. 193) notes 
that there are more ﬁsh and game wardens in the U.S. than occupational 
safety and health inspectors.
Critics have expressed greater apprehension over the impact of di-
rect regulation on economic productivity (Burton and Chelius 1997). 
There is a public perception, shared by some economists, that the pro-
liferation of industrial regulation in the 1960s, particularly with respect 
to occupational health and safety and environmental protection was 
responsible for anemic productivity growth since that time. Research 
is sparse, however. One study, estimating annual total factor productiv-
ity for 450 U.S. industries between 1958 and 1978, found that OSHA 
accounted for around 19 percent of the productivity slowdown of the 
1970s (Gray 1987). Viscusi (1996) has estimated the cost and beneﬁts 
of ﬁve OSHA regulations and found that for four of these, the costs of 
the regulation exceed the beneﬁts in terms of lives saved. However, 
Stone (1997) challenged Viscusi’s estimates, claiming he ignored other 
beneﬁts, such as the reduction in injuries and illnesses. His reanalysis 
of one of these regulations showed it was in fact efﬁcient, when these 
other beneﬁts were considered.
Nonetheless, if one assumes that the direct regulation of workplace 
safety is inefﬁcient public policy, then it is possible that direct regula-
tion could actually result in the deterioration of worker health. Keeney 
(1994) has argued that a reduction in disposable income due to these 
regulatory costs can lead to changes in spending on safety and health-
care more generally, greater stress due to job loss, and risky behavior 
such as increased alcohol and tobacco consumption.
Internal Responsibility System
A principal criticism of direct regulation is that it fails to recognize 
ﬁrm heterogeneity, so that standards appropriate for one ﬁrm are likely 
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to be inappropriate for another. In contrast, the internal responsibility 
system is highly adaptable to the particular circumstances of the ﬁrm 
and is ﬂexible so that it can respond relatively quickly to technological 
change. The design of safety “standards” is in the hands of the parties 
themselves—labor and management—who are intimately familiar with 
plant operation and who are therefore well placed to implement regula-
tory standards that are effective and efﬁcient. In addition, administra-
tive costs, which are principally borne by employers, at least initially, 
are relatively low. Enforcement is in the hands of the ﬁrm’s workforce 
so that the probability of detecting a violation will be high.
On the other hand, the success of the internal responsibility system 
is critically dependent on employee bargaining power. It is likely that 
internal responsibility is less effective in nonunion workplaces than in 
union ones. In addition, unions are political organizations that neces-
sarily respond to the preferences of their memberships. And safety and 
health are often given a relatively low priority by a rank and ﬁle that 
sometimes appears to be more interested in wages and job security. Fur-
thermore, the internal responsibility system can be used by employees 
to shirk legitimate work assignments or by labor unions as leverage in 
collective negotiations with employers. Finally, there are concerns that 
labor members may lack the expertise, particularly in the realm of oc-
cupational health, to either design effective standards or monitor ﬁrm 
compliance.
Unlike either direct regulation or general ﬁnancial incentives, there 
is little direct evidence on the efﬁcacy of the internal responsibility sys-
tem. Most of this research has examined joint health and safety com-
mittees (JHSCs) and much of it uses data on Canadian workplaces.12 
By and large, however, the Canadian studies either examine process 
issues or factors determining the relative effectiveness of JHSCs rather 
than the question of whether or not they reduce injury rates or otherwise 
improve worker health compared to workplaces without such commit-
tees. In addition, these studies often rely on subjective reports by the 
participants rather than objective evidence. Nevertheless, some useful 
information relevant to the question of the effectiveness of the internal 
responsibility system may be gleaned from this research.
For example, Shannon et al. (1992) ﬁnd that lower accident rates 
are found in ﬁrms where the JHSC includes a senior manager; where la-
bor members had access to professional expertise; and where the JHSC 
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had a broad mandate rather than a narrow one. Furthermore, Tuohy 
and Simard (1993) ﬁnd that JHSCs were more effective in reducing 
accident rates when the committee had an equal number of labor and 
management members and where there are well-established operating 
procedures. In other words, both studies indicate that JHSCs are more 
effective when employers give them greater resources and support.
Three studies directly examine the issue of whether JHSCs ame-
liorate workplace safety. Cooke and Gautschi (1981) combined OSHA 
administrative data with the results of a survey of 113 manufacturing 
ﬁrms in Maine to investigate, among other things, whether joint labor-
management safety programs affected ﬁrm injury rates. They obtained 
mixed results, which depended on ﬁrm size. Large ﬁrms with joint safe-
ty programs had lower injury rates than large ﬁrms that did not have a 
joint program. However, this result was statistically signiﬁcant only for 
ﬁrms with more than 300 employees and only at the 0.10 conﬁdence 
level. For small ﬁrms, the opposite result was found; ﬁrms with joint 
programs had higher injury rates. Boden et al. (1984) surveyed 290 
large (more than 500 employees) Massachusetts ﬁrms but failed to ﬁnd 
a relationship between the presence of a joint safety committee and 
workplace injury or illness rates. Importantly, both of these studies—
Cooke and Gautschi (1981) and Boden et al. (1984)—use cross-sec-
tional, rather than longitudinal data, and are, therefore, limited in their 
ability to address the question of whether there is a causal relationship 
between JHSCs and workplace safety.
On the other hand, the most careful examination of internal respon-
sibility found that the internal responsibility system generally and JH-
SCs in particular were associated with lower levels of workplace inju-
ries and illness (Lewchuk et al. 1996). This study used administrative 
data from the Ontario Workers’ Compensation Board supplemented 
with data from two surveys. The authors ﬁnd that both enactment of 
internal responsibility legislation and the introduction of JHSCs were 
negatively and signiﬁcantly related to the workplace injury rate. Spe-
ciﬁcally, they ﬁnd that JHSCs may reduce lost-time claims by as much 
as 18 percent relative to similarly situated ﬁrms without JHSCs. Impor-
tantly, they also ﬁnd that joint committees were more effective at reduc-
ing injury rates in unionized ﬁrms than in nonunion ﬁrms.
The latter results suggest that unions play an important role deter-
mining the effectiveness of JHSCs. Similarly, Weil (1991, 1992) has 
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argued that unions improve the effectiveness of direct regulation. Us-
ing 1985 OSHA data from the United States, he has shown that unions 
increase inspection probability; inspection intensity, as measured by the 
duration of inspections per employee; and the scope of the inspection, 
i.e., whether or not the inspection resulted in a physical examination 
of the workplace. Weil also found that unions increased the number of 
citations as well as the severity of the penalties. These results suggest 
that there may be a synergy between direct regulation and internal re-
sponsibility, at least for unionized workplaces.
On the other hand, critics cite anecdotal evidence that shows that 
unions use regulatory agencies and, in particular, occupational safety 
and health agencies to enhance their power in organizing campaigns 
and in collective bargaining (Northrup 1997). JHSCs would seem to 
offer similar opportunities for unions to enhance their organizing and 
collective bargaining outcomes. However, Schurman et al. (1998) note 
that complaint-based inspections in unionized ﬁrms result in a higher 
percentage of violations than similar inspections in nonunion ﬁrms and 
argue that this contradicts an interpretation that unions use safety regu-
lation to gain organizing and bargaining advantage.
Hebdon and Hyatt (1998) present conﬂicting evidence with respect 
to this issue. They use Ontario data to examine factors inﬂuencing the 
probability of a refusal to do unsafe work or the probability of a health 
and safety complaint. In general, they found that while the probability 
of both events was higher where there is a contentious industrial rela-
tions environment, they found no evidence of concerted harassment of 
employers during collective negotiations.
More generally, we might expect that unionization could lead to 
more optimal health and safety conditions. Workplace health and safety 
has characteristics of a public good in that consumption is neither rival 
nor excludable.13 In addition, free rider problems may prevent unorga-
nized workers from negotiating the optimal provision of safety condi-
tions by the employer. That is, workers will be individually reluctant 
to reveal preferences because they fear that they will pay the full cost 
of safety. Employers must therefore rely on information gleaned from 
the labor market. However, such information necessarily reﬂects the 
preferences of workers who are very different than the average worker; 
these marginal workers are younger and are less likely to have family 
responsibilities. Among other things, marginal workers are likely to be 
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less concerned about workplace hazards and should be less willing to 
trade off wages for increased safety.
On the other hand, unions, which are democratic political organiza-
tions, are more likely to reﬂect the preferences of the average workers. 
In fact there is some evidence that unions in fact respond to the safety 
objectives of more senior workers while management is more likely 
to be inﬂuenced by the preferences of marginal workers (Kahn 1987; 
1990).
General Financial Incentives
Both direct regulation and internal responsibility attempt to regulate 
the safety process, imposing sanctions on employer behaviors thought 
to affect the accident rate. In contrast, a regime using general ﬁnan-
cial incentives regulates safety outcomes, imposing sanctions based on 
employer performance with respect to results-based workplace safety 
measures. One proposal for general ﬁnancial incentives is the injury 
tax, whereby the government imposes a monetary penalty for each 
work-related injury or illness (Smith 1974). A more prosaic form of 
general ﬁnancial incentives is experience-rated workers’ compensa-
tion insurance, as discussed in the previous section, whereby the ﬁrm’s 
compensation assessment is based, wholly or partially on its accident 
experience.
Like the internal responsibility system, a system of general ﬁnancial 
incentives imposes no speciﬁc requirement vis-à-vis ﬁrm health and 
safety practices, allowing ﬁrms to select the most appropriate means 
for attaining its safety goals. Furthermore, under a system of general 
ﬁnancial incentives, administrative costs will be lower than those in-
curred under either direct regulation or the internal responsibility sys-
tem. However, because experience-rating adjustments to workers’ com-
pensation assessments are based on the ﬁrm’s claim experience rather 
than its accident experience, experience rating provides employers with 
incentives to engage in claims management as well as accident preven-
tion. Claims management includes a number of less than desirable prac-
tices, including retaliation against workers who initiate compensation 
claims and legal challenges to legitimate claims by injured workers. In 
addition, for actuarial reasons, true experience rating is not feasible for 
small ﬁrms.
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There is substantial research investigating the impact of experience 
rating on the frequency and severity of work accidents. In general, these 
studies have found considerable evidence that experience rating is as-
sociated with lower injury rates, although there are a few exceptions 
(Hyatt and Thomason 1998). However, research that fails to ﬁnd the ex-
pected effect is, in general, methodologically weaker than studies that 
do (Hyatt and Thomason 1998). Studies investigating injury severity 
have generally produced mixed results. There are two possible explana-
tions for the disappointing results with respect to injury severity: either 
employers have less ability to affect severity than the incidence of in-
juries or the effects of experience rating on incidence overwhelm the 
severity effect. That is, on the margin, experience rating induces em-
ployers to reduce the frequency of less severe injuries. In either event, 
severity studies are generally less informative and will not be reviewed 
here. However, a brief review of injury rate research follows.
Research examining the impact of experience rating on workplace 
safety, most of which uses U.S. data, falls into one of three categories. 
The earliest studies exploited the fact that U.S. experience-rating for-
mulae are different for large and small ﬁrms, so that large ﬁrms are 
more likely to be experience rated and are more extensively experi-
ence rated than small ﬁrms. Since a difference in injury rates between 
large and small ﬁrms could be ascribed to ﬁrm size effects unrelated 
to experience rating—such as, scale economies in accident prevention 
efforts—these studies examined the relationship between beneﬁt gener-
osity and accident rate. As indicated previously, empirical research con-
clusively demonstrated work injuries are positively related to beneﬁt 
levels. However, if experience-rating induces ﬁrms to improve work-
place safety, then this relationship should be attenuated in large ﬁrms 
relative to small ones. That is, as beneﬁt levels become more generous, 
experience rated ﬁrms will increase their safety investment, partially 
offsetting the increased level of injuries resulting from worker moral 
hazard. Several studies found this hypothesized relationship (Ruser 
1985; Butler and Worrall 1988; Ruser 1991); only one failed to do so 
(Chelius and Smith 1983).
As indicated, the positive relationship between beneﬁt levels and 
the work injury rate is primarily attributable to a reporting effect; work-
ers are more likely to report an injury when beneﬁt levels are high than 
when they are low. It is unlikely that fatal claims are subject to this 
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reporting phenomenon, so that the relationship between beneﬁt levels 
and fatal injury probability should more accurately reﬂect the impact of 
beneﬁts on employer behavior. Four studies have examined this rela-
tionship, and three found that the incidence of fatal injuries was nega-
tively associated with higher beneﬁt levels, as expected if experience 
rating has safety-enhancing effects (Moore and Viscusi 1989; Ruser 
1991; and Durbin and Butler 1998). Only Butler (1983) failed to ﬁnd 
the hypothesized negative relationship.
Several studies have taken advantages of “natural experiments” to 
compare injury rates before and after the implementation of an experi-
ence rating program. Chelius and Kavanaugh (1988) examined inju-
ry rates of two New Jersey colleges before and after they elected to 
self-insure and ceased to be covered by private compensation insur-
ance.14 Chelius and Smith (1993) compared occupational injury rates 
for small ﬁrms in Washington, which gives experience-rated discounts 
to these ﬁrms, with injury rates for small ﬁrms in states that do not 
offer these workers’ compensation claim rates in Ontario and British 
Columbia, respectively, before and after the introduction of experience 
rating in those provinces. Shields et al. (1997) explored the effect of 
the implementation of “large-deductible” compensation insurance poli-
cies—where insured ﬁrms are responsible for the ﬁrst several thousand 
dollars of compensation costs—in Texas. Finally, Durbin and Butler 
(1998) used state-level U.S. data to investigate the effects of both large 
and small deductible policies as well as a rule change that lowered eligi-
bility criteria for experience rating.15 With the sole exception of Chelius 
and Smith (1993), these experiments found that experience rating was 
associated with lower injury rates.
Out of 14 studies reviewed here, 11 found evidence that experience 
rating results in an amelioration of workplace health and safety. This 
evidence was produced by research that is remarkably mixed with re-
spect to both data sources and methodology. And, as indicated, a careful 
examination reveals that studies failing to detect this relationship were 
methodologically weaker than those that did. Taken as a whole the evi-
dence is quite compelling: experience rating works.
However, as Hyatt and Thomason (1998) point out, the leap from 
the observation that experience rating is associated with lower injury or 
claims rates to the conclusion that experience rate enhances ﬁrm safety 
is short, but perilous. Experience rating may lead to increased claims 
Roberts.indb   26 6/7/2005   9:27:25 AM
Economic Incentives and Workplace Safety  27
management by employers, who ﬁle claims, as well as pro-active staff-
ing practices designed to screen job applicants likely to ﬁle a workers’ 
compensation claim. This has the effect of reducing injury reporting, 
while leaving workplace hazards undisturbed. Two studies show expe-
rience rating increases employers claims management activity.
Examining a large set of administrative records from Ontario, Hyatt 
and Kralj (1995) found that experience-rated employers were signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to appeal claims than non-experience rated employ-
ers, and that the likelihood of an appeal for experience-rated employers 
increased as a function of the ﬁnancial incentives that they faced. Kralj 
(1994) analyzed a small survey of Ontario employers in which manag-
ers were asked to report their impressions of the effects of experience 
rating on their behavior, i.e., changes in accident prevention and claims 
management practices resulting from experience rating. He found that 
while both prevention and claims management behaviors increased, 
experience rating had a greater impact on accident prevention efforts. 
Thus, while it is clear that experience rating leads to more intensive 
claims management efforts, this is not the only effect. Furthermore, 
claims management is not an unalloyed evil. The denial of fraudulent 
claims is both equitable and efﬁcient, and there is evidence indicating 
that a prompt return to work leads to more successful rehabilitation.
Using a survey data set consisting of over 450 Quebec manufactur-
ers, Thomason and Pozzebon (2002) examined the estimated relation-
ship between experience rating and a wide range of ﬁrm health and 
safety and claims management practices. These practices included, for 
example, the amount of health and safety training provided to workers, 
the extent to which the ﬁrm disputed workers’ compensation claims, 
the number of in-house personnel devoted to claims management or 
accident prevention activities, and ﬁrm expenditures on personal pro-
tective equipment. They found that experience-rated ﬁrms were both 
more likely to engage in more aggressive claims management and to 
make greater effort to increase workplace health and safety. Interest-
ingly, however, the evidence also suggested that high wage ﬁrms are 
more likely to reduce workers’ compensation claim costs by increasing 
their accident prevention efforts (relative to their claims management 
efforts) than low wage ﬁrms. This result implies that there may be a 
“high road” and a “low road” response to experience rating.
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CONCLUSIONS
The past 20 years have seen a substantial accumulation of knowl-
edge concerning the effects of various policy options, although much is 
left to be learned. It is by no means certain that policy makers have fully 
taken advantage of this knowledge or that they have developed a co-
herent policy with respect to occupational health and safety problems. 
Rather, policy has developed in a piecemeal fashion as jurisdictions 
have experimented with various approaches to these problems.
Until recently, these approaches tended to emphasize direct regu-
lation and, more recently, internal responsibility; general ﬁnancial in-
centives are little used. Workers’ compensation programs have only 
recently introduced experience rating to the assessment process, and 
in most provinces in Canada, there are restrictions on its application, 
which substantially limit its effectiveness. For example, in British Co-
lumbia the experience rating adjustment is limited to 30 percent of the 
base assessment rate.
However, considerable evidence indicates that general ﬁnancial in-
centives are effective in reducing accident rates. Moreover, experience-
rating does not share many of the problems associated with the other 
two approaches. In addition, both the costs of direct regulation and its 
apparent limited effectiveness call into question whether a broad appli-
cation of direct regulation is appropriate.
Nonetheless, general ﬁnancial incentives, particularly in the form 
of experience-rated compensation assessments, are not a panacea. Two 
problems may be identiﬁed. First, because accidents are, by deﬁnition, 
random events, general ﬁnancial incentives are not easily applied to 
small ﬁrms—the small ﬁrm’s experience is not necessarily indicative 
of its underlying safety. Second, due to the long latency of many oc-
cupational diseases, it is difﬁcult to assign responsibility to a particular 
employer. Finally, direct ﬁnancial incentives assume that ﬁrms engage 
in an optimizing cost-beneﬁt calculus, but the evidence suggests that 
limited information processing capacity may lead managers to satisﬁce. 
Under these circumstances, direct regulation could provide a needed 
shock to focus managerial attention on safety and health problems.
While this implies a continued role for direct regulation, it also 
suggests a more limited and targeted approach. More speciﬁcally, due 
to the high costs of direct regulation, the resources required by this 
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option should be directed at high-risk industries. This would include, 
in particular those in which there are numerous small ﬁrms, such as 
construction and those in which there is a relatively high probability 
of catastrophe—that is, an accident in which there is signiﬁcant loss of 
life—such as underground mining. In addition, these resources should 
also be directed to the problem of long latency occupational disease, 
where it is unlikely that general ﬁnancial incentives will be effective. 
This includes funding research that would investigate the relationship 
between occupational exposures and subsequent disease development 
as well as funding for monitoring workplace exposure.
Key Messages
• Much has been learned in the last two decades regarding effec-
tive policies to reduce disabling injury at work.
• Both direct regulation and internal responsibility have been wide-
ly used in Canada, whereas general ﬁnancial incentives recently 
have become more pervasive as they are in the United States.
• Financial incentives do appear effective in reaching injury rates 
whereas the limited effectiveness of direct regulation raises ques-
tions about its value except where it may be targeted at high-risk 
individuals and longer-latency occupational disease exposures.
• General ﬁnancial incentives are limited in their value for small 
ﬁrms.
• A stronger role for workplace exposure surveillance is necessary. 
Notes
 This chapter reprinted by permission. See Thomason (2003).
 1.  Accident prevention costs are manifested in higher production costs and lost 
productivity, which means that there are fewer goods and services including, for 
example, medical and rehabilitation services for those claimants who are injured 
or become ill due to a workplace accident or exposure.
 2.  The $10,000 ﬁgure for accident costs subsumes an evaluation of the monetary 
value for intangibles such as pain and suffering.
 3.  This example assumes that workers are risk neutral, i.e., they are indifferent be-
Roberts.indb   29 6/7/2005   9:27:26 AM
30  Thomason
tween income that will be paid with certainty (such as the wage income available 
from safe employers, where there is no risk of injury) and income that is uncer-
tain (such as the wage income paid by hazardous employers, where there is a 10 
percent chance that the worker will lose wage income due to a work accident). If 
the worker is risk averse, as is generally thought to be the case, then the worker 
would demand a salary higher than $41,000 to compensate him or her for the 
additional risk incurred by working for a hazardous employer.
 4.  It is important to note that workers will continue to have an incentive to avoid 
workplace accidents and illnesses even if the wage is fully compensating, i.e., if 
it compensates workers for all of the expected cost of injury. This is because the 
worker will continue to incur costs if an accident occurs, unless he or she is able 
to purchase insurance that covers those costs.
 5.  Interestingly, one of the few studies that failed to ﬁnd this relationship used a 
Canadian data set (Martinello and Meng 1992).
 6.  It is not feasible to experience rate small ﬁrms, i.e., ﬁrms with only a few em-
ployees. Because work accidents are random events and because their employ-
ment base is small, the number of accidents does not provide a reliable estimate 
of the underlying risk of injury.
 7.  It is also possible that Occupational Health and Safety regulations could attempt 
to inﬂuence the behavior of employees, although none of the existing regulatory 
models contemplates this.
 8.  Alternatively, sanctions raise the costs of not engaging in accident prevention.
 9.  Scholz and Gray also used their data set to replicate prior research in order to de-
termine reasons for the discrepancy between their results and the results of these 
earlier analyses. They concluded that Smith (1979) and McCaffrey (1983) failed 
to ﬁnd signiﬁcant abatement effects because they had not accounted for long-
term enforcement effects. Smaller deterrence effects found by Viscusi (1986) 
were attributed to sample differences. Speciﬁcally, the Scholz and Gray sample 
contained plants that were larger, more dangerous, and more heavily inspected 
than the average manufacturing plant examined by Viscusi. Scholz and Gray 
hypothesized that the plants in their sample were more amenable to the ameliora-
tive effects of OSHA enforcement than the average plant.
 10.  The phrase “limited information processing capacity” is not meant to apply only 
to the abilities (or limitations) of managers. Rather it refers to limitations that 
constrain us all (including university professors).
 11.  For example, Meisenhelter (1991) notes that a period of six years elapsed be-
tween OSHA’s initial work on a Hazards Communication standard — similar 
to WHMIS — before it was ﬁnally issued in November 1983. Over 200 written 
comments were submitted totaling over 12,000 pages. There were 19 days of 
hearings, which produced 4,250 pages of transcripts.
 12.  A literature search uncovered only two studies examining the effect of an aspect 
of internal responsibility other than JHSCs on workplace safety. Lanoie (1992) 
estimated the impact of refusals to do unsafe work in Quebec, using industry 
aggregate data. He failed to ﬁnd a relationship between the number of refusals 
per employee and the lost-time injury rate. However, Lanoie’s data show that 
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refusals are negatively related to injury severity, although this relationship is 
only marginally signiﬁcant in two of his four speciﬁcations and statistically not 
different to zero in the other two. On the other hand, Cousineau et al. (1995), who 
also used Quebec data, found that refusals were positively related to one type 
of injury (“struck by or striking against”) thought to be particularly susceptible 
to safety regulation, while negatively related to two other types (“caught in or 
between” and “falls or slips”). However, the latter two relationships were not 
statistically signiﬁcant.
 13.  A rival good is one that may be consumed by one and only one person. If it is 
possible to prevent the consumption of a good, it is excludable. A candy bar is a 
good that is both rival and excludable, while, clean air is both nonrival and non-
excludable. These distinctions are important because it is generally thought that 
a private market is perfectly capable of efﬁciently providing rival and excludable 
goods, but not goods that are nonrival and nonexcludable.
 14.  Firms that self insure, an option available in most U.S. states for ﬁrms that meet 
certain ﬁscal requirements, are, by deﬁnition, perfectly experience-rated.
 15.  In most U.S. states, there is a minimum payroll requirement that a ﬁrm must 
satisfy in order to become experience rated.
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Workers’ compensation is the primary form of ﬁnancial support 
available to people who are injured or become ill as a result of their em-
ployment. In 2001, workers and their medical care providers received 
$49.4 billion in workers’ compensation payments, and employers paid 
out $59.2 billion (NASI 2003). By covering medical costs and replac-
ing lost earnings, workers’ compensation can minimize the economic 
impact of workplace injuries and illnesses, although other impacts will 
remain. 
The designers of workers’ compensation programs did not intend 
for nonmonetary losses to be covered. Workers lost the right to receive 
payments for “pain and suffering” in the quid pro quo in which they 
were required to give up their ability to sue negligent employers in 
exchange for workers’ compensation beneﬁts that were provided on a 
no-fault basis. But, presumably, they did intend for lost earnings to be 
covered, although the question of how much of the lost earnings should 
be covered by workers’ compensation beneﬁts remains an unsettled is-
sue. While beneﬁt adequacy is a central goal of workers’ compensa-
tion, other goals often come into conﬂict with adequacy. These include 
high workers’ compensation costs to employers, concerns about worker 
fraud, and excessive time off work. Responses to these perceived prob-
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lems include reducing cash beneﬁts and limiting eligibility for workers’ 
compensation beneﬁts. 
This pattern was particularly evident during the 1990s, when more 
than half the states modiﬁed their workers’ compensation laws. During 
that period, many of the laws that were passed were designed to reduce 
employers’ costs by either reducing beneﬁts or limiting the number of 
claims ﬁled (Burton and Spieler 2001; Boden and Ruser 2003). 
Traditionally, workers’ compensation systems have required employ-
ers to pay beneﬁts to workers whose injuries or illnesses “arise out of and 
in the course of employment.” Other contributing factors, like preexist-
ing medical conditions, the aging process, and workers’ lifestyles may 
have contributed to work-related disabilities, but this did not in principle 
prevent workers from receiving beneﬁts. Laws passed in the 1990s limit 
the compensability of conditions that are not solely caused by workplace 
risks. They do so by creating a number of new requirements for receiving 
beneﬁts. These include requiring that work be a major or predominant 
cause of the disability or eliminating compensation for the aggravation 
of a preexisting condition or for a condition related to the aging process. 
Other restrictive laws allow workers to demonstrate disability only by us-
ing objective medical evidence. These new laws can make it much more 
difﬁcult to receive compensation for chronic musculoskeletal disorders, 
including carpal tunnel disease, noise-induced hearing loss, and most 
back injuries. Thomason and Burton (2001) estimate that such legislation 
enacted by Oregon in the late 1980s and early 1990s reduced beneﬁts for 
workers and costs for employers by about 20 to 25 percent below what 
the amounts would have been if the laws had not been enacted. Finally, 
during the 1990s at least 22 states passed workers’ compensation an-
tifraud laws. Following passage, some states began aggressive public 
campaigns threatening criminal sanctions for workers who ﬁled fraudu-
lent claims. These campaigns sent the message that it was dangerous to 
ﬁle a claim, that the authorities would be checking up on you, and that 
perhaps it was safer, even for truly injured workers, not to ﬁle. 
In addition to limiting access to beneﬁts, several states reduced 
beneﬁt payments in the 1990s. Some reduced the weekly beneﬁt paid 
(for example Connecticut and Massachusetts), while others reduced the 
maximum number of weeks that could be paid, even for workers with 
permanent disabilities.  
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The issue of beneﬁt adequacy was not addressed in any of these 
cases. Legislators did not even have access to data on beneﬁt adequacy. 
In fact, virtually the only quantiﬁed policy parameters available to leg-
islators were cost-related: incurred beneﬁts per claim, claim frequency, 
changes in costs and frequency, overall costs, premium rates, insurer 
ﬁnancial data, and so on. Weekly beneﬁt payment parameters and ben-
eﬁt payment data were available, but nobody could relate them to the 
adequacy of beneﬁts, since losses incurred by injured workers were un-
known. 
In the research presented in this paper, we describe the kind of 
data that would allow an informed discussion of beneﬁt adequacy as a 
system goal and of the trade-offs between adequacy and cost. We ﬁrst 
explain the measure of adequacy we use. This is followed by a brief 
review of empirical studies of adequacy from 1950 through the 1980s. 
Based on research completed in the last ﬁve years, we bring together 
what we currently know about the adequacy of workers’ compensa-
tion cash beneﬁts in the small number of states that have been studied. 
Finally, we discuss the implications of research to date for a workers’ 
compensation research and policy agenda. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF WORK-RELATED DISABILITY
For the year 2002, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 
about 5,500 deaths1 and 5,000,000 occupational injuries and illnesses2 
in the private sector. These numbers are substantial, but a growing num-
ber of studies indicate that they greatly underestimate the true extent of 
the problem because many workplace injuries go unreported (Biddle et 
al. 1998; Morse et al. 1998; Morse et al. 2001; Azaroff, Levenstein, and 
Wegman 2002). Even in the face of substantial underreporting, the total 
economic costs of occupational illness and injury have been estimated 
to rival those of cancer and heart disease (Leigh et al. 1997, 2000). 
These illnesses and injuries also have important noneconomic effects 
on quality of life. Physical and psychological functioning in everyday 
activities can be affected, self-esteem and self-conﬁdence reduced, fam-
ily relationships stressed (Morse et al. 1998; Keogh et al. 2000; Pransky 
et al. 2000; Strunin and Boden 2004). Although we do not address these 
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nonmarket effects of workplace injuries, they may well be as important 
as the effects on earnings. 
THE NATURE OF WORK-RELATED EARNINGS LOSSES 
Many workplace injuries are minor and result in little or no time lost 
from work. For these injuries, no lost earnings result. Workers may lose 
a little time from the job to receive ﬁrst aid, but this does not affect their 
wages. For other injuries, workers may need more substantial medical 
treatment and may incur functional limitations that do not allow them to 
return to their regular work immediately. These limitations may cause 
them to stay home or may require restrictions on the tasks that they can 
perform at work. The interaction of these functional limitations, work-
ers’ skills, and job demands can lead to time lost from work or to work 
limitations that result in reduced wages. These consequences of work-
place injuries can last a few days, but they can also last a lifetime. 
The factors that affect injury-related losses are not conﬁned to the 
medical consequences of injuries. Labor market and other behavioral 
factors can affect the amount of earnings lost. Economists have focused 
on the incentive effects of workers’ compensation beneﬁts on how 
quickly workers return to employment (for example Meyer, Viscusi, 
and Durbin 1995), but these are not the only behavioral factors in opera-
tion. Friction between workers and employers over the amount of ben-
eﬁt payments, disputes about readiness to return to work, and employer 
concerns about fraudulent claims can result in the employer’s refusal 
to offer a job or a worker’s refusal to return to the at-injury workplace. 
Any of these can cause lost earnings to be considerably higher than 
necessitated by the physical consequences of the injury as a result of 
increased job search time and the loss of job-speciﬁc human capital. 
When employees cannot work for a long time, their employers may 
ﬁnd it too costly to continue to hold their jobs open and, as a result, 
may replace them. The resulting job loss also can substantially increase 
overall lost earnings. In addition, future potential employers may view 
a long period off work or a workers’ compensation injury as a negative 
signal about the worker, thus reducing future job opportunities.  
This combination of functional limitations and labor market behav-
ior leads to lost earnings that may persist for many years. This is the 
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context in which workers’ compensation systems provide beneﬁts that 
replace part of workers’ lost earnings. 
DEFINING BENEFIT ADEQUACY 
As a social insurance program, workers’ compensation is supposed 
to cushion the ﬁnancial impact of injuries on workers and their families. 
In principle, this means that cash beneﬁts should cover much of the 
losses workers would otherwise incur. Beneﬁt adequacy can thus be 
measured by the extent to which losses are replaced. The replacement 
rate—beneﬁts received as a proportion of pretax losses—is thus the 
fundamental measure of beneﬁt adequacy in this program.3  
If we accept the replacement rate as a measure of adequacy, the 
question of what replacement rate is adequate immediately follows. 
There is no obvious answer to this question. One approach is to make 
the worker whole by covering all ﬁnancial losses. Under this approach, 
adequate beneﬁts would be 100 percent of after-tax losses net of job-re-
lated expenses plus any loss of fringe beneﬁts and any earnings lost by 
other family members because of the injury. This would leave the work-
er ﬁnancially as well off as if the injury had not occurred. In addition, 
high beneﬁts would increase employer incentives to control workplace 
hazards. However, there are a number of reasons to consider lower re-
placement rates. First, providing full replacement reduces the incentive 
to return to work and thus may increase the overall costs of injuries. In 
addition, employers worry that the resulting high costs may affect their 
competitive position. Finally, although employers generally pay work-
ers’ compensation premiums, high premiums will reduce the demand 
for labor and may lead to lower wages. In this sense, workers pay for 
a part—possibly a large part—of the cost of workers’ compensation 
insurance in the form of lower wages (Leigh et al. 2000, pp. 175–179). 
At a high enough beneﬁt level, they might prefer to take higher wages 
rather than increased beneﬁts. As in other forms of insurance, workers 
might be willing to trade incomplete coverage for a lower premium.
There is no theoretical justiﬁcation for a speciﬁc adequacy bench-
mark, but we have chosen two-thirds of pretax earnings as our measure. 
We justify it largely for historical reasons. Most states pay temporary 
total disability (TTD) beneﬁts at two-thirds of preinjury earnings up to 
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a maximum weekly amount, an indication of substantial agreement.4 
This is also the standard used by the 1972 National Commission on 
State Workmen’s Compensation Laws for temporary total and per-
manent total disability beneﬁts. Although there is no similar explicit 
standard for permanent partial disability (PPD) beneﬁts, Berkowitz and 
Burton (1987) and Hunt (2004) suggest using the two-thirds standard 
for these beneﬁts as well. In addition, greater coverage of small losses 
than of large losses is not generally an efﬁcient use of insurance. So if 
two-thirds replacement is the standard for temporary disability, it is dif-
ﬁcult to justify a lower standard for PPD. 
Given these considerations, we will use two-thirds of pretax lost 
earnings as a standard of adequacy. For ease and simplicity, we will not 
attempt to account for lost fringe beneﬁts (which would reduce the mea-
sure of adequacy) and expenses related to employment (which would 
increase it). 
MEASURING BENEFIT ADEQUACY
Measuring Losses
To measure the adequacy of cash beneﬁts, we use the replacement 
rate, the present value of beneﬁts paid divided by the present value of 
losses, both discounted to the date of injury.5 To measure wage replace-
ment, we need to measure injury-related lost earnings and compare the 
losses to workers’ compensation beneﬁts received. Although there are 
some practical difﬁculties in determining the amount of income beneﬁts 
paid, these difﬁculties pale in comparison to the effort required to mea-
sure lost earnings. 
Lost earnings are actual earnings minus what would have been 
earned if the injury had not occurred. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 adapted from 
Reville (1999), display a conceptual model of lost earnings. Before the 
injury, the worker’s earnings are observed. Figure 3.1 shows them at 
about $19,000 annually and increasing slowly through time. After the 
injury, the worker recovers at home or in the hospital. Earnings are zero 
until the worker begins work again. At that point, wages may return to 
the uninjured earnings path (indicated by the dashed line). This ﬁgure 
displays a TTD. Upon return to work, some people continue to work 
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fewer hours or at a lower rate of pay or experience more unemployment 
than would have been the case had the injury not occurred. Eventually, 
many recover to the preinjury earnings path, but others never do. In this 
case, workers have a permanent disability. This is shown in Figure 3.2, 
where injured earnings never reach the level of uninjured earnings. 
If we could observe uninjured earnings, then we could simply 
subtract them from injured earnings to determine lost earnings. This 
is represented by the shaded areas in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. However, 
a worker is either injured or uninjured at a moment in time. If we ob-
serve somebody’s injured earnings, we cannot observe their uninjured 
earnings. So we must ﬁnd a way to estimate uninjured earnings from 
another source. 
Traditionally, workers’ compensation systems have used average 
preinjury earnings as the measure of uninjured earnings, assuming that 
the worker would have continued at the same level of earnings absent 
the injury. In the short run, this is probably a good assumption. But 
in the longer run, this assumption is less likely to hold. On average, 
Figure 3.1  A Conceptual Model of Temporary Injury-Related Losses
SOURCE: Adapted from Reville (1999).
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for example, most workers’ earnings rise as they get older, peaking at 
age 45–50, then declining, with a sharp decline at retirement, which, 
for many, is age 65. The age-earnings proﬁle differs depending on a 
number of factors, including education. The earnings of more-educat-
ed people tend to be higher and peak later in life. One implication is 
that, for workers with permanent disabilities, using preinjury earnings 
might underestimate losses for young workers and overestimate them 
for workers over 50. 
An alternative is to estimate uninjured earnings of injured workers 
by ﬁnding workers who are similar to the injured workers in all other 
respects but who were not injured. If we can identify uninjured work-
ers who have the same personal, job, and employer characteristics, the 
same wage and job histories over the year before the injury, and so on, 
then it is reasonable to think that their average (uninjured) earnings will 
be close to the average uninjured earnings of their injured counterparts. 
Figure 3.2  A Conceptual Model of Permanent Injury-Related Losses
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Figure 3.2 A Conceptual Model of Permanent Injury-Related Losses
SOURCE: Adapted from Reville (1999).
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This can also be tested by examining whether the uninjured earnings of 
the two groups before the match period are the same.
Two approaches have been used to estimate uninjured earnings: 
matching and regression. The matching approach uses a comparison 
group of uninjured workers and matches each injured worker to one 
or more uninjured workers with similar relevant characteristics in the 
immediate preinjury period. In the research discussed below, up to ﬁve 
uninjured workers are matched to speciﬁc injured workers if they were 
employed in the same workplace at the time of injury and, in addition, 
had wages in each of the four preinjury quarters within 10 percent of 
the injured worker. Even though we wouldn’t expect this to be true in 
every case, statisticians have shown that, under reasonable conditions, 
average uninjured earnings of the two groups should be identical. The 
most important of these is that comparison workers must be chosen so 
that all factors that affect both the probability of injury and earnings are 
accounted for. 
Under these conditions, the average earnings of uninjured workers 
matched to a speciﬁc injured worker provide an estimate of what the 
injured worker’s earnings would have been in the absence of injury. In 
each observed postinjury period, this estimate of uninjured earnings is 
subtracted from the actual wages of the injured worker. This difference 
produces an estimate of the injured worker’s losses for each period.6 
These estimated losses are then averaged for all injured workers over all 
observed postinjury periods to obtain an estimate of average losses. 
The other currently used statistical approach to measuring losses, 
the regression approach, doesn’t try to match individual injured and 
comparison workers. Instead, it uses statistical regression techniques 
to generate models of average earnings over time for uninjured work-
ers with speciﬁc individual, job, and employer characteristics. It then 
applies these models to injured workers with the same characteristics, 
generating estimated uninjured earnings for those workers. This is sim-
ilar to generating age-earnings proﬁles for workers with given char-
acteristics. As with the matching method, the difference between the 
postinjury earnings of injured workers and their estimated uninjured 
earnings estimates their wage losses. These losses are then averaged for 
all workers to obtain a measure of average wage losses. 
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Measuring Beneﬁts
Measuring beneﬁts is generally easier than measuring losses, as 
in many states insurers and self-insured employers report beneﬁt pay-
ments to state agencies. Beneﬁt payments typically are reported by type 
of beneﬁt (medical, temporary disability, PPD, and so on). However, 
cases involving disputed beneﬁts often are resolved by settlements in 
which the parties agree to a speciﬁed amount as full and ﬁnal payment 
of all beneﬁts. As such, these settlements often include not only pay-
ments to cover lost wages but also to account for future medical costs 
and possibly other factors as well. Typically, settlements do not distin-
guish among types of beneﬁts, so we cannot tell how much is being paid 
to cover lost earnings. 
The approach in the research presented in this chapter allocates all 
settlements entirely to cash beneﬁts. For this reason, it overestimates 
both cash beneﬁts and the replacement rate. We believe that the bulk of 
settlement payments goes to cover lost earnings, but certainly not 100 
percent.  
THE PROBLEM OF UNDERREPORTING 
To this point, the discussion of adequacy has been based on estimat-
ing adequacy for injuries reported as lost-time workers’ compensation 
cases. However, there is growing evidence that many injured workers 
do not ﬁle workers’ compensation claims. Recent studies of ﬁling for 
physician-diagnosed upper-extremity musculoskeletal disorders sug-
gest that only in a small minority of cases did workers’ compensation 
cover these cases (Biddle et al. 1998; Morse et al. 1998; Morse et al. 
2001). Part of the reason for the low coverage rates for these cases is 
that employers and insurers may not believe that all of them are work-
related. However, even in the case of work-related ﬁnger amputations, 
an obviously work-related and reportable injury, Sorock, Smith, and 
Hall (1993) found that 12 of 134 patients entitled to workers’ compen-
sation beneﬁts were not paid from that source.7 
It could be argued that the amount of underreporting and the losses 
involved in unreported injuries should be taken into account in mea-
suring adequacy, since workers with injury-related losses who do not 
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receive cash beneﬁts have replacement rates of zero. So, for example, 
if a state’s replacement rate was 50 percent but workers with 40 percent 
of the losses received no beneﬁts, the true average replacement rate 
would be 30 percent. We do not have adequate information to know 
the proportion of losses that go uncompensated. As a consequence, we 
cannot estimate the extent to which underreporting affects average re-
placement rates. 
Although the amount of underreporting is related to the generosity 
of beneﬁts, from a policy perspective the question of how to design the 
beneﬁt structure is distinct from that of how to insure that all eligible 
workers receive the beneﬁts to which they are entitled. Thus, it might 
be better to view the estimates we calculate as measures of how well a 
workers’ compensation system serves those who participate in it. 
EARLIER STUDIES OF ADEQUACY
The study of workers’ compensation beneﬁt adequacy using claim-
level data began with the publication of a study of California workplace 
injuries that occurred in the 1950s. In this study, Cheit (1961) derived 
hypothetical postinjury uninjured earnings by adjusting preinjury earn-
ings by changes in the general level of wages and by changes in earn-
ings related to age. He concluded that more than half these workers 
received permanent disability beneﬁts without any permanent earnings 
losses.8 For workers who experienced permanent losses, however, PPD 
beneﬁts typically replaced only a small fraction. For workers with rat-
ings under 70 percent, he concluded that beneﬁts typically replaced 
less than 10 percent of losses. Beneﬁts covered 36 percent of losses for 
workers with the highest disability ratings.
Ginnold (1979) studied workers in Wisconsin who had an occupa-
tional injury in 1968 resulting in PPD beneﬁt payments. He measured 
expected earnings by adjusting average earnings of injured workers in 
the two years before injury by average changes in wages and prices for 
the economy as a whole. He further adjusted this by an “age-educa-
tion factor,” capturing how earnings change over a person’s working 
life. Five years after injury, Ginnold calculated that male workers in the 
group he studied still were losing an average of 16 percent of predicted 
earnings. Ginnold estimated that permanent disability beneﬁts averaged 
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either 16.4 percent or 24.6 percent of pretax lifetime earnings losses, 
depending on whether he used a 5 percent or a 10 percent discount rate, 
respectively. 
In a study of people injured at work during 1968 in Florida, Cali-
fornia, or Wisconsin, Berkowitz and Burton (1987) calculated expected 
earnings using the preinjury average earnings of injured workers as a 
base. They adjusted these preinjury earnings by a growth ratio derived 
from the earnings growth of workers who were injured in California 
in 1968 and who received permanent disability ratings between 1 and 
5 percent. This adjustment was based on the assumption that injured 
workers in the other states were similar to those in California and that 
workers in California with disability ratings less than 6 percent had no 
permanent loss of income after the healing period. Berkowitz and Bur-
ton measured income beneﬁts net of legal fees for 1968 through 1973. 
Discounted earnings losses estimated by Berkowitz and Burton for per-
manently disabling injuries averaged 8 percent of potential earnings in 
Wisconsin, 15 percent in Florida, and 18 percent in California. In this 
study, pretax replacement rates in Wisconsin averaged 75 percent. In 
Florida they averaged 59 percent, while in California they were only 
46 percent.
Replacement rates estimated by Berkowitz and Burton for perma-
nently disabling injuries for 1968 in Wisconsin are much higher than 
those derived by Ginnold. Average beneﬁts paid in the two studies are 
similar, but Ginnold calculated higher future earnings and thus higher 
earnings losses. The primary difference between the two estimates ap-
pears to be that Berkowitz and Burton focused only on the six years 
after the injury, while Ginnold projected earnings losses to the expected 
working life of the injured workers. The average age of injured workers 
is in the mid-30s, so the expected postinjury working life is about 30 
years. 
Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington (1979) measured income replace-
ment among workers with permanent impairment ratings of at least 10 
percent. These workers were injured between 1968 and 1970 in Califor-
nia, Florida, New York, Washington, or Wisconsin. The authors estimat-
ed expected earnings by adjusting preinjury earnings for inﬂation and for 
average productivity changes in the private sector. In 1975, ﬁve to seven 
years after injury, many of these workers still had substantial earnings 
losses. The authors then calculated after-tax replacement rates for the 
Roberts.indb   48 6/7/2005   9:27:31 AM
The Adequacy of Workers’ Compensation Cash Beneﬁts   49
year 1975, focusing on workers whose earnings losses were estimated 
to be at least $500. For this group, workers’ compensation replaced only 
9 percent of after-tax losses. For about one-third of the injured workers, 
the study estimated earnings losses in 1975 at less than $500, with losses 
averaging $45. This group received mean beneﬁts of $163. 
RECENT STUDIES OF ADEQUACY 
Methods
Beginning in the late 1990s, researchers began a series of studies 
of lost earnings and beneﬁt adequacy in California, New Mexico, Or-
egon, Washington, and Wisconsin. These studies are based on empirical 
estimates of injured workers’ lost earnings (Biddle 1998; Peterson et 
al. 1998; Boden and Galizzi 1999; Reville 1999; Reville et al. 2001). 
Studies in all these states provide estimates of the losses of workers re-
ceiving permanent disability beneﬁts or settlements. In addition, studies 
of Washington and Wisconsin also provide estimates of losses of work-
ers who received cash beneﬁts only for temporary disability beneﬁts 
(Biddle 1998; Boden and Galizzi 1999). 
All these recent studies use state workers’ compensation claims 
data linked to quarterly earnings data from the state agency responsible 
for administering unemployment insurance. This provides data on earn-
ings before and after the date of injury. Biddle (1998) and Boden and 
Galizzi (1999) use linear regression methods to estimate both injured 
and uninjured earnings. Their comparison groups are workers with mi-
nor injuries.9 To calculate uninjured earnings, Biddle uses workers with 
medical-only injuries (with either no lost time or less than 4 days lost 
time). Boden and Galizzi use injured workers who lost 8–10 days from 
work but who lacked permanent disability beneﬁts.10 Both studies apply 
these methods to all lost-time injuries and, in addition, separate injuries 
into groups by whether permanent disability beneﬁts were paid and, 
for claims involving only temporary disability, by the duration of dis-
ability. 
Using data from California, Peterson et al. (1998) and Reville 
(1999) were the ﬁrst to use matching methods to estimate injured work-
ers’ losses. Their comparison group consists of between one and ﬁve 
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uninjured workers at the same ﬁrm as the injured worker and with earn-
ings in the year before the injury within about 10 percent of the injured 
worker’s. A later study uses this matching method applied consistently 
to the ﬁve states for which there are now adequacy measures (Reville 
et al. 2001). In all these studies, the authors estimate losses only for 
cases involving permanent disability payments or settlements. 
The researchers in these studies acquired data on postinjury earn-
ings for periods ranging from 3½ to 9 years after injury. Even for the 
states with the longest period of postinjury earnings data, average losses 
continue to be substantial throughout the entire observed period. Figure 
3.3 shows the average actual earnings of workers with permanent dis-
ability claims in Oregon relative to the earnings of matched uninjured 
workers. The difference between uninjured earnings (represented by 
the horizontal line labeled “100 percent”) and actual earnings is the 
estimate of losses. In this ﬁgure, we can see that these losses remain ap-
proximately 20 percent of uninjured earnings for at least ﬁve years after 
injury. The long-term nature of these losses presents researchers with a 
dilemma. Because the vast majority of cash beneﬁts are paid within ﬁve 
years of injury, and losses continue long into the future, limiting esti-
mated losses to the observed period would signiﬁcantly underestimate 
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lifetime injury-related losses but not workers’ compensation beneﬁts. 
As a consequence, replacement rates would be overstated. On the other 
hand, many people would not be comfortable with the accuracy of loss-
es projected 30 years into the future (the average age at injury is about 
37). The results we report here are a compromise, with losses projected 
from the end of the observed period until 10 years after the injury. 
Beneﬁt Adequacy for All Lost-Time Cases
Studies of losses for all lost-time cases have been completed for 
only two states: Wisconsin and Washington. These two studies were 
done in the late 1990s and used regression methods. We have recalcu-
lated losses and beneﬁts for the Wisconsin and Washington regression 
studies, using assumptions equivalent to those used in the matching 
studies below.11 
Boden and Galizzi (1999) used regression methods to estimate 
losses and adequacy for workers injured in Wisconsin in 1989–1990. 
As shown in Table 3.1, for cases with only temporary disability beneﬁts 
paid, losses increase with duration of disability payments, with average 
losses reaching over $53,000 for men receiving more than 16 weeks 
of temporary disability beneﬁts. In fact, average losses for both men 
and women in this category exceeded losses in the permanent disability 
category. 
Boden and Galizzi found that estimated quarterly losses for injuries 
less than 6 weeks in duration were not signiﬁcantly different from zero 
after the ﬁrst two postinjury quarters, so they set later losses to zero. For 
some groups estimated losses were small and positive, while for others 
they were small and negative. If we did cumulate these small positive 
(but statistically insigniﬁcant) losses over 10 years, we substantially in-
crease estimates of total losses and reduce estimated replacement rates 
to about 10 percent for the groups with less than two months of TTD 
beneﬁt payments. It is possible that small long-term losses are a conse-
quence of averaging a very large proportion of cases with no losses with 
a small proportion of cases involving substantial long-term losses but 
for which beneﬁts were stopped after a short period. Researchers have 
not yet been able to determine if this is the case.12
On the other hand, many workers in Wisconsin who lose at least 
two months of work and who do not receive permanent disability pay-
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ments clearly have large and continuing losses. The relatively low aver-
age temporary disability payment suggests that these injured workers 
have losses that continue long past the termination of these beneﬁts. In 
terms of losses, they are in a similar position to workers who receive 
permanent disability beneﬁts, except they do not receive these addi-
tional beneﬁts. As a consequence, their beneﬁts are much less adequate 
than for permanent disability cases. 
Biddle (1998) carried out a similar study of workers in Washing-
ton State who had job-related injuries in 1993–1994. In this study, he 
Losses per injury ($) Replacement rate (%)
Men
(n=36,283)
Women
(n=18,026)
Men
(n=36,283)
Women
(n=18,026)
TTD beneﬁts only
8–10 days 704 483 67 68
11–14 days 1,098 888 60 51
2.1–4 weeks 1,541 991 69 74
4.1–8 weeks 2,899 1,935 74 75
8.1–16 weeks 24,118 16,372 16 17
16.1+ weeks 53,515 34,003 20 20
PPD beneﬁts and settlements
 (including TTD beneﬁts)
PPD beneﬁts 33,441 31,434 43 39
Compromise settlements 82,843 62,340 50 43
All claims 14,427 12,568 41 36
NOTE: Does not include lost fringe beneﬁts. For groups with more than 8 weeks of 
TTD, PPD, or compromise beneﬁts, losses are projected for 10 years. For other 
groups, loss calculations are limited to the quarter of injury and the next quarter. 
Real discount rate is 2.3%.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, updated from Boden and Galizzi (1999).
Table 3.1  Wisconsin Average Pretax Losses and Replacement Rates,
 by Beneﬁt Category, 1989–1990 Injuries (2003 $)
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provided estimates for losses and replacement rates for 3½ years after 
injury for temporary disability cases divided into groups by duration, 
as well as for PPD cases and settlements. For this chapter, we project 
Biddle’s initial results to 10 years postinjury, which are displayed in 
Table 3.2. As with our estimates for the Wisconsin data, we have cu-
mulated only two quarters of losses for people with, at most, 60 days 
(8½ weeks) of TTD. As in Wisconsin, this method indicates generally 
adequate replacement rates for the group with at most 60 days of TTD 
(with only one replacement rate below 50 percent).13 For people with 
disabilities lasting longer than 60 days, losses are very large and re-
placement rates are 30 percent or less. For permanent disability and 
settlement cases, replacement rates are about 40 percent. Injured work-
ers in Washington with at least 180 days of temporary disability beneﬁts 
do somewhat better than those with a shorter duration of payments, but 
they still do not do as well as those receiving permanent disability ben-
Table 3.2 Washington Average Pretax Losses and Replacement Rates, by 
Beneﬁt Category, 1993–1994 Injuries (2003 $)
Average pretax
wage loss ($)    Replacement rate (%)
Men Women Men Women
TTD beneﬁts only 
Less than 15 days 710 524 40 50
15–30 days 2–4 wk 1,765 1,179 56 76
31–60 days 4.1–8 wk 2,791 1,925 74 86
61–180 days 8.1 wk+ 36,672 30,874 14 13
More than 180 days 84,741 73,557 30 27
PPD beneﬁts and settlements 48,362 38,190 41 44
NOTE: Does not include lost fringe beneﬁts. For groups with more than 8 weeks of 
TTD, PPD, or compromise beneﬁts, losses are projected for 10 years. For other 
groups, loss calculations are limited to the quarter of injury and the next quarter. 
Real discount rate is 2.3%. Both wage losses and beneﬁts are observed for 3.5 years 
following the injury or illness. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, updated from Biddle (1998).
Roberts.indb   53 6/7/2005   9:27:42 AM
54  Boden, Reville, and Biddle
eﬁts or settlements. Overall, these results are similar to the Wisconsin 
results in Table 3.1.  
In both states, the data suggest that a substantial proportion of work-
ers with very long-term losses do not receive permanent disability ben-
eﬁts. These losses may occur because of labor market effects that persist 
long after full medical recovery from the injury. For example, workers 
who take months to recover from their injuries may lose their at-injury 
jobs and thereby lose their investments in skills and seniority at those 
jobs. This may cause long-term losses despite full medical recovery. If 
permanent disability beneﬁts are only paid for workers with incomplete 
recovery, these workers will not receive them. Another explanation for 
this ﬁnding is that some workers who are eligible for permanent disabil-
ity beneﬁts are not aware of their eligibility and that these beneﬁts are 
not paid voluntarily by the responsible employer or insurer. 
Beneﬁt Adequacy for Permanent Disability Cases
The most ambitious attempt to date to estimate lost earnings and 
workers’ compensation adequacy across several states has studied per-
manent disability cases in ﬁve states: California, New Mexico, Oregon, 
Washington, and Wisconsin. These estimates use matching methods as 
described above.14 Table 3.3 shows the characteristics of the samples 
used. Losses of 6,000–32,000 injured workers were analyzed, with 
an average of about four matched uninjured workers for each injured 
worker. Maximum follow-up time ranged from six years in New Mex-
ico and Washington to nine years in Wisconsin (the beginning of 1989 
through the end of 1997). 
We studied these ﬁve states because they had collected the neces-
sary data and were willing to share them with us. While there is no 
reason to think that these states are representative of all 50 states, there 
is substantial variation among the systems. Washington offers workers’ 
compensation insurance through its exclusive state fund, while Cali-
fornia and Oregon have competitive state funds, and New Mexico and 
Wisconsin have private insurers only. The states also have very differ-
ent beneﬁt payment levels, with California paying $1.58 per $100 of 
covered wages in 2001 compared with $1.68 in Washington, $0.88 in 
Oregon, $1.12 in Wisconsin, and $0.86 in New Mexico (NASI 2003). 
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These workers’ compensation systems also have different features 
that may affect the magnitude of lost earnings and, thereby, beneﬁt ad-
equacy. California’s system is known as one of the most litigious, with 
attorney representation in 75 percent of PPD cases and 30 percent of 
lost-time cases (CWCI 2003), and Wisconsin’s is recognized for its low 
rate of attorney involvement—only in 24 percent of PPD cases and 5 
percent of lost-time cases (authors’ calculation from 1989–1990 Wis-
consin workers’ compensation data). The other states’ litigation rates 
fall somewhere in the middle. Litigation may increase tensions between 
workers who feel they are being treated poorly and employers who feel 
that they are being taken advantage of. This may well inhibit recovery 
of earnings losses by making workers less interested in returning to the 
at-injury employer and employers less interested in taking back injured 
workers.  
In addition, several states have programs providing incentives to 
employers to hire disabled workers. Oregon offers its Employer-at-In-
jury Program, which assists time-of-injury employers with job modiﬁ-
cations and other costs of reemployment. Both Washington and Oregon 
have also instituted Preferred Worker Programs that offer subsidies to 
other employers to hire occupationally disabled workers. Wisconsin 
and Oregon have two-tier permanent disability beneﬁts that pay higher 
beneﬁts to workers who do not return to work at or close to the prein-
jury wage. These provide incentives to the at-injury employer to offer 
Table 3.3  Sample Characteristics from Five States, PPD Claims
State Injury years
Earnings 
years
Number 
of injured 
workers
Number of 
comparison 
workers
New Mexico 1994–1998 1993–1999 5,996 25,128
California 1993–1995 1991–1999 32,358 128,722
Washington 1993–1994 1990–1998 13,317 47,371
Oregon 1992–1993 1988–1998 14,082 56,773
Wisconsin 1989–1990 1988–1997 16,186 69,480
SOURCE: Reville et al. (2001).
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jobs to their injured employees. Finally, the Wisconsin law provides for 
penalties to employers who unreasonably refuse to hire injured work-
ers. 
Figure 3.4 shows the relative earnings of workers receiving perma-
nent disability beneﬁts in all ﬁve states over the ﬁve years after injury 
(with only four years of postinjury earnings available for Washington). 
In each of the ﬁve states, the general pattern is the same. There is a 
drop in earnings in quarters 1 and 2, and some recovery. However, the 
pattern differs across states. The initial drop in earnings is steepest in 
Wisconsin, California, and New Mexico. Wisconsin and New Mexico 
experience a larger recovery than those in California. Earnings drop the 
least in Oregon and Washington. 
Table 3.4 reports 10-year earnings losses and replacement rates for 
the ﬁve states.15 The earnings losses results are also shown in Figure 
3.4. Proportional earnings losses in California are the highest, followed 
by Wisconsin and then New Mexico. They are lowest in Washington 
and Oregon. In all ﬁve states, replacement rates are no more than 46 
percent, varying from a low of 30 percent in Wisconsin to 46 percent in 
Figure 3.4  Earnings of PPD Recipients Relative to Uninjured Earnings: 
5 States
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Table 3.4  Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates PPD claims, 
(2003 $)
California
1994 Washington
New 
Mexico Wisconsin Oregon
Ten-year losses ($) 68,139 47,925 40,172 55,404 44,691
Potential earnings ($) 266,797 290,956 194,287 250,773 232,478
Total beneﬁts ($) 25,372 19,456 18,398 16,374 16,273
Proportional losses (%) 26 16 21 22 19
Pretax replacement (%) 37 41 46 30 36
SOURCE: Adapted from Reville et al. (2001).
New Mexico. California has both the highest losses in dollars and the 
highest proportional losses (losses as a fraction of potential earnings).
Differences across states in outcomes for injured workers may be 
driven by differences in their workers’ compensation systems, but they 
may also be driven by differences in the characteristics of injured work-
ers and their employers. For example, we can see from Table 3.4 that 
the potential earnings of injured workers in Washington are 50 percent 
higher than in New Mexico. In addition, industry composition and the 
proportion of employers who are self-insured (an indirect measure of 
employer size) differ among the ﬁve states. These factors may affect 
both losses and beneﬁt adequacy. To control for them, we match the 
PPD claims in California with claims in each of the other four states 
on industry (one-digit SIC) and insurance status of the employer. We 
retain matches where the other state’s claims are within 10 percent of 
the average wage of the matched California claim over the four quarters 
before injury. We then examine the losses and beneﬁts of these Califor-
nia-matched claims in each state.  
The question we seek to answer is, if workers with PPD claims 
in the other states have the same preinjury wage and are working in 
the same industry, in ﬁrms of similar employment size, and with the 
same insurance status as PPD claims in California, what will be their 
lost earnings and replacement rates? The answer is in Table 3.5. Except 
for New Mexico, whose estimated replacement rate decreases substan-
tially, replacement rates change by three percentage points or less. In 
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none of the ﬁve states do replacement rates come close to the two-thirds 
standard for adequacy. 
Table 3.5 compares losses and adequacy across the ﬁve states, but 
it does not account for one very important difference among the states: 
the fraction of workers with temporary disability beneﬁts who also re-
ceive permanent disability beneﬁts varies from 17 percent in Wisconsin 
to 41 percent in California (Table 3.6). If we assume that the distribu-
tion of injury severity is the same from state to state, then an additional 
24 percent of injured workers in Wisconsin with TTD who lost more 
than 7 days off work would have received permanent disability ben-
eﬁts if they had been injured in California. Judging from the results 
of the studies in Wisconsin and Washington described above, workers 
with long temporary disability but no PPD beneﬁts tend to have high 
and continuing losses. And because they have high losses and don’t get 
PPD beneﬁts, they have very low replacement rates. Averaging them 
in with other Washington workers who received PPD beneﬁts would 
reduce the overall average beneﬁts for the 41 percent who would have 
been eligible for beneﬁts if they worked in California. For this reason, 
Wisconsin’s workers’ compensation system is even less generous com-
pared with California’s system than indicated in Table 3.5. The same is 
the case for the other three states.
Table 3.5  Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates PPD claims, 
Other States’ Workers Matched to California’s (2003 $)
California
1994 Washington
New 
Mexico Wisconsin Oregon
Ten-year losses ($) 68,139 47,181 45,423 49,895 42,129
Potential  
earnings ($)
266,797 255,695 237,431 248,121 258,743
Total beneﬁts ($) 25,372 19,127 17,077 15,964 16,627
Proportional  
losses (%)
26 18 19 20 16
Pretax  
replacement (%)
37 41 38 32 39
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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To account for differences in the propensity to award permanent 
disability beneﬁts, we attempt to create for each state a sample of 41 
percent of the most severe injuries involving more than three days off 
work.16 Because we do not have an independent measure of severity, we 
use workers’ compensation beneﬁts as a proxy. We begin with all per-
manent disability cases. To make other states comparable to California, 
we randomly select additional people in each temporary disability dura-
tion group so that the proportion in that group that would have received 
permanent disability in California is included in the comparison.
For example, in California, 96 percent of workers in the top 10 per-
cent of temporary disability durations are receiving permanent disabil-
ity. In Washington, 64 percent of workers in the top 10 percent are re-
ceiving permanent disability. We calculate the replacement rate for the 
64 percent who actually receive permanent disability in Washington, 
plus an additional randomly selected 32 percent of workers with tem-
porary disability in the top decile (not including those receiving perma-
nent disability) so that 96 percent of the top decile (including all actual 
permanent disability cases) are represented in the sample. We repeat 
this exercise for every decile so that the resulting sample is 41 percent 
of all lost-time claims in each of the states.17 
Table 3.7 displays the results of this exercise. It provides a picture 
of losses and replacement for people who would have received per-
manent disability beneﬁts if they had been injured in California. By 
deﬁnition, California’s losses and replacement rates are the same as in 
Table 3.5. The other three states’ losses are lower than when only their 
permanent disability cases are included, but their beneﬁts are lower yet. 
The result is a decline in replacement rates for all three. The four states 
have replacement rates between 23 percent and 37 percent—well below 
the two-thirds standard of beneﬁt adequacy. 
Table 3.6  PPD Claims as a Proportion of all Claims with More than 
Seven Days of TTD Beneﬁts (%)
California
1994 Washington New Mexico Wisconsin Oregon
41 21 23 17 31
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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It is also notable in Table 3.7 that the proportional losses experi-
enced by California’s PPD recipients are substantially higher than for 
equivalent workers in the next highest state, Washington. Indeed, they 
are 76 percent higher than the average losses of equivalent workers in 
Wisconsin. 
CONCLUSION
Beneﬁt adequacy is a central goal of workers’ compensation. Yet, in 
most states we know little about whether cash beneﬁts are indeed ade-
quate. Our initial studies in ﬁve states have shown that, for many groups 
of injured workers, replacement rates do not approach the two-thirds 
benchmark for adequacy. This gives us cause for concern, as there is 
no reason to believe that other states’ replacement rates will be much 
higher than the ﬁve states we have studied to date. It also underlines the 
importance of conducting studies of adequacy in additional states.
To the extent that beneﬁts are inadequate, it would be helpful to 
understand the effects of policies available to increase replacement 
rates. Potential policy choices include increasing weekly beneﬁt pay-
ment levels, increasing the level of beneﬁts paid for each percentage 
point of permanent disability, changing permanent disability guidelines 
to increase the likelihood that people with a given level of lost earnings 
will receive permanent disability beneﬁts, and eliminating roadblocks 
Table 3.7  Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates, Four 
States, Matched PPD Claims Augmented with Long-Term 
TTD (2003 $)
California
1994 Washington Wisconsin Oregon
10-year losses ($) 68,139 50,044 36,214 40,144
Potential earnings ($) 266,797 253,242 249,714 260,387
Total beneﬁts ($) 25,372 14,502 8,347 13,739
Proportional losses (%) 26 20 15 15
Pretax replacement (%) 37 29 23 34
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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that prevent injured workers from receiving workers’ compensation 
beneﬁts. Each of these policies would directly increase overall beneﬁt 
payments to workers and therefore increase costs to employers. Ad-
ditionally, each would buck the recent trend toward reducing beneﬁts 
and eligibility. 
Alternate approaches focusing on beneﬁts would try to improve the 
distribution of beneﬁts by targeting beneﬁts more toward groups with 
particularly low replacement rates or toward groups with particularly 
large losses. These steps would improve the equity of beneﬁt distribu-
tion. However, unless they worked hand-in-hand with beneﬁt increas-
es, they would imply substantial reductions in beneﬁts for untargeted 
groups. 
Another approach is to try, ex post, to target beneﬁts at people 
whose compensation turns out to be incommensurate with their losses. 
Most permanent disability systems provide beneﬁts in expectation of 
losses. Naturally, sometimes people’s actual losses differ substantially 
from what was predicted. To address this, Texas has a supplemental 
beneﬁt program that identiﬁes people with large and continuing losses 
and pays additional beneﬁts to them. 
Other avenues to improve beneﬁt adequacy would focus on reduc-
ing lost earnings of injured workers or on reducing injury rates. Both of 
these approaches have the potential to increase replacement rates with-
out increasing employer costs. One area that may have great potential 
is private or public policies directed at return-to-work at the at-injury 
employer. Studies also have shown that, when the preinjury employer 
rehires the injured or disabled worker, time lost from work is reduced 
substantially and the employment trajectory is improved (Burkhauser, 
Butler, and Kim 1995; Galizzi and Boden 2003). The Oregon Employ-
er-at-Injury Program is an example of such an approach. As described 
earlier, it provides subsidies to employers who offer modiﬁed or light-
duty jobs to allow injured workers to return to work before they have 
fully recovered from their workplace injuries. The primary goal is to 
maintain employment at the at-injury employer and thus to improve the 
trajectory of postinjury employment and earnings. 
To fully understand the implications of these and other policy alter-
natives for improving beneﬁt adequacy, much additional research would 
be required. Our understanding of the adequacy of workers’ compensa-
tion beneﬁts is in its infancy. The list of important unanswered ques-
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tions is long and could form the basis of a valuable research agenda. 
Still, this does not absolve us from attempting to respond to the chal-
lenge of inadequate beneﬁts. 
We end this chapter with a partial list of important questions that 
we would like to see addressed in future research.18 Answers to these 
questions would provide an empirical basis for policymakers to decide 
among alternatives for improving the adequacy of workers’ compensa-
tion beneﬁts. 
 1) How do replacement rates differ among states? For example, 
do states with high maximum weekly beneﬁts tend to have high 
replacement rates? Do states with a high propensity to provide 
PPD beneﬁts have high replacement rates? Does unionization 
affect replacement rates? 
 2) To what extent could replacement rates from workers’ com-
pensation be increased through more effective assistance with 
return to work or job accommodations? How effective are cur-
rent state programs designed to encourage the at-injury em-
ployer or other employers to offer jobs to injured workers? 
How effective are vocational rehabilitation programs?
 3) Are losses reduced and adequacy improved by two-tier PPD 
systems that pay higher beneﬁts if employers do not rehire in-
jured workers in comparable jobs?
 4) How effective is the supplemental beneﬁt program in Texas in 
increasing beneﬁt adequacy for workers with large losses?
 5) To what extent do workers receive beneﬁts from other wage-
replacement programs, such as Social Security disability or 
retirement beneﬁts, unemployment insurance, state temporary 
disability beneﬁts, employer sponsored pensions, sick leave or 
private long-term disability insurance? How different would 
total replacement rates be if they included payments from oth-
er programs? 
 6) Do injured workers also lose nonwage (fringe) beneﬁts? Which 
beneﬁts are lost, and what is the value of these losses to the 
worker? If we include lost fringe beneﬁts, how would this af-
fect our measure of the adequacy of beneﬁts? 
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 7) How much are the increased costs to families because they 
must care for injured workers or replace household work for-
merly done by them? How much are the offsetting savings to 
workers from reduced work expenses, such as commuting, 
child care, food, and clothing? And how do these impact ben-
eﬁt adequacy? 
 8) Does absence from work, from any cause, lead to reduced fu-
ture earnings? If so, how long an absence must occur before 
the future loss becomes signiﬁcant? Does an absence as a re-
sult of work-related injury or disease exhibit the same or a dif-
ferent pattern of future wage loss than an absence due to some 
other reason?
 9) What impact do the costs of obtaining beneﬁts have on the 
adequacy of the beneﬁts actually received by workers (e.g., 
what are the effects of delays and the reduction in claimants’ 
net recoveries after payment of attorney fees and litigation ex-
penses)?
 10) What is the relationship between pretax and after-tax wage re-
placement rates in different states?
 11) To what extent can losses be predicted by medical information 
about the injury, such as the information used in the American 
Medical Association Guides?
12) Are there worker, employer, or labor market characteristics that 
affect losses and replacement rates? Examples include gender, 
race, age, preinjury earnings, and union status; employer size 
and industry; and state unemployment rates. 
13) In states where this issue has not yet been studied, are replace-
ment rates relatively low for workers with long-duration tem-
porary disability but no permanent disability beneﬁts? If this 
disparity exists, can we determine its causes? 
14) To what extent do states with high rates of litigation have 
higher or lower replacement rates (net of attorney fees paid 
by workers)? If any differences exist, what are the underlying 
reasons for them? 
15) To what extent are large losses of injured workers caused by 
the functional limitations caused by their injuries? 
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16) To what extent are these losses caused by labor market impacts 
of time lost from work, injury-related job loss, or stigma at-
tached to workers with long-term injuries and illnesses? 
17) What is the magnitude of losses related to workplace injuries 
that do not receive workers’ compensation income beneﬁt 
payments? How do these uncompensated cases affect over-
all replacement rates? To what extent do changes in workers’ 
compensation laws affect the proportion of injuries that go un-
reported? 
18) Can the methodology used in the recent studies of adequacy be 
simpliﬁed and/or explained so that state agencies can conduct 
adequacy studies? 
19) What are the advantages and disadvantages of the various 
methods used to estimate earnings losses in the earlier and re-
cent studies of adequacy? For example, Ginnold (1979) relied 
on state income tax records, and Berkowitz and Burton (1987) 
relied on Social Security earnings records, while the recent 
studies have relied on state unemployment insurance records. 
Notes
 1. See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/cfoi.nr0.htm.
 2. See http://www.bls.gov/news.release/osh.t02.htm. 
 3.  Adequacy can also be measured by whether family income is restored to a so-
cially acceptable level, such as the poverty level. This concept of adequacy is not 
typically applied to the workers’ compensation program. However, limitations 
on weekly temporary disability beneﬁts (typically to 100 percent of the state av-
erage weekly wage) do reﬂect this notion of adequacy to some extent. For a more 
complete discussion of alternate measures of workers’ compensation adequacy, 
see Hunt (2004). 
 4.  Some states pay at a somewhat different rate, and others pay based on a measure 
of after-tax earnings, but this is the predominant rate. For short-term injuries, 
replacement is lower because of the impact of the waiting period.
 5.  Because beneﬁts and losses occur over time, and beneﬁts and losses years from 
now are worth less than if they occurred today, we discount them, using an an-
nual real discount rate of 2.3 percent. This is drawn from Social Security Ad-
ministration studies. We also convert beneﬁts and wages to 2003 dollars to take 
inﬂation into account. 
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 6.  There is no reason to expect that individual workers’ losses will be captured by 
this method, but only that the average difference between estimated uninjured 
earnings and actual earnings will be an unbiased measure of average losses.
 7.  Fraudulent reporting of injuries would be the converse of underreporting. How-
ever, there are no studies that indicate that overreporting is nearly of the same 
magnitude as underreporting. 
 8.  Cheit drew this conclusion from looking at predicted and actual postinjury earn-
ings of individual workers. This ﬁnding suggests that a substantial number of 
workers had little or no work-related lost earnings. However, ﬁndings for indi-
vidual workers are subject to substantial uncertainty. See note 12. 
 9.  Uninjured workers could not be used in the regression context because personal 
characteristics controlled for in this setting (for example, age and gender) are 
unavailable for the uninjured workers.
 10.  To account for the losses of workers out for 8–10 days, they added 9 days’ wages 
to each worker’s estimated losses.
 11.  This includes a 2.3 percent discount rate. Also, in the 1999 Wisconsin study, 
Boden and Galizzi imputed changes in the employment rates of uninjured work-
ers over time as they might affect losses. The other studies did not do this, so, for 
sake of comparison, we omitted this step. 
 12.  Determining the true losses of individual workers is virtually impossible because, 
at the individual level, we cannot know what factors caused changes in earnings. 
Only by estimating losses of large groups of workers can we apply statistical 
techniques that “average out” the noninjury causes of changes in earnings.
 13.  The relatively low replacement for the group under 15 days is caused by the fact 
that this group is not paid beneﬁts for the ﬁrst 3 days off work. Once 15 days is 
reached, the ﬁrst 3 days’ beneﬁts are paid.
 14.  Initial match quality was judged by how well earnings of injured and matched 
uninjured workers tracked each other in the prematch period. Match quality was 
excellent in New Mexico and insured ﬁrms, but less so in the other three states 
and self-insured ﬁrms in California. To improve match quality in these cases, 
uninjured workers were matched by employee tenure in addition to employer 
and preinjury wages.
 15.  In Washington, on the basis of the average over the last 4 quarters observed 
(quarters 11–15), we project a 1.9 percent quarterly decline in wage losses af-
ter the last quarter observed. In California, we project a 1 percent decline after 
the last quarter observed, which is also based on the last quarters observed. In 
Wisconsin, almost 10 years of postinjury earnings are directly observable. In 
Oregon, the data suggest that no decline in wage losses is occurring at the end of 
the observed period. 
 16.  Because New Mexico has a seven-day waiting period and the other states have 
three-day waiting periods, we do not include it in this comparison. 
 17.  California permanent disability recipients have the longest temporary disabil-
ity durations. Using deciles instead of actual durations controls for differences 
across workers’ compensation systems that might extend or reduce the durations 
of temporary disability, such as the level of beneﬁts or control over medical 
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care or levels of litigation. If true severity were the only determining factor of 
temporary disability durations across states, because California has the highest 
durations, this approach (using deciles instead of durations) would overstate the 
fraction that would receive permanent disability beneﬁts if they had been injured 
in California. On the other hand, California may not award permanent disability 
randomly within long-duration temporary disability groups. Rather, permanent 
disability may be awarded to workers within these groups likely to have the larg-
est lost earnings. In this case, our method would underestimate the losses among 
workers in other states who would have received permanent disability beneﬁts 
in California because we randomly chose workers within temporary disability 
groups. 
 18.  Several of these questions are adapted from another agenda for research on 
workers’ compensation adequacy published in an appendix to Hunt (2004).
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Permanent Partial 
Disability Beneﬁts
John F. Burton, Jr.
Rutgers University
Permanent partial disability (PPD) cash beneﬁts constitute the most 
expensive and complex type of beneﬁt provided by workers’ compensa-
tion programs.1 PPD beneﬁts are paid to workers whose workplace in-
juries have consequences that are permanent but not totally disabling.2 
This chapter provides an overview of the previous research on PPD 
beneﬁts, with particular emphasis on the contributions of Terry Thoma-
son, and indicates the topics for which additional research is needed.
INTRODUCTION TO PPD BENEFITS 
The importance of PPD beneﬁts in the U.S. workers’ compensation 
program and the variability among states in the relative importance of 
PPD beneﬁts are shown in 1999 data on incurred cash beneﬁts (Blum 
and Burton 2003). Nationally, temporary total disability (TTD) beneﬁts 
are more common than PPD beneﬁts (Figure 4.1), and permanent total 
disability (PTD) beneﬁts and fatal beneﬁts are much more expensive 
per case than PPD beneﬁts (Figure 4.2). However, the total expendi-
tures on PPD beneﬁts per 100,000 workers account for over 70 percent 
of all cash beneﬁts nationally (Figure 4.3). Blum and Burton (2003) 
also report that nationally PPD cash beneﬁts increased from $14.4 mil-
lion per 100,000 workers in 1996 to $17.2 million in 1999.
There are signiﬁcant differences among states in these measures 
of incurred PPD beneﬁts, as shown in the lowest, ﬁrst quartile, mean, 
median, third quartile, and highest values for the 46 jurisdictions with 
data. The frequency of PPD claims per 100,000 workers varies from 
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1,221 in California to 128 in the District of Columbia, almost a tenfold 
difference (Figure 4.4). The average cost of cash beneﬁts per PPD case 
varies from $86,872 in Michigan to $13,909 in Indiana, a more than 
sixfold difference (Figure 4.5). As measured by total expenditures on 
PPD cash beneﬁts per 100,000 workers, the $43.3 million in California 
is more than 10 times the $4.1 million in Utah (Figure 4.6).
One research task is to explain the interstate and intertemporal dif-
ferences in these measures of incurred PPD beneﬁts. One logical de-
terminant of the amount of incurred cash beneﬁts in a state is the gen-
erosity of the beneﬁts prescribed by the state’s workers’ compensation 
statute. Another obvious candidate for a variable that would explain 
interstate differences in incurred beneﬁts is the state’s injury rate.3
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXAMINING PPD 
BENEFITS
Permanent Consequences of Workplace Injuries and Diseases: 
Terminology and Concepts
There are signiﬁcant differences among the states and provinces in 
their approaches to compensating permanent disabilities. Furthermore, 
Figure 4.1  Frequency per 100,000 Workers in 1999, National Averages
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Figure 4.2  Average Cash Beneﬁts per Case in 1999, National Averages ($)
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Figure 4.3  Cash Beneﬁts per 100,000 Workers in 1999, National 
Averages (in Millions $)
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Figure 4.4  Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts Frequency per 100,000 
Workers in 1999, Variations among States
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among jurisdictions using the same approach, the terminology used to 
describe the same approach may differ. Thus, a common set of terms 
is a practical necessity for effective interjurisdictional comparisons re-
garding PPD beneﬁts.
Three time periods
 As shown in Figure 4.7, three time periods are pertinent in com-
pensating a worker with an injury serious enough to result in PPD ben-
eﬁts. The preinjury period is relevant because inter alia the employee’s 
average wage is used in calculating the cash beneﬁts after the worker 
is injured. The temporary disability period refers to the time from the 
onset of the injury or disease until the date of maximum medical im-
provement (MMI) has been reached; the permanent disability period 
refers to the period following MMI. The distinction between the tem-
porary and permanent disability periods is important because workers’ 
compensation programs provide different types of cash beneﬁts in the 
two periods.
What are the permanent consequences? 
Most workers injured on the job fully recover by the date of MMI 
and thus sustain no permanent consequences from the injury. For those 
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Figure 4.5  Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts, Average Cash Beneﬁts 
per Case in 1999, Variations among States
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Figure 4.6  Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts, Cash Beneﬁts per 
100,000 Workers in 1999, Variations among States
43.3
17.2 16.1
12.5
10.1
4.1
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
California National
 average 
(mean)
Colorado Maryland
(median)
Alabama Utah
Roberts.indb   73 6/7/2005   9:28:48 AM
74  Burton
workers with relatively serious injuries, several permanent consequenc-
es are possible. There may be a persistence of pain and suffering and a 
continuing need for medical care and rehabilitation. Of particular inter-
est are the other permanent consequences (shown in Figure 4.8) be-
cause they are the focus of most of the debate concerning the optimal 
design of PPD beneﬁts.4
 A permanent impairment is any anatomic or functional abnormality 
or loss that remains after MMI has been achieved. Amputated limbs or 
enervated muscles are examples of permanent impairments. The impair-
ment probably causes the worker to experience functional limitations. 
Physical performance may be limited in such activities as walking, 
climbing, reaching, and hearing; furthermore, the worker’s emotional 
and mental performance may be adversely affected or limited.
Functional limitations, in turn, are likely to result in a disability, 
of which there are two types: work disability and nonwork disability. 
Work disability can be conceptualized as having two phases: the loss of 
earning capacity, which results in actual wage loss. In a strict sense, 
these two aspects of work disability must accompany one another. An 
actual loss of earnings only occurs if there is loss of earning capacity. 
Nevertheless, the distinction is important because (as discussed later) 
some types of workers’ compensation beneﬁts are based solely on a 
determination of a presumed loss of earning capacity, while other types 
of beneﬁts require demonstration of actual wage loss. 
Nonwork disability includes the loss of the capacities for other as-
pects of life, such as recreation and the performance of household tasks, 
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improvement (MMI) 
Temporary 
disability
period
Preinjury
period
Figure G – Three Time Periods in a Workers’ Compensation Case Where 
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Figure 4.7 Three Time Periods in a Workers’ Compensation Case Where  
the Injury Has Permanent Consequences
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and can be conceptualized as having two phases: the loss of capacity for 
nonwork activities which results in actual noneconomic loss. Again, in 
a strict sense, these two aspects of nonwork disability must accompany 
one another, but at least conceptually they can be measured separately.
Factors that affect the magnitudes of the permanent  
consequences
The relationships shown in Figure 4.8 indicate chains of causation 
that begin with the worker’s injury, which in turn results in permanent 
impairment, functional limitations, work disability, and nonwork dis-
ability. However, the chains of causation are neither automatic nor are 
they immutable because they are the result of factors that are uncon-
trollable after the date of injury. Rather, as shown in Table 4.1, in each 
stage in the chains of causation there are also factors controllable by the 
worker, or by participants in the delivery system for workers’ compen-
sation beneﬁts, or by public policy.5
Stage 1—the movement from the injury or disease to the permanent 
impairment—will be affected by such controllable factors as the quality 
of the medical care received by the worker and by such uncontrollable 
factors as the worker’s previous health status. Stage 2—the movement 
from the permanent impairment to the functional limitations—is also 
affected by controllable factors (such as the quality of medical reha-
bilitation) and uncontrollable factors (such as the worker’s prior physi-
cal condition). Likewise, stage 3A—the progression from functional 
limitations to loss of earning capacity—will be inﬂuenced by control-
Work
disability
Nonwork
disability
Functional
limitations
Permanent
impairment
Injury
or
disease
Figure H – Permanent Consequences of an Injury or Disease 
Figure 4.8 Permanent Consequences of an Injury or Disease
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Table 4.1  Factors That Affect the Extent of the Permanent Consequences
Stage 1 Injury to Permanent Impairment
Controllable factors include Medical care
Uncontrollable factors include Prior health status
Stage 2 Permanent Impairment to Functional Limitations
Controllable factors include Medical rehabilitation
Uncontrollable factors include Prior physical condition
Stage 3A Functional Limitations to Loss of Earning Capacity
Controllable factors include Vocational rehabilitation
Uncontrollable factors include Age, prior education, prior work 
experience
Stage 4A Loss of Earning Capacity to Actual Wage Loss
Controllable factors include Employer return-to-work policies, 
reasonable accommodations at work 
site; design of beneﬁts (affecting 
incentive to return to work)
Uncontrollable factors include General state of the labor market
Stage 3B Functional Limitations to Loss of Capacity for Nonwork Activities
Controllable factors include Rehabilitation (such as training to 
operate modiﬁed automobile)
Uncontrollable factors include Age, prior experience
Stage 4B Loss of Capacity for Nonwork Activities to Actual Noneconomic Loss
Controllable factors include Redesigned facilities or equipment 
(such as modiﬁed automobile)
Uncontrollable factors include None, perhaps
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lable factors (the quality of vocational rehabilitation, for example) and 
uncontrollable factors (such as the worker’s age and prior work experi-
ence). Finally, in stage 4A—the actual wage loss resulting from the loss 
of earning capacity—other factors will inﬂuence the outcome, such as 
the employer’s return-to-work policies (controllable) and the general 
state of the labor market (uncontrollable for a particular employer or 
worker). Table 4.1 also catalogues several controllable and uncontrolla-
ble factors that affect the extent of loss of capacity for nonwork activity 
resulting from functional limitations (stage 3B) and the amount of ac-
tual noneconomic loss resulting from the loss of capacity for nonwork 
activity (stage 4B).
The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable factors in 
Table 4.1 is not meant to provide a rigid classiﬁcation scheme, nor is 
the list of factors meant to be exhaustive. One purpose of the table is 
to suggest that some factors that affect the chains of causation between 
the initial injury or disease and the ultimate work or nonwork disabil-
ity can be inﬂuenced by workers, employers, physicians, rehabilitation 
providers, and others in the workers’ compensation delivery system, or 
by policymakers who design the workers’ compensation PPD beneﬁts 
system; however, other factors can not be inﬂuenced. 
Another purpose of Table 4.1 is to emphasize that there are numer-
ous factors that affect all of the stages in the chains of causation. As a 
result, knowing the extent of a worker’s loss for any of the intermediary 
consequences shown in Figure 4.8 may not provide a good prediction 
of the extent of the loss for a subsequent consequence. The accuracy 
of predictions of actual wage losses from the ratings of loss of earning 
capacity, and other such purported relationships among the various per-
manent consequences of work-related injuries or diseases, including the 
efﬁcacy of intervention at various stages of the disability determination 
process, are empirical issues that deserve further research.
The Effect of Work Injuries on Earnings
The loss of earnings resulting from a work-related injury or disease 
that has permanent consequences is illustrated by Figure 4.9. Prior to 
the injury, the wages increased through time from A to B, reﬂecting the 
worker’s increasing productivity as well as general inﬂation. At point 
B, the worker experienced a work-related injury that permanently re-
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duced his earnings. Had he not been injured, his earnings would have 
continued to grow along the line BC. Although these potential earn-
ings cannot be observed for the injured worker, they can be estimated 
from information on what happened after point B to earnings of similar 
workers who were not injured.
The injured worker’s actual earnings in this example dropped from 
B to D and continued at this zero earnings level until point E, when the 
worker returned to work at wage level F. Thereafter, actual earnings 
grew along the line FG. This example assumes that the worker’s actual 
earnings never return to the potential earnings (line BC) that he would 
have earned if he had never been injured. The worker’s “true” wage 
loss due to the injury is equal to the worker’s potential earnings after the 
date of injury (BC) minus the worker’s actual earnings after the date of 
injury (BDEFG).6  
Of course, not all workers with permanent impairments resulting 
from their work injuries have wage histories that correspond to the ex-
ample in Figure 4.9. Some may return to their old jobs at the wage they 
would have earned if they had never been injured; others may experi-
ence a total loss of earnings from their injuries. The example shown 
illustrates an intermediate case, in which the worker has a partial but 
not total loss of earnings.
Figure 4.9 Actual Loss of Earnings for a Worker with a Permanent 
Disability
A
B
C
G
F
ED
Time
Date of injury Date of maximum medical 
improvement
Figure 4.9 – Actual Loss of Earnings for a Workers with a Permanent Disability 
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C
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There are a myriad of issues that must be resolved in order to mea-
sure the actual loss of earnings resulting from work-related injuries and 
the workers’ compensation beneﬁts actually received by workers as a 
result of those injuries. These issues and a catalogue of research topics 
are presented in Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005).7
WHICH PERMANENT CONSEQUENCES SHOULD BE 
COMPENSABLE?
The taxonomy of the permanent consequences of workplace injuries 
provided in the previous section serves as a basis for the design of a PPD 
beneﬁts system. One policy issue that implicitly or explicitly has to be 
resolved in any jurisdiction in order to design this system pertains to the 
purpose of the PPD beneﬁts.8  
The obligation of the workers’ compensation program to provide 
medical care and rehabilitation services is generally accepted (although 
in some jurisdictions, there is disagreement about the extent of vocational 
rehabilitation services to which the worker is entitled). Conversely, in 
most jurisdictions there is general agreement that the worker is not en-
titled to beneﬁts because of pain and suffering.9 The rationale often given 
is that the original design of workers’ compensation involved a trade-off, 
in which the employee is eligible for beneﬁts without demonstrating em-
ployer fault and the employer’s liability is limited to certain consequences 
of the injury, which not did encompass pain and suffering.
Most of the recent controversy over which of the permanent conse-
quences of a work-related injury deserve compensation involves argu-
ments concerning the four permanent consequences shown in Figure 
4.8. Because the four consequences are sequential and interdependent, 
a particular consequence may be endorsed as a basis for compensation 
because it serves as a convenient proxy for other consequences of primary 
concern.
Thus, one may argue that the amount of the PPD beneﬁts should op-
erationally be based on the extent of the worker’s impairment when the 
real concern is for the work disability caused by the impairment. This 
indirect route to compensating work disability may be chosen because 
impairment may be easier to measure than work disability. Unfortunately, 
those who favor payment when the worker suffers an impairment do not 
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always make clear whether this payment is meant to compensate for the 
existence of the impairment by itself or is meant to compensate for the 
work disability (or some other consequence) that is expected to result 
from the impairment.
To the extent that the rationale for beneﬁts is discernable, however, 
two schools of thought can be identiﬁed. One view considers lost wages 
due to the injury (work disability) as the sole justiﬁcation for workers’ 
compensation beneﬁts. Supporters of this position recognize that some 
jurisdictions pay beneﬁts on the basis of an evaluation of the extent of 
impairment or of some of the other permanent consequences in Figure 4.8 
prior to actual wage loss, but argue that when such evaluations are made, 
wage loss is conclusively presumed. The jurisdiction, in short, compen-
sates on the basis of one of these intermediate consequences because it 
serves as a proxy for wage loss.
An alternative view of the rationale for beneﬁts for workers with 
permanent consequences of their injuries accepts work disability as the 
primary basis for beneﬁts, but argues that there is a secondary role for 
beneﬁts paid for nonwork disability. Arguments for these “impairment 
beneﬁts” indicate that the purpose is not only to compensate impairment 
per se but to also use permanent impairment as a convenient proxy for the 
functional limitations and nonwork disability that result from the impair-
ment. A variant on this alternative view is to argue that nonwork disability 
merits compensation, and that the degree of permanent impairment serves 
as a proxy for the extent of nonwork disability.10
The dominant view probably is that the only permanent conse-
quences that warrant beneﬁts in a workers’ compensation program are 
medical care, rehabilitation, and work disability. There are, however, 
several jurisdictions that explicitly adopted beneﬁts for nonwork dis-
ability, including Florida (which paid what were termed “permanent 
impairment” beneﬁts from 1979 to 1993) and most Canadian provinces, 
such as Ontario (which pays noneconomic loss beneﬁts). One provoca-
tive research question is why Canadian provinces are much more recep-
tive to paying noneconomic loss beneﬁts than U.S. states? 
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THE THREE BASIC OPERATIONAL APPROACHES TO PPD 
BENEFITS
Among those states in which work disability is the sole reason why 
PPD beneﬁts are paid, most jurisdictions use another of the permanent 
consequences shown in Figure 4.8 as a proxy or predictor of the ex-
tent of work disability. This section provides an overview of the basic 
operational approaches for PPD beneﬁts found in U.S. and Canadian 
jurisdictions.11
Three Basic Operational Approaches for Work Disability Beneﬁts 
Three basic operational approaches for work disability beneﬁts, 
plus variants of each of the three basic approaches, are shown in Table 
4.2.12 The operational approaches represent the building blocks for PPD 
beneﬁts systems. The difference among the three basic operational ap-
proaches depends on which of the permanent consequences shown in 
Figure 4.8 is used as a proxy for or measurement of work disability. 
Operational Approach I: The permanent impairment
approach
The ﬁrst basic operational approach, the permanent impairment ap-
proach, evaluates the seriousness of the worker’s permanent impair-
ment and/or functional limitations resulting from the work-related in-
jury.13 An impairment rating is made, which is used to determine the 
amount of the PPD beneﬁts.  
The ﬁrst variant of the permanent impairment approach is the 
“pure” permanent impairment approach (Operational Approach I.A). 
As indicated in Table 4.2, the only worker-speciﬁc factor that affects 
the amount of PPD beneﬁts in this approach is the size of the permanent 
impairment rating. This presumably provides a very rough proxy for the 
worker’s actual loss of wages, but a few jurisdictions nonetheless rely 
on this approach for work disability beneﬁts.
The second variant of the permanent impairment approach is the 
permanent impairment and preinjury wage approach (Operational Ap-
proach I.B). This approach multiplies the permanent impairment rating 
by a weekly beneﬁt that is largely determined by the worker’s weekly 
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Table 4.2  Operational Approaches for Permanent Disability Beneﬁts
Operational Approach I: The Permanent Impairment Approach
 Operational Approach IA: The “Pure” Permanent Impairment Approach
1.  The worker is given a permanent impairment rating based on the extent of the 
workers’ permanent impairment/functional limitations.
2.  The worker’s permanent partial disability (PPD) beneﬁts are determined by 
multiplying the rating by a dollar amount per point that does not vary among 
individuals on the basis of their preinjury wages.
 Operational Approach IB: The Permanent Impairment and Preinjury   
 Wage Approach
1.  The worker is given a permanent impairment rating based on the extent of the 
workers’ permanent impairment/functional limitations.
2.  The duration of the PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the rating times 
a duration speciﬁed in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
3.  The weekly PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury 
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to 
minimum and/or maximum weekly beneﬁts.a
Operational Approach II:  The Loss of Earning Capacity (LEC) Approach
 Operational Approach IIA:  The Ad Hoc Loss of Earning Capacity   
 Approach
1.  The worker is given an LEC rating based on the facts of the particular case, 
which includes the worker’s permanent impairment rating and other factors, 
such as the worker’s age, occupation, education, and prior work experience. 
2.  The duration of the PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the LEC rating 
times a duration speciﬁed in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
3.  The weekly PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury 
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to 
minimum and/or maximum weekly beneﬁts.b
 Operational Approach IIB: The Loss of Earning Capacity by Formula   
 Approach
1.  The worker is given a loss of earning capacity rating based on a formula, 
which considers the worker’s permanent impairment rating and other factors, 
such as the worker’s age, occupation, and education.
2.  The duration of the PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the rating times 
a duration speciﬁed in the statute or workers’ compensation agency rule.
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3.  The weekly PPD beneﬁt is determined by multiplying the worker’s preinjury 
wage by a percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to 
minimum and/or maximum weekly beneﬁts.
 
 Operational Approach IIC:  The “Pure” Loss of Earning Capacity Approach
1.  The worker is given a loss of earning capacity rating based on the facts of the 
case or based on a formula.
2.  The rating is used to determine the amount of PPD beneﬁts using a formula 
that does not vary among workers on the basis of their preinjury wages.
III.  Operational Approach III: The Actual Wage Loss Approach
 Operational Approach IIIA: The “Pure” Actual Wage Loss Approach
1. The worker’s actual wage loss is (a) the worker’s projected wages in the 
permanent disability periodc and (b) the worker’s actual earnings in the 
permanent disability period.
2.  The worker must demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the effects 
of the permanent impairment and was not because of other factors, such as the 
worker’s voluntarily retiring or withdrawing from the labor force, or refusing 
a legitimate job offer, or general economic conditions.
3.  If the worker’s actual wage loss is zero (or a negative number), there are no 
PPD beneﬁts.
4.  The duration of the PPD beneﬁt depends on the duration of the worker’s 
actual wage loss (subject to a statutory maximum on duration).
5.  The weekly PPD is determined by multiplying the actual wage loss by a 
percentage (e.g., 66⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to minimum and/
or maximum weekly beneﬁts.
 Operational Approach IIIB: The Limited Actual Wage Loss Approach
1. The worker’s actual wage loss is (a) the worker’s projected wages in the 
permanent disability periodd and (b) the worker’s actual earnings in the 
permanent disability period.
2.  The worker must demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the effects 
of the permanent impairment and was not because of other factors, such as the 
worker’s voluntarily retiring or withdrawing from the labor force, or refusing 
a legitimate job offer, or general economic conditions.
3.  The worker’s maximum compensable wage loss is the workers’ projected 
wages in the permanent disability period times either (c) the worker’s loss of 
earning capacity rating or (d) the worker’s permanent impairment rating;  
and/or the worker’s maximum compensable wage loss is the actual wage loss 
in excess of a threshold that is a percent of the worker’s preinjury wage.e
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4.  The worker’s compensable wage loss is the lesser of the worker’s actual wage 
loss or the worker’s maximum compensable wage loss. 
5.  If the worker’s compensable wage is zero (or a negative number), there are no 
PPD beneﬁts.
6.  The duration of the PPD beneﬁt depends on the duration of the worker’s 
compensable wage loss (subject to a statutory maximum on duration).
7.  The weekly PPD is determined by multiplying the compensable wage loss by 
a percentage (e.g., 66 ⅔ percent); the weekly beneﬁt is subject to minimum 
and/or maximum weekly beneﬁts.
a In a few jurisdictions, the duration of the PPD beneﬁts is ﬁxed and the rating is used 
to help determine the weekly PPD beneﬁt.
b In a few jurisdictions, the duration of the PPD beneﬁts is ﬁxed and the rating is used 
to help determine the weekly PPD beneﬁt.
c In most workers’ compensation programs, the worker’s projected wages in the 
permanent disability period are the same as the worker’s preinjury wages.
d In most workers’ compensation programs, the worker’s projected wages in the 
permanent disability period are the same as the worker’s preinjury wages.
e The choice among the worker’s loss of earning capacity rating or the worker’s 
permanent impairment rating or the threshold linked to preinjury wages varies 
among jurisdictions.
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wage prior to the workplace injury. This variant is more closely aligned 
with the idea that the purpose of PPD beneﬁts is to compensate for work 
disability.
Operational Approach II: The loss of earning capacity
approach
The loss of earning capacity approach considers the seriousness of 
the worker’s permanent impairment and functional limitations, as well 
as other factors that may affect the loss of the worker’s earning capacity 
resulting from the injury. These factors may include the worker’s age, 
prior education, and prior work experience. In addition, factors such 
as the job opportunities in a given location may be considered. After 
all the factors relied on in the particular jurisdiction are considered, a 
rating of the worker’s loss of earning capacity due to the work-related 
injury or disease is produced. In turn, that rating is used to determine 
the duration (or, in some jurisdictions, the weekly amount) of the PPD 
beneﬁts. Loss of earning capacity is presumably used as a proxy for the 
actual wage loss that is expected to result. 
The ﬁrst variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the ad 
hoc loss of earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II.A in 
Table 4.2). The extent of the loss of earning capacity is decided on the 
facts of the case, which may vary from case to case in the same juris-
diction depending on the predilections of the parties (including the ad-
ministrative law judge) involved in the case. This approach multiplies 
the loss of earning capacity rating by a maximum duration speciﬁed in 
the statute to determine the duration of the worker’s PPD beneﬁts. The 
weekly beneﬁt is largely determined by the worker’s weekly wage prior 
to the workplace injury.
The second variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the 
loss of earning capacity by formula approach (Operational Approach 
II.B in Table 4.2). The worker’s permanent impairment rating is modi-
ﬁed by a formula that considers factors such as the worker’s age or 
occupation in order to determine the loss of earning capacity. The third 
variant of the loss of earning capacity approach is the “pure” loss of 
earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II.C in Table 4.2). 
The worker’s loss of earning capacity is determined based either on the 
facts of the particular case or on a formula. The loss of earning capac-
ity rating is then used to determine the amount of PPD beneﬁts based 
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on factors such as the extent of the loss of earning capacity. However, 
the beneﬁt does not vary among workers on the basis of their preinjury 
wages.14
Operational Approach III: The actual wage loss approach
The actual wage loss approach determines the actual wage loss due 
to the work-related injury by comparing the worker’s earnings in the pe-
riod after the date of maximum medical improvement (MMI) with the 
worker’s earnings before the date of injury. The duration and amount 
of PPD beneﬁts are then related to the duration and amount of actual 
wage loss.
The ﬁrst variant of the actual wage loss approach is the “pure” ac-
tual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III.A). As explicated 
in Table 4.2, this approach deﬁnes actual wage loss as the difference 
between the worker’s projected earnings in the permanent disability 
period and the worker’s actual earnings in that period. If the worker 
can demonstrate that the actual wage loss was due to the workplace 
injury or disease, the weekly PPD beneﬁt is calculated as a percent of 
the actual wage and is paid for the duration of the wage loss (subject to 
statutory limits on the duration).
The second variant of the actual wage loss approach is the limited 
actual wage loss approach. The details of the approach are shown in Ta-
ble 4.2. The distinguishing feature of this approach is that the worker’s 
compensable wage loss is limited by the extent of the worker’s loss of 
earning capacity, or by the extent of the worker’s permanent impair-
ment, or by the amount of actual wage loss above a threshold that is 
a percent of the worker’s preinjury wage, or by a combination of the 
limiting factors. For example, if the worker’s actual earnings in the per-
manent disability period are 75 percent below the projected earnings, 
but the worker is considered to have only lost 25 percent of preinjury 
earning capacity, then the PPD beneﬁts will be based on the 25 percent 
ﬁgure. Another example is that if the worker had preinjury wages of 
$500 per week and has actual wage loss of $100 per week in the perma-
nent disability period, but the state limits compensable wage loss to the 
amount in excess of 15 percent of the worker’s preinjury wages, then 
the compensable wage loss is only $25 per week.
Roberts.indb   86 6/7/2005   9:28:53 AM
Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts   87
The essential attributes of the actual wage loss approach
There is a critical distinction between the ﬁrst two operational ap-
proaches—the permanent impairment operational approach and the 
loss of earning capacity approach—and the actual wage loss approach. 
The states that rely on the actual wage loss approach require the worker 
1) to demonstrate that a work-related injury has produced a permanent 
impairment and/or loss of earning capacity15 and 2) to demonstrate that 
he or she has experienced an actual loss of earnings because of the 
work-related injury or disease. In contrast, the impairment and loss of 
earning capacity approaches will pay PPD beneﬁts even if there is no 
actual loss of earnings so long as the worker can demonstrate that the 
work injury caused a diminution in one of the proxies for actual wage 
loss.
The elusive nature of the actual wage loss approach
As discussed in more detail later, the actual wage loss approach—
which requires that cases be kept open for extended periods—can easily 
be transformed in practice into the loss of earning capacity approach 
through the use of compromise and release agreements.
The Operational Approach for Nonwork Disability Beneﬁts
As previously indicated, a few jurisdictions, in addition to compensat-
ing for work disability, also provide injured workers with an additional 
beneﬁt that is designed to compensate for noneconomic loss (or nonwork 
disability). For example, permanent impairment beneﬁts were available 
in Florida from 1979 to 1993, while noneconomic loss beneﬁts have been 
paid in Ontario since 1990. The operational basis for the noneconomic 
loss beneﬁts in both Florida and Ontario corresponds to the “pure” per-
manent impairment approach (Operational Approach I.A) shown in Table 
4.2.16 
Roberts.indb   87 6/7/2005   9:28:53 AM
88  Burton
HOW STATES DESIGN SYSTEMS OF PPD BENEFITS
Common Distinctions within States for PPD Beneﬁts
All jurisdictions have different PPD beneﬁts (measured by weekly 
amount or potential duration) for different categories of injuries and 
diseases, and some jurisdictions use different operational approaches 
for different categories of injuries. The most common distinctions in-
volve three factors.
1) Distinctions between diseases and injuries. Several states pro-
vide more restrictive PPD beneﬁts for diseases than for injuries.17 Mon-
tana, for example, does not provide compensation for partial disability 
resulting from a disease. 
2) Distinctions between different types of injuries. Most states treat 
scheduled injuries differently than nonscheduled injuries. Unfortunate-
ly, these terms are not used in a uniform and unambiguous fashion. The 
workers’ compensation statutes in most states contain a schedule that 
lists the number of weeks or the dollar amounts of compensation ben-
eﬁts to be paid for the physical loss or (in most jurisdictions) the loss 
of use of speciﬁed parts of the body. A scheduled injury is any injury 
that is speciﬁcally enumerated in the workers’ compensation statute and 
typically involves injuries to the upper and lower extremities (arms, 
legs, hands, feet, ﬁngers, and toes).18 Injuries to the trunk, back, internal 
organs (such as heart or lungs), nervous system, and other body systems 
usually are not included in the list of injuries found in the statutes; these 
are nonscheduled injuries (or unscheduled injuries). I describe these 
states as the “scheduled/nonscheduled distinction states.”
A signiﬁcant minority of states do not distinguish between sched-
uled injuries and nonscheduled injuries in the sense I use those terms: 
the former are speciﬁcally listed in the workers’ compensation statute 
and the latter are not. These unitary rating system states treat all injuries 
the same way in the workers’ compensation statute, either by specifying 
that a particular rating system should be used for all injuries or by au-
thorizing the workers’ compensation agency to adopt a comprehensive 
rating system.19
3) Distinctions between injuries with different degrees of severity. 
Within the category of PPD beneﬁts, many jurisdictions provide more 
generous beneﬁts (in terms of weekly amount and/or potential duration) 
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for more serious injuries than for less serious injuries. Some states also 
distinguish between injuries that result in amputations of a body mem-
ber and injuries that involve permanent loss of use of the body member. 
The former may be entitled to PPD beneﬁts, while the latter may not.
A Taxonomy of State Systems of PPD Beneﬁts
I am aware of three attempts to systematically classify states in 
terms of their approaches to PPD beneﬁts relying on the three basic 
operational approaches discussed in the previous section and the dis-
tinctions among injuries just discussed. Berkowitz and Burton (1987) 
examined 10 states based on ﬁeldwork and a literature review. The Na-
tional Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI 1995) classiﬁed all 
50 states plus the District of Columbia based on a questionnaire. The 
latest taxonomy of the 51 U.S. jurisdictions, on which the balance of 
this section is largely based, was prepared by Barth and Niss (1999).
The states and provinces in North America utilize the three opera-
tional approaches to work disability beneﬁts and the one operational 
approach to nonwork disability beneﬁts in a variety of systems of PPD 
beneﬁts. Each jurisdiction has a system of PPD beneﬁts because with-
out exception each jurisdiction makes some distinction among the types 
of injuries or diseases that affects either the operational approach for the 
beneﬁts or the amount or duration of those beneﬁts. This section brieﬂy 
describes six systems of PPD beneﬁts, each used in at least one North 
American jurisdiction. A more extended discussion, with examples of 
speciﬁc states, is included in Reville et al. (2005, Appendix A1). Some 
states do not neatly ﬁt into the six systems, but I believe the taxonomy 
provides a good representation of the most important or interesting sys-
tems of PPD beneﬁts.20 I begin with three systems of PPD beneﬁts used 
in scheduled/nonscheduled distinction states.
System I PPD beneﬁts: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction 
states that rely on the permanent impairment approach 
for nonscheduled injuries
Most states have PPD beneﬁt systems that distinguish between 
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries. In about a dozen states that rely 
on this distinction, including New Jersey, both scheduled and nonsched-
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uled injuries receive PPD beneﬁts based on the extent of permanent 
impairment. 
System II PPD beneﬁts: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction 
states that rely on the loss of earning capacity approach for 
nonscheduled injuries
The System II design for PPD beneﬁts draws a distinction between 
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries similar to that found in System 
I. Also, similar to System I, the scheduled injuries in System II are 
compensated on the basis of the permanent impairment. The distinctive 
feature of System II is that the nonscheduled beneﬁts are based on the 
loss of earning capacity approach (Operational Approach II). 
An interesting variant of System II is Wisconsin, which relies on 
Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury 
wage approach) for scheduled injuries.21 For nonscheduled injuries, 
there are two possibilities. If the worker has returned to work and is 
earning at least 85 percent of the worker’s preinjury wage, the workers’ 
permanent impairment is rated. The duration of PPD beneﬁts for such 
a worker is determined by multiplying the PI rating times 1,000 weeks. 
Thus, the Wisconsin PPD beneﬁts for the worker who has returned to 
work and is earning at least 85 percent of preinjury wages are based 
on Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury 
wage approach). 
If the worker with the nonscheduled injury has not returned to work 
and is earning at least 85 percent of the preinjury wage, the worker’s 
loss of earning capacity is determined. The evaluation of the LEC takes 
into account the seriousness of the worker’s permanent impairment, 
plus such factors as the worker’s age, education, and prior work experi-
ence. The evaluation produces a rating indicating the percentage loss 
in earning capacity due to the injury, and the rating is multiplied by 
1,000 weeks to determine the duration of the PPD beneﬁts. Thus, the 
nonscheduled PPD beneﬁts for Wisconsin workers who are not back to 
work earning at least 85 percent of preinjury wages is based on Opera-
tional Approach II.A (the ad hoc loss of earning capacity approach). 
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System III PPD beneﬁts: Scheduled/nonscheduled distinction 
states that rely on the actual wage loss approach for 
nonscheduled injuries
The System III design for PPD beneﬁts draws a distinction between 
scheduled and nonscheduled injuries similar to that found in Systems I 
and II. Also, similar to Systems I and II, the scheduled injuries in Sys-
tem III are compensated on the basis of the permanent impairment. The 
distinctive feature of System III is that the nonscheduled beneﬁts are 
based on the actual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III). 
New York is an example of a state relying on System III. The ﬁrst 
step in New York in determining the applicable beneﬁts for an injury 
with permanent consequences is to determine whether the injury is 
scheduled or unscheduled. The distinction is similar to that used in New 
Jersey and Wisconsin, where injuries to arms, legs, and other bodily 
extremities are classiﬁed as scheduled, and injuries to internal organs 
and the back are deﬁned as unscheduled.22 In New York, the operational 
basis for scheduled PPD beneﬁts is the permanent impairment and pre-
injury wage approach (Operational Approach I.B).
New York’s system relies on the actual wage loss approach for non-
scheduled beneﬁts, which has several traits. One trait is that, unless 
the worker has actual earnings after the date of MMI that are less than 
the worker’s preinjury earnings, no beneﬁts are paid even if the work 
injury has resulted in a permanent impairment or loss of earning capac-
ity.23 Another characteristic of the wage loss approach is that the total 
duration of the PPD beneﬁts is not determined shortly after the date of 
MMI, as in the permanent impairment or loss of earning capacity ap-
proaches. Instead, the duration of beneﬁts depends on the length of time 
the worker experiences actual losses of earnings due to the work injury. 
In New York, this duration can range from zero weeks (for those cases 
closed with no present wage loss) to the balance of the worker’s life. 
There are three outcomes possible for nonscheduled injuries in New 
York. First, if, at the time the case is initially classiﬁed as a nonsched-
uled PPD, the worker has returned to work and is experiencing no wage 
loss, the worker receives no PPD beneﬁts and the case is closed.24
Second, if, at the time the case is initially classiﬁed as a nonsched-
uled PPD, the worker experiences a wage loss, beneﬁts commence. The 
duration these beneﬁts will continue is unknown because the duration 
of subsequent wage loss is unknown.25 
Roberts.indb   91 6/7/2005   9:28:54 AM
92  Burton
In New York, there is a third outcome for a nonscheduled PPD case, 
namely a lump-sum settlement. The lump-sum settlement in New York 
is essentially a compromise and release agreement, in which the parties 
reach a compromise concerning the amount of beneﬁts to be paid, the 
worker receives a lump-sum payment, and the employer is released from 
any further liability for the particular injury.26
System IV PPD beneﬁts: Unitary rating system states with a 
single operational approach for PPD beneﬁts
California is an example of a jurisdiction providing System IV PPD 
beneﬁts in which all injuries are rated using the same approach. Califor-
nia relies on a formula to combine the impairment ratings with the age 
and occupational factors in order to produce a disability rating, which 
is Operational Approach II.B, the loss of earning capacity approach by 
formula approach. The California PPD system uses the disability rating 
to determine the duration of PPD beneﬁts, using a formula that provides 
more weeks per percent rating for more serious injuries than for less 
serious injuries.27
System V PPD Beneﬁts: Unitary rating system states 
with multiple operational approaches for PPD beneﬁts 
(the hybrid approach)
The ﬁfth system of PPD beneﬁts is the hybrid approach, which 
potentially pays two types of PPD beneﬁts on a sequential basis. The 
approach is used in Connecticut and Texas, and was used in Florida 
between 1994 and 2003.28 
In Texas, the initial phase of PPD beneﬁts is based on Operational 
Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and preinjury wage approach). 
Once the worker reached the date of MMI, the extent of permanent im-
pairment for all injuries with permanent consequences is rated using 
the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Per-
manent Impairment. Three weeks of impairment beneﬁts are then paid 
for each 1 percent impairment rating. The weekly beneﬁt is 70 percent 
of the worker’s preinjury wage, subject to a maximum beneﬁt that is 70 
percent of the state’s average weekly wage. 
Those workers who have a permanent impairment rating of at least 
15 percent have an opportunity to qualify for wage loss beneﬁts (known 
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as “supplemental income beneﬁts” in Texas) after the impairment ben-
eﬁts expire (i.e., at least 45 weeks after the initial eligibility date for 
impairment beneﬁts). The wage loss beneﬁts are paid to workers who 
experienced at least a 20 percent drop in wages between the preinjury 
period and the period of permanent disability; 80 percent of the wage 
loss in excess of the 20 percent threshold is compensated (again subject 
to a maximum week beneﬁt that is 70 percent of the state’s average 
weekly wage). The wage loss beneﬁts in Texas are an example of the 
Operational Approach III.B (the limited actual wage loss approach).
System VI PPD beneﬁts: The dual beneﬁts approach 
(nonwork disability beneﬁts and/or work disability beneﬁts), 
depending on the type of injury
A few jurisdictions have explicitly paid nonwork disability (or 
noneconomic loss) beneﬁts in addition to work disability beneﬁts. The 
System VI variant of dual PPD beneﬁts was used in Florida from 1979 
until 1993, although some signiﬁcant modiﬁcations were made in 1990 
prior to the total abandonment of the approach in 1993.  
The Florida program had two types of beneﬁts—impairment ben-
eﬁts and wage loss beneﬁts—and an injured worker with permanent 
consequences of his or her injury could qualify for either, both,29 or 
neither of the beneﬁts, depending on the facts in the case.
Impairment beneﬁts were paid to workers with certain types of per-
manent impairments, including amputations, loss of 80 percent or more 
of vision, or serious head or facial disﬁgurements. Other types of per-
manent impairments, such as total or partial loss of use of a body mem-
ber without amputation, did not qualify for the beneﬁts. The purpose of 
these “impairment beneﬁts” was to compensate the worker for nonwork 
disability. The impairment beneﬁts were paid using Operational Ap-
proach I.A (the “pure” permanent impairment approach).
The wage loss beneﬁts contained in the 1979 Florida legislation 
required the worker to have at least a 1 percent permanent impairment 
rating. In addition, the worker had to experience at least a 15 percent 
decline between the wages in the preinjury period and the wages in the 
permanent disability period. The wage loss beneﬁts then replaced 85 
percent of the actual wage loss in excess of the 15 percent threshold. 
This description of the dual beneﬁts approach in Florida is simplis-
tic and does not capture the initial acclaim and eventual disillusionment 
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with the approach, especially the wage loss component, which ulti-
mately led to the abandonment of the dual beneﬁts approach in Florida 
after 1993. This overview of North American systems of PPD beneﬁts 
would be remiss, however, if we did not mention that the dual beneﬁts 
approach is still alive and apparently operating well in several Canadian 
provinces, including Ontario and Saskatchewan. 
Observations
This section has identiﬁed six different systems of PPD beneﬁts, 
and others are possible. Several observations seem warranted, drawing 
in part on the survey of state PPD programs by Barth and Niss (1999).
First, the most common type appears to be System I, in which both 
scheduled and nonscheduled beneﬁts are based on the permanent im-
pairment approach. Barth and Niss (1999) reported that about 13 juris-
dictions use this approach.30
Second, Systems III and VI, which contain elements of the actual 
wage loss approach that begin for some types of injuries at the date of 
MMI, appear to be under threat, at least in the United States. Florida 
has abandoned the dual beneﬁts system (System VI), and Pennsylvania, 
which has used a variant of System III (in which scheduled beneﬁts are 
based on the impairment approach and the nonscheduled beneﬁts based 
on the actual wage loss approach)31 has recently added a qualiﬁcation 
that beneﬁts can be reduced even if the worker does not have actual 
earnings in the permanent disability period so long as the employer 
can establish that light-duty work is available within commuting dis-
tance.32
Third, use of System V, the hybrid approach, has received some 
recent interest. Florida used this approach between 1994 and 2003, and 
the current Connecticut and Texas statutes provide impairment beneﬁts 
followed by wage loss beneﬁts.
Fourth, I again want to emphasize the critical distinction between 1) 
the permanent impairment operational approach and the loss of earning 
capacity approach, and 2) the actual wage loss approach. The perma-
nent impairment and loss of earning capacity approaches will pay PPD 
beneﬁts even if there is no actual loss of earnings so long as the worker 
can demonstrate that the work injury caused a diminution in one of the 
proxies for actual wage loss. In contrast, there must be actual losses of 
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earnings in the permanent disability period in order for beneﬁts to be 
paid in the actual wage loss approach.
Fifth, compromise and release agreements, in which workers release 
their claim to future beneﬁts in exchange for a lump-sum settlement, 
can turn the actual wage loss approach into the loss of earning capacity 
approach. That is, the compromise and release agreement transforms a 
case from one relying on the wage loss approach (where the amount of 
PPD beneﬁts is unknown until the end of the period of permanent dis-
ability or the worker reaches the statutory maximum for such beneﬁts) 
into a loss of earning capacity approach (where the amount of PPD 
beneﬁts is determined near the beginning of the period of permanent 
disability based on an assessment of the extent of loss of earning capac-
ity). 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF PPD BENEFITS
Each North American workers’ compensation program provides 
PPD beneﬁts. As previous sections indicate, there are three basic op-
erational approaches for PPD beneﬁts, which have been used to de-
sign a variety of systems of PPD beneﬁts. What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of the different operational approaches and PPD beneﬁt 
systems? This section provides ﬁve criteria that can be used to answer 
these questions and attempts some answers. There are several caveats 
to this exercise: the criteria are not universally endorsed, there are only 
a limited number of studies that use the criteria in the evaluation of 
PPD beneﬁts, the application of different criteria sometimes leads to 
conﬂicting assessments of the same program, and the existing literature 
generally does not compare the performance of the different basic op-
erational approaches or PPD beneﬁt systems. These caveats mean there 
are virtually endless opportunities for research in this area.
Adequate Beneﬁts
Deﬁnition of the adequacy criterion
The meaning of the adequacy criterion will only be brieﬂy exam-
ined here because the topic is extensively examined in Hunt (2004), 
which is the result of a multiyear study by the National Academy of 
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Social Insurance (NASI).33 The primary test for adequacy adopted by 
NASI can be explained by reference to Figure 4.9. The NASI standard 
is that after the date of MMI, PPD beneﬁts should replace two-thirds of 
the difference between the worker’s potential earnings (along line BC) 
and the worker’s actual earnings (along line FG). Alternatively stated, 
beneﬁts are adequate if the replacement rate—the PPD beneﬁts divided 
by “true” wage loss—is at least 66⅔ percent.34
Application of the adequacy criterion
The application of the adequacy criterion will also only be brieﬂy 
examined here because the topic is examined by Boden, Reville, and 
Biddle in Chapter 3 of this volume. The essence of their ﬁndings is 
that in the ﬁve jurisdictions they examined (California, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin), PPD beneﬁts replaced between 
16 and 26 percent of earnings losses in the 10 years after workers were 
injured, which meant the “replacement rates do not approach the two-
thirds benchmark for adequacy.”
Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005) include a useful list of research 
topics concerning the adequacy of PPD beneﬁts. What also needs to be 
examined is whether choices among the different operational approach-
es or PPD beneﬁt systems identiﬁed in this chapter make any difference 
in the quest for adequacy? There is no obvious reason why the choices 
should make a difference, and there is no obvious pattern between the 
extent of adequacy and the design of the PPD beneﬁt systems in the ﬁve 
jurisdictions studied by Boden, Reville, and Biddle. However, to the 
best of my knowledge, no one has studied this important question.
Another matter concerning adequacy discussed in Hunt (2004) is 
worth repeating. The best way to determine whether a state has ad-
equate beneﬁts is to conduct a wage loss study, which examines the 
actual earnings losses of and beneﬁts received by a large sample of in-
jured workers. But such studies are expensive and time consuming, and 
not all states have the requisite data. The issue is whether there is a mea-
sure of a state’s PPD beneﬁts that is relatively easy to calculate (such as 
the actuarial assessments of the state’s workers’ compensation statutory 
provisions reported by Thomason and Burton [2001]) that provides a 
satisfactory proxy for the results of a wage loss study.
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Equitable Beneﬁts
Deﬁnition of the equity criterion
The equity criterion for permanent disability beneﬁts has two di-
mensions: horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity re-
quires that workers who are equivalent should be treated equally.35 Thus 
workers with equal losses of earnings should receive equal beneﬁts.36 A 
narrow test of vertical equity requires that workers with different losses 
of income should receive beneﬁts proportional to their losses.37 A more 
general test for vertical equity only requires that there be a consistent 
relationship between losses and beneﬁts. A state may decide, for ex-
ample, that the proportion of beneﬁts to losses should increase (or de-
crease) as losses increase.38 
The previous paragraph applied the horizontal and vertical equity 
tests to the relationships between losses of earnings and beneﬁts (the 
replacement rates). However, the equity tests can be applied to other as-
pects of PPD cases. For example, do workers with the same PPD rating 
have the same replacement rates?39 Other aspects of cases to which the 
equity tests could be applied include the workers’ characteristics, such 
as age, occupation, and sex, the types of injuries experienced by work-
ers, and workers’ compensation system characteristics, such as whether 
the case was litigated or not.
Application of the equity criterion
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 341–353) compared earnings 
losses, beneﬁts, and replacement rates for California workers injured 
in 1968 for workers of different ages, injury types, severity of injuries, 
and three types of cases: 1) formal, in which a formal PPD rating was 
received from the Disability Evaluation Unit; 2) informal, in which an 
informal PPD rating was received; and 3) other. They found signiﬁcant 
equity problems with the California PPD beneﬁts as of that time, such 
as the lower replacement rates for contested cases with trunk injuries 
compared to injuries to other parts of the body. Similar equity problems 
were found for the PPD beneﬁts in Wisconsin and Florida.
Reville et al. (forthcoming) examined the equity of the PPD rat-
ing system in the California workers’ compensation program and found 
large differences among types of injuries in the relationship between 
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average disability ratings and average earnings losses. For example, 
PPD cases involving injuries to the elbow had a 1.86 ratio between the 
disability ratings and average earnings losses, while cases involving the 
shoulder had a 0.90 ratio between ratings and losses.
The 2004 amendments to the California workers’ compensation 
program will allow the program to adjust the ratings and beneﬁts for 
different types of injuries based on empirical evidence of the sort devel-
oped by Reville et al. (forthcoming), which should make a major con-
tribution to improving the equity of the California PPD beneﬁt system. 
But are there other operational approaches or beneﬁt systems that could 
do even a better job of providing PPD beneﬁts that are equitable? One 
of the rationales for the adoption of the wage loss approach in Florida 
in 1979 was a better ability to provide beneﬁts to workers in proportion 
to their earnings losses. But we lack evidence about whether the Florida 
wage loss approach (while it lasted) or the variants of wage loss ap-
proach used in other states achieved greater equity.40 
Delivery System Efﬁciency
Deﬁnition of the delivery system efﬁciency criterion
The beneﬁts and services in workers’ compensation are provided 
by a delivery system comprised of employers, carriers, state agencies, 
attorneys, doctors, and other participants. Berkowitz and Burton (1987, 
pp. 26–28) evaluated the efﬁciency of this delivery system by examin-
ing the relationship between two variables. One variable measures the 
administrative costs of providing beneﬁts incurred by the participants 
in the workers’ compensation delivery system. The other variable mea-
sures the quality of the workers’ compensation beneﬁts, where quality 
is assessed on the basis of one or more of the other criteria used to 
evaluate a PPD beneﬁts system, such as adequacy and equity.  
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 27–28) suggest that one meaning 
of delivery system efﬁciency, panoramic efﬁciency, is that beneﬁts of a 
particular quality are provided at the least possible administrative costs. 
Another meaning of delivery system efﬁciency, myopic efﬁciency, is 
only concerned with reducing administrative costs without concern for 
the quality of the program. 
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Application of the delivery system efﬁciency criterion 
Evaluation using the delivery system efﬁciency criterion is espe-
cially difﬁcult.41 For one thing, data on the expenses of administering 
the program that are borne by employers and others in the private sec-
tor, plus the amount of attorneys’ fees for both workers and employers, 
as well as other types of data relevant to the assessment of the efﬁciency 
of the delivery system are scarce. Another reason the delivery system 
efﬁciency criterion is hard to apply is that the quality of the beneﬁts and 
the administrative costs must be simultaneously considered in order to 
evaluate the panoramic efﬁciency of a state’s workers’ compensation 
program.
An important aspect of the delivery system efﬁciency test con-
cerns the delivery system model used to provide workers’ compensa-
tion beneﬁts. One model relies on an active state agency that makes 
many decisions itself, closely supervises the operation of employers 
and private carriers, and limits the role for attorneys.42 A considerably 
different model relies on the private parties, particularly attorneys, to 
make most of the decisions about beneﬁts payments.43 The agency is 
essentially passive, although it will resolve disputes brought to it by 
the private parties. An intermediate model involves a state agency that 
conducts a minimal review of decisions made by the private parties and 
that resolves disputes in a relatively high proportion of the cases, but 
that nonetheless relies on extensive attorney involvement to make the 
delivery system operate.44
How attorneys are used is an important feature differentiating these 
three delivery system models. As recounted by many commentators on 
the history of workers’ compensation, the original notion was that the 
elimination of the fault concept and the prescription of beneﬁts by stat-
ute would enable employees to protect their interests without external 
assistance. From that standpoint, the substantial reliance on lawyers 
suggests at the minimum a lack of myopic efﬁciency. And yet the in-
volvement of attorneys can also be viewed as a prima facie indictment 
of the idea that workers’ compensation laws can be self-administering; 
attorneys may be in the system because they help achieve the criteria 
of adequate and equitable beneﬁts. In other words, the involvement of 
attorneys may represent a lack of myopic efﬁciency but not necessarily 
a lack of panoramic efﬁciency.
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Whether, in fact, attorneys help achieve the equity and adequacy 
of beneﬁts is not clear a priori. On one hand, they receive fees that 
generally are subtracted from the workers’ awards, which, in a nominal 
sense, reduces the adequacy of the beneﬁts. On the other hand, attor-
neys may increase the awards in some cases in which they are involved 
and possibly have an indirect impact on the amount of beneﬁts in other 
cases in which they are not involved. Thus on a priori grounds, the 
impact of attorneys on the adequacy of beneﬁts is unclear. Likewise, 
the impact of attorneys on the equity of beneﬁts is unclear. They may 
take cases in which beneﬁts would otherwise be inappropriately low, 
or, alternatively, their involvement may be on a basis unrelated to the 
relative under compensation of the case, such as the worker’s member-
ship in a union.
Thomason and Burton (1993) studied the effect of attorney involve-
ment on the outcome of cases paying nonscheduled PPD beneﬁts in 
New York, and found that attorneys increase the probability of lump-
sum settlements, reduce the amounts of those settlements, and have no 
statistically signiﬁcant effect on the size of litigated awards. While this 
study is conﬁned to one state, it suggests that assuming the use of attor-
neys improves the adequacy or equity of PPD beneﬁts is inappropriate 
without supporting evidence.
Berkowitz and Burton (1987) compared Florida, California, and 
Wisconsin and concluded that Wisconsin had the best record of delivery 
system efﬁciency at the time. The Wisconsin beneﬁts were more ade-
quate and equitable than those in California and Florida, while the costs 
of the Wisconsin delivery system—including the expenses of operating 
the state agency as well as the cost of attorneys’ fees for claimants, em-
ployers, and carriers—were lower than those in the other two states.45
I am unaware of any research that systematically considers the pos-
sible relationship of delivery system efﬁciency to different operational 
approaches to beneﬁts and PPD beneﬁt systems. PPD beneﬁt systems 
that rely on the permanent impairment or loss of earnings capacity ap-
proaches to beneﬁts are likely to require fewer resources to operate than 
beneﬁt systems that incorporate elements of the actual wage loss ap-
proach (because the latter approach requires cases to remain open for 
extended periods and to be periodically monitored), which means the 
wage loss approach is probably less efﬁcient using the myopic meaning 
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of efﬁciency. But is the wage loss approach less or more efﬁcient using 
the panoramic meaning of efﬁciency?
Prevention, Compensation, and Rehabilitation (PCR) Efﬁciency
Deﬁnition of PCR system efﬁciency
PCR system efﬁciency is concerned with avoiding adverse effects 
of the PPD beneﬁts on the fundamental objectives of the workers’ dis-
ability system, namely to prevent injuries and diseases; to compensate 
disabled workers adequately and equitably; and to rehabilitate workers 
and return them to work.46 
Applying the PCR system efﬁciency criterion to the prevention 
objective
One of the objectives of the PCR system is the prevention of inju-
ries and diseases among workers. Increasing the level of PPD beneﬁts 
can have a number of effects on the behavior of employers and employ-
ees.47 Because the premiums for the employers of most workers are 
experience rated, the higher PPD beneﬁts cause the potential costs of 
the workers’ compensation program to increase for employers. These 
higher potential workers’ compensation costs should lead to behavioral 
changes by employers, which have been labeled the “safety effect.” The 
safety effect includes all those safety improvements (including not only 
changes in the physical plant, but changes in training, safety monitor-
ing, etc.) that are cost-effective. Although the theory that experience 
rating provides safety incentives has been postulated since the ﬁrst state 
workers’ compensation program was enacted in Wisconsin in 1911, 
there is still a controversy about whether that theory is valid. Thomason 
(2003) indicates that most recent studies show that experience rating 
does matter for safety, and to the extent this is true, then increasing PPD 
beneﬁts has an indirect effect that is desirable.
There are, however, other effects of increasing the level of PPD 
beneﬁts. A number of studies during the last 15 years have shown that, 
as statutory workers’ compensation beneﬁts rise, both claims frequen-
cy and the reported severity of injuries increase. For example, Butler 
(1994, I–85) indicates that claims frequency rises from 3 to 8 percent in 
response to a 10 percent increase in the real level of beneﬁts.
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Whether the increased frequency and severity are adverse conse-
quences of the higher PPD beneﬁts depends on the nature of the chang-
es in employee behavior that result in these increases. The “true injury 
effect” postulates that workers will take less care on the job (and thus 
incur more work injuries) because the higher beneﬁts mean they will 
have increased income security if they are injured. The “reporting ef-
fect” postulates that workers will report claims for injuries that would 
not have been reported in the absence of the greater monetary incentives 
resulting from the higher potential beneﬁts. The “duration effect” pos-
tulates that workers will extend their period of reported disability (and 
thus increase the apparent severity) because of the higher beneﬁts.48
If the evidence demonstrating that higher beneﬁts result in increased 
frequency and severity of injuries were due to the true injury effect, this 
would be considered an unintended and adverse consequence of the 
higher beneﬁts. Fortunately, Durbin and Butler (1998) report that most 
recent studies argue that the true injury effect is not the major reason 
for the positive relationship between beneﬁts and the measures of work-
place safety. Instead, the relationships appear to primarily be due to the 
reporting effect and the duration effect.
Applying the PCR system efﬁciency test to the rehabilitation 
objective
There are circumstances in which workers’ compensation beneﬁts 
can be so high as to induce the reporting effect or the duration effect, 
and in which greater utilization is an undesirable outcome. The most 
egregious example of PPD beneﬁts that were inadvertently designed to 
have a serious disincentive for reemployment is the wage loss beneﬁts 
enacted by the Florida legislature in 1979.49 The law provided that, once 
a worker experienced at least a 15 percent drop in income after the 
date of MMI due to the work injury, the PPD beneﬁts would replace 
95 percent of the wage loss above that 15 percent threshold. This ben-
eﬁt formula meant that, for a worker who had begun the rehabilitation 
process and had already returned to work one-third time, a decision 
to increase work to two-thirds time would lead to a reduction in PPD 
beneﬁts that would be 103 percent of the increase in net earnings (gross 
wages minus taxes) resulting from the additional hours worked. Surely 
this disincentive was an unintended and adverse consequence of the 
1979 Florida PPD beneﬁts scheme. Disincentives to this extent are not 
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inevitable in a wage loss system, but the poor design of these beneﬁts 
was one reason why the wage loss approach in Florida has subsequently 
been virtually vitiated. In short, the 1979 PPD beneﬁts in Florida failed 
to meet the PCR system efﬁciency test because the beneﬁts undermined 
the rehabilitation and return-to-work objective.
The wage loss approach appears to be more likely to undermine 
PCR efﬁciency than the impairment approach and the loss of earning 
capacity approach, since workers’ compensation beneﬁts are reduced 
if the worker has increased earnings, while the PPD beneﬁts are not 
affected by greater employment after the date of MMI in the other ap-
proaches. However, there has been little if any evidence on the magni-
tudes of the differences between the approaches in their ability to pro-
mote or hinder PCR efﬁciency.
Affordability
Affordability is concerned with designing a system of PPD beneﬁts 
that employers, workers, and the public can afford without serious ad-
verse consequences, such as loss of jobs. 
A historical perspective on affordability
Affordability generally has not been explicitly recognized as a cri-
terion for evaluating workers’ compensation programs in general and a 
system of PPD beneﬁts in particular. However, the importance of afford-
ability was recognized in the National Commission Report (National 
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws 1972, p. 125):
While the facts dictate that no State should hesitate to improve 
its workmen’s compensation program for fear of losing employers, 
unfortunately this appears to be an area where emotion too often 
triumphs over fact . . . whenever a State legislature contemplates 
an improvement in workmen’s compensation which will increase 
insurance costs, the legislators will hear claims from some em-
ployers that the increase in costs will force a business exodus. It 
will be virtually impossible for the legislators to know how genu-
ine are these claims . . .
When the sum of these inhibiting factors is considered, it 
seems likely that many States have been dissuaded from reform 
of their workmen’s compensation statute because of the specter 
Roberts.indb   103 6/7/2005   9:28:57 AM
104 Burton
of the vanishing employer, even if that apparition is a product of 
fancy not fact. A few States have achieved genuine reform, but 
most suffer with inadequate laws because of the drag of laws of 
competing States.
The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws 
offered a solution to the inhibitions to reform caused by potential em-
ployer departures. That solution was federal standards for 19 essential 
attributes of state workers’ compensation programs pertaining to extent 
of coverage and levels of beneﬁts. 
While the affordability issue was obviously important 30 years 
ago—it likely was the major reason why the commission recommended 
federal standards—it has become even more important in recent de-
cades. One ironical reason is the legacy of the commission. While fed-
eral standards were never enacted, for a period in the 1970s the threat 
of standards was taken seriously and many states improved the levels 
of cash beneﬁts in their workers’ compensation programs. One conse-
quence of the higher beneﬁts was higher costs: the average costs nation-
ally peaked at about 2.2 percent of payroll in the early 1990s, almost 
double the percentage in the early 1970s. Employers’ costs relative to 
payroll have since dropped in response to various factors, including a 
declining injury rate and more stringent eligibility rules for workers’ 
compensation programs (Spieler and Burton 1998). Moreover, the dif-
ferences in costs of workers’ compensation insurance have probably 
widened since 1972,50 which means the specter of the vanishing em-
ployer is more credible now than it was when the National Commission 
characterized the threat as “a product of fancy not fact.” Compounding 
the runaway employer concern in recent years is the substantial loss of 
manufacturing jobs in many states and the widely publicized bout with 
high workers’ compensation costs in California.
Affordability for whom?
The deﬁnition of the affordability criterion indicated that the pur-
pose is to design a system of PPD beneﬁts that employers, workers, and 
the public can afford without serious adverse consequences, such as 
loss of jobs. The primary focus in the affordability discussion is usually 
on the costs of workers’ compensation to employers in the form of in-
surance premiums or the equivalent expenditures by self-insuring em-
ployers. However, the affordability criteria must be formulated in terms 
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of the three possible bearers of the costs of workers’ compensation.51 
Employers are likely to bear much of the cost of higher workers’ 
compensation premiums in the short run in the form of lower proﬁts, 
and in the long run are also likely to experience some reduction in prof-
its. Consumers also bear part of the cost of higher workers’ compensa-
tion beneﬁts and premiums in the long run in the form of higher prices 
and reduced consumption. Workers also bear part of the cost of higher 
workers’ compensation beneﬁts and premiums in the long run in the 
form of lower wages and less employment. The empirical evidence sug-
gests that workers bear most of the costs of higher beneﬁts in the form 
of lower wages. To be sure, workers are also the primary beneﬁcia-
ries of the higher beneﬁts, but those beneﬁts are largely paid for by the 
workers in the form of lower wages.
This point is worth emphasizing because the debates over work-
ers’ compensation reform in general, and PPD reform in particular, are 
generally cast as a trade-off between adequacy of beneﬁts (which pre-
sumably is primarily of interest to workers) and affordability (which 
presumably is primarily of interest to employers). In fact, there are posi-
tive aspects for employers of more adequate beneﬁts (including higher 
morale and greater productivity among workers who feel they are being 
treated fairly, as well as the lower wages that eventually will result from 
the higher beneﬁts),52 and there are negative aspects for workers from 
higher beneﬁts (including loss of jobs and lower wages). 
Observations on the Criteria
There is a danger expanding the evaluation criterion from the tradi-
tional trinity (adequacy, equity, and efﬁciency) to the ﬁve criteria pre-
sented in this chapter. This is particularly true because the criteria often 
come into conﬂict in evaluating PPD beneﬁt systems, and the more cri-
teria we use, the greater the number of conﬂicts and trade-offs that must 
be considered in the evaluation process.
I am persuaded, however, that the use of all ﬁve criteria serves a 
useful purpose. Efﬁciency is a term that has been used by some econo-
mists to include both what I term delivery system efﬁciency and preven-
tion compensation, and rehabilitation system efﬁciency, and the explicit 
separation should help distinguish between the two meanings of efﬁ-
ciency. Affordability has seldom been explicitly mentioned as a crite-
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rion, but has always been an implicit factor lurking in the background. 
Indeed, in recent years, affordability may have de facto become the 
dominant criterion in the reform of PPD beneﬁts in many states, and ex-
plicit recognition of affordability as a criterion may improve the policy 
debates associated with efforts to reform PPD beneﬁts.
Researchers and policymakers may ﬁnd my list of ﬁve evaluation 
criteria too cumbersome, and I encourage efforts to develop a more 
parsimonious set of evaluations standards. Yet there is also the possibil-
ity that the list of factors that govern the design of PPD beneﬁt systems 
is incomplete. Perhaps a missing criterion that would help explain the 
evolution of PPD beneﬁt systems is risk minimization or risk shifting: 
how can the system be designed to reduce the overall uncertainty as-
sociated with the payment of PPD beneﬁts, or how can the system be 
designed to reduce the risks of long-term disability borne by the partici-
pants in the workers’ compensation system with the greatest political 
inﬂuence?
CONCLUSIONS 
I have tried to provide an organized approach to examining PPD ben-
eﬁts, to summarize some of the research literature, and to pose some areas 
where additional research is needed. I conclude by posing a few more 
questions I hope a new generation of scholars will examine.
One question that warrants contemplation is whether the conceptual 
framework presented in the second section is the most useful organi-
zational structure for research and operational purposes? For example, 
perhaps the number of consequences can be reduced: the Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment published by the American Medical 
Association (2000) do not distinguish between permanent impairments 
and functional limitations.
The ﬁfth section provides an overview of how the states design their 
systems of PPD beneﬁts. Are the six systems the best way to categorize 
the many varieties of state laws? And what explains why different states 
have adopted similar or different PPD beneﬁt systems? Moreover, how 
do we explain why some states (such as New Jersey) have PPD beneﬁt 
systems that have basically been unchanged since the early years of 
workers’ compensation in the United States, while other states have 
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made major changes in their systems? The most notable example of a 
state that has tried a variety of approaches in the last 40 years is Florida. 
Is this due to a commendable willingness to learn from weaknesses of 
prior approaches, or to impatience, or to unrealistic expectations?
The ﬁnal section offers several criteria for the evaluation of PPD 
beneﬁt systems. In addition to the questions I raise about whether the 
list of criteria is too long or too short (or just right!), more attention 
needs to be devoted to the trade-offs among the criteria. Thomason, 
Schmidle, and Burton (2001) present evidence that one of the major 
determinants of the employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insur-
ance is the percentage of cases paying PPD beneﬁts. They also devote 
a chapter to beneﬁt adequacy versus affordability, and conclude that if 
states were to adopt adequate beneﬁts (as prescribed by the Model Act 
issued by the Council of State Governments [1974]), the result would 
be substantially higher workers’ costs nationally, as well as greater dis-
persion of costs among states. Whether this trade-off between adequacy 
and affordability is accurate deserves scrutiny. The more fundamental 
point is that research and policy making would beneﬁt from explicit 
consideration of trade-offs among criteria, rather than reforms based on 
a single goal, such as reducing employers’ costs.
Notes
 1.  Workers’ compensation programs provide cash, medical, and rehabilitation ben-
eﬁts to workers disabled by work-related injuries and diseases. This chapter fo-
cuses solely on cash beneﬁts.
 2.  For this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, the term injuries includes both inju-
ries and diseases.
 3.  Steve Guo, a Rutgers University graduate student, is examining the determinants 
of interstate differences in incurred beneﬁts for his Master’s thesis.
 4.  A more extended discussion of the consequences of injuries is included in 
Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 5–13).
 5.  The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable is not as clear as the 
text suggests. For example, the quality of vocational rehabilitation is identiﬁed 
as a controllable factor in the progression from functional limitations to loss of 
earning capacity. However, for a particular worker in a state that does not require 
employers to provide vocational rehabilitation, vocational rehabilitation is ef-
fectively uncontrollable.
 6.  Although this deﬁnition of “true” wage loss is appropriate for many purposes, it 
is not the measure of wage loss typically encompassed in a workers’ compensa-
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tion statute, which usually measures restricted wage loss. That is, the worker’s 
earnings as of the date of injury are projected into the future at that level. Then 
the “restricted” wage loss is measured as the difference between the worker’s 
preinjury wages and the worker’s actual earnings after the date of injury. In gen-
eral, “restricted” wage loss is smaller than “true” wage loss. 
 7.  The issues of measuring wage losses and beneﬁts are also examined in Berkow-
itz and Burton (1987, pp. 365–389). 
 8.  An extended discussion of which consequences should be compensable is pro-
vided in Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 20–22).
 9.  Some jurisdictions do not compensate for pain and suffering per se, but do con-
sider pain and suffering in determining the extent of the loss of earning capacity 
resulting from the injury. Thus in the California workers’ compensation program, 
Swezey (2003, § 5.40) indicates, “It is important to note that pain and suffering 
as such are not ratable. Pain is ratable only to the extent it causes disability.”
10.  The National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws (1972, 
p. 38) justiﬁed the payment of impairment beneﬁts in terms of a broad set of 
consequences: “The argument for impairment beneﬁts is that many workers with 
work-related injuries or diseases experience losses which are not reﬂected in lost 
remuneration. Permanent impairment involves lifetime effects on the personality 
and on normal activity.”
 11.  This chapter uses the terms states, provinces, and jurisdictions interchangeably.
 12.  This three-category scheme is adapted from the taxonomy in Berkowitz and Bur-
ton (1987).
 13.  The rating systems for this approach typically contain a mixture of impair-
ment ratings (amputations are given a speciﬁed rating without any requirement 
to measure the resulting loss of function) and functional limitations ratings (loss 
of use of a limb typically is rated by examining the loss of function caused by the 
injury).
 14.  Idaho uses the “pure” loss of earning capacity approach for nonscheduled PPD 
beneﬁts. The degree of loss of earning capacity is multiplied by 500 weeks to 
determine the duration of the beneﬁts. The weekly beneﬁt is 55 percent of the 
state average weekly wage for all workers.
 15.  States differ on which of the permanent consequences (permanent impairment, 
functional limitations, or loss of earning capacity) must be demonstrated, and 
differ as well on the extent of these consequences that are required for wage loss 
beneﬁts to be paid.
 16.  In both Florida and Ontario, the primary basis for assessment has been the AMA 
Guides. Research by Sinclair and Burton (1995) on noneconomic loss beneﬁts in 
Ontario raises serious doubts about the appropriateness of using the AMA Guides 
permanent impairment ratings as a proxy for the extent of noneconomic loss. 
 17.  Additional examples of programs that distinguish between injuries and diseases 
are included in Reville et al. (2005, Appendix A1). The examples are from U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce (2003, Chart IV).
18.  In addition, states commonly schedule beneﬁts for the enucleation of an eye and 
for hearing and vision loss.
Roberts.indb   108 6/7/2005   9:28:58 AM
Permanent Partial Disability Beneﬁts   109
 19.  Examples of the “unitary rating system” are the System IV and System V PPD 
Beneﬁts discussed in the next subsection.
 20.  The six systems of PPD beneﬁts are based in part on Burton (1996). In the cur-
rent study, the states were assigned to the categories largely based on the descrip-
tions of the PPD beneﬁts included in Barth and Niss (1999), who may not agree 
with the systems used in this chapter. Some states, e.g., Arizona and New York, 
are classiﬁed differently by Barth and Niss than in my taxonomy.
 21.  The distinction between scheduled and nonscheduled injuries in Wisconsin is 
similar to that in New Jersey, with injuries to arms, legs, hands, etc., listed in the 
statutory schedule, while injuries to backs and internal organs are nonscheduled 
injuries. The scheduled durations in the two jurisdictions differ, however. An 
arm, for example, is worth 500 weeks in Wisconsin compared to 330 weeks in 
New Jersey. 
 22.  The scheduled durations are, to be sure, different among the states, with the New 
York arm worth only 312 weeks.
23.  This is a crucial difference between the true wage loss approach and the loss of 
earning capacity approach; a worker who experiences a loss of earning capacity 
but has no actual loss of earnings is precluded from beneﬁts in the wage loss ap-
proach but is not precluded in the loss of earning capacity approach.
24.  The worker’s eligibility for nonscheduled beneﬁts, as well as the weekly amount 
of those beneﬁts, can change through time in jurisdictions using the wage loss 
approach. For example, in New York a worker whose case is initially closed with 
no beneﬁts because of no present wage loss can reopen the case for up to 18 years 
after the date of injury or 8 years after the last beneﬁt payments. PPD beneﬁts can 
commence after the reopening if the work injury is then causing lost earnings. 
 25.  As discussed by Berkowitz and Burton (1987, pp. 244–248) the exact variant 
of the actual wage loss approach used for New York workers with at least some 
actual wage loss depends on whether the worker has any earnings during the 
permanent disability period. If the worker has some earnings, then the “pure” ac-
tual wage loss approach (Operational Approach III.A) is used. Thus, if a worker 
had preinjury wages of $500 per week and returns to employment at $200 per 
week, the nonscheduled beneﬁts is two-thirds of the wage loss, which means 
the weekly beneﬁt is $200. (The weekly PPD beneﬁt is subject to a maximum 
amount, which as of 2004 is $400 per week.) If the worker does not have any 
earnings in the permanent disability period, then the limited actual wage loss ap-
proach (Operational Approach III.B) is used. The worker’s loss of earning capac-
ity is evaluated and serves as a limit on the worker’s wage loss. Thus, if a worker 
had preinjury wages of $500, does not return to work and is rated as having a 50 
percent loss of earning capacity, the weekly PPD beneﬁt is $166.67. 
 26.  The use of compromise and release agreements in the New York workers’ com-
pensation program was examined in Thomason and Burton (1993).
 27.  The life pension is a weekly beneﬁt that is 1.5 percent of the worker’s preinjury 
wage for each 1 percent of disability over 60 percent (subject to a maximum weekly 
beneﬁt) Swezey (2003, Sec. 5.9). The California PPD beneﬁts system draws an-
other distinction among workers depending on the magnitude of the disability 
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rating. A disability rating of 100 percent qualiﬁes the worker for permanent total 
disability beneﬁts for life. A disability rating between 1 and 69.75 percent quali-
ﬁes a worker for PPD beneﬁts. For workers with a disability rating between 70 
and 99.75, the worker qualiﬁes for PPD beneﬁts using the formula summarized 
above, and when those PPD beneﬁts expire, the worker qualiﬁes for a life pen-
sion.
 28.  Texas and Florida use Operational Approach I.B (the permanent impairment and 
preinjury approach) for the initial phase of their PPD beneﬁts and Operational 
Approach III.B (the limited actual wage loss approach) for the second phase of 
their PPD beneﬁts. Connecticut uses Operational Approach I.B (the permanent 
impairment and preinjury approach) for the initial phase of the PPD beneﬁts 
and Operational Approach III.A (the “pure” actual wage loss approach) for the 
second phase of the PPD beneﬁts. 
 29.  The possibility that a worker with a single injury could receive both impairment 
and wage loss beneﬁts is different than the System I, II, and III PPD beneﬁts, 
where a worker with a single injury qualiﬁes for either scheduled or nonsched-
uled beneﬁts. (There are occasional exceptions to this pronouncement regarding 
System I and System II beneﬁts, such as a scheduled injury that has psychologi-
cal overlays that are nonscheduled.)
 30.  The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) (1995) indicated that 
of the 42 states in which some permanent partial injuries are compensated on a 
nonscheduled basis, eight states use the actual wage loss approach, 26 states use 
the impairment approach, and 14 states use some other approach (in most cases, 
probably the loss of earning capacity approach). As indicated in my review of the 
NCCI Inventory (Burton 1995), I think that Arizona is actually a loss of earning 
capacity state (not a wage loss state) and that New York is actually a wage loss 
state (not an “other” state). However, these misclassiﬁcations should not affect 
the textual conclusion that the System I version of PPD beneﬁts, in which the 
impairment approach is used for nonscheduled beneﬁts, is the most common 
system.
 31.  Pennsylvania’s PPD beneﬁts are described in Berkowitz and Burton (1987, 
Chapter 8).
 32.  A brief report on the recent “reforms” of the Pennsylvania workers’ compensa-
tion law is provided at 7 BNA’s Workers’ Compensation Report 319 (June 14, 
1996).
 33.  Examinations of the adequacy criterion are also found in Berkowitz and Burton 
(1987, pp. 365–373) and Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005).
34.  This formulation of the adequacy test assumes that the sole purpose of PPD cash 
beneﬁts is to compensate for work disability.
 35.  The equity tests can be applied to workers within a state (e.g., do workers in 
Idaho with equal losses of earnings receive equal beneﬁts, thus satisfying the 
horizontal equity test for that jurisdiction?) as well as to workers in different 
states (e.g., do workers in Indiana and Massachusetts with similar losses of wag-
es receive similar beneﬁts, thus satisfying an interstate horizontal equity test?). 
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36.  If workers A and B both have $1,000 of earnings losses, and worker A receives 
$700 of beneﬁts (and thus has a 70 percent replacement rate) and worker B re-
ceives $300 of beneﬁts (a 30 percent replacement rate), then the horizontal eq-
uity test has been violated.
 37.  If worker C has $5,000 of earnings losses and received $3,000 of beneﬁts, while 
worker D has $10,000 of earnings losses, then the narrow test of vertical equity 
requires that worker D receive $6,000 of beneﬁts (so that the replacement rate for 
both workers is 60 percent). 
38.  Although the general formulation of vertical equity is more difﬁcult to translate 
into empirical tests than the narrow test, reasonable requirements appear to be 1) 
that the ratio of beneﬁts to earnings consistently increase (or decrease) as earn-
ings losses increase, and not ﬂuctuate as losses increase, and 2) that there should 
be no abrupt changes in the ratio of beneﬁts to earnings losses as those losses 
increase. The more general test of vertical equity would be violated if worker 
E had $1,000 of earning losses and received $700 of beneﬁts (for a 70 percent 
replacement rate), worker F had $2,000 of earnings losses and received $1,000 of 
beneﬁts (for a 50 percent replacement rate), and worker G had $3,000 of earnings 
losses and received $2,700 of beneﬁts (for a 90 percent replacement rate).
39.  If worker H has a 10 percent PPD rating and a 40 percent replacement rate, while 
worker I has a 10 percent PPD rating and a 70 percent replacement rate, there is 
a lack of horizontal equity among PPD ratings. 
40.  It appears likely that the widespread use of compromise and release agreements 
in Florida undercut the potential for greater equity from beneﬁts based on the 
wage loss approach, but that is mere speculation.
41.  Roberts (2003) is one of the few studies that have examined the efﬁciency of 
workers’ compensation delivery systems, including the effects of workers’ com-
pensation agency activism on outcomes for employers, employees, and insur-
ance carriers.
42.  Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used Wisconsin as an example of this approach.
43.  Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used the federally operated Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensate Act as an example of this approach.
44.  Berkowitz and Burton (1987) used Florida and California as examples of this 
approach when they conducted their study of workers injured in 1968.
45.  The positive assessment of the efﬁciency of the Wisconsin workers’ compensa-
tion program is based on a study involving injuries that occurred in 1968. Based 
on inconsistent and fragmentary information, I am not certain that the current 
Wisconsin workers’ compensation program would receive an equally positive 
assessment. Boden, Reville, and Biddle (2005) found that the PPD beneﬁts in 
Wisconsin were less adequate than the PPD beneﬁts in the other four jurisdic-
tions examined in their study. In addition, Berkowitz and Pascale (1995) graded 
the annual reports of state workers’ compensation agencies, and Wisconsin was 
one of the six jurisdictions that received an F because it had not issued an annual 
report. However, in a more recent evaluation of workers’ compensation agency 
websites, Berkowitz (2001) assigned Wisconsin (and 12 other jurisdictions) an A 
grade.
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46.  The prevention, compensation, and rehabilitation system includes an array of 
programs. The prevention components of the workers’ compensation program 
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act; the cash beneﬁts provided by public 
programs (such as workers’ compensation and the disability insurance compo-
nent of the Social Security system), and by employers (such as long-term dis-
ability beneﬁts); the health care provided by public programs (such as workers’ 
compensation and Medicaid) and by employers (such as group health plans); 
and the rehabilitation provided by workers’ compensation programs and by state 
vocational rehabilitation agencies are examples of these programs.
47.  These behavioral effects are discussed in Butler (1994) and Burton and Chelius 
(1997).
48.  The threefold distinction among the true injury effect, the reporting effect, and 
the duration effect is an extension of the twofold distinction used by Butler 
(1994).
49.  This provision of the Florida law is examined in more detail in Burton (1983, pp. 
40–49).
50.  Burton and Schmidle (1992, Table 8, pp. 1–15) indicate that the means and stan-
dard deviations (in parentheses) for average insurance rates for 44 insurance 
classes for weighted observations from 42 states were 0.772 (0.273) in 1972 
and 0.996 (0.339) in 1975. Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (2001, Table C.18, 
p. 376) report that the means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the 
average insurance rates for 71 insurance classes for weighted observations for 
42 states were 0.910 (0.377) in 1975 and 2.929 (0.823) in 1995. The standard de-
viation is a statistical measure of the dispersion among the observations (in this 
case, states) and thus the data indicate the dispersion among states in the costs 
of workers’ compensation insurance roughly tripled between 1972 and 1995. 
Although more recent data using a consistent measure or workers’ compensation 
insurance rates are not available, it seems unlikely that the interstate differences 
in the costs of workers’ compensation insurance have narrowed appreciably 
since 1995.
 51.  This discussion of the incidence of the costs of the workers’ compensation pro-
gram is based on Chelius and Burton (1992, 1994), which are reprinted in Bur-
ton and Schmidle (1995). Their approach is summarized in Leigh et al. (2000, 
p. 178) who assert “Chelius and Burton (1994) conclude that all premiums are 
passed down to workers in the form of lower wages. They acknowledge that 
their conclusion is ‘radical’ (25).” More precisely, Chelius and Burton (1994, 
pp. 24–25) summarized the research of Moore and Viscusi (1990) as “radical” 
in this passage: “The conclusion that may be inferred from the ﬁnding of this 
study—that higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts, from the employer’s per-
spective, more than pay for themselves in the form of lower wages—is a radical 
one that undoubtedly will be sharply contested by many members of the workers’ 
compensation community.” Chelius and Burton’s own views were more modest 
(1994, p. 26): “We have a reasonable degree of conﬁdence that social science 
research has indeed provided an answer to our question of who actually pays for 
workers’ compensation: a substantial proportion of workers’ compensation costs 
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(and even, according to some estimates, all of the costs) are shifted onto work-
ers.” (Italics in the original.)
52.  If the costs of higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts are largely paid for by em-
ployees in the form of lower wages and reduced employment, then why do em-
ployers place so much emphasis on the affordability criterion when reforms of 
PPD beneﬁts are undertaken? First, many employers are unaware of the economic 
analysis that suggests that workers bear much of the costs of improved beneﬁts in 
the form of lower wages. Or, if they are aware of the argument, they are not per-
suaded by the logic or supporting evidence. Second, in the short run, the costs of 
higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts are largely borne by employers in the form 
of lower proﬁts until prices and wages can be adjusted to reﬂect these higher costs. 
 Third, the affordability issue does not just involve employers and workers 
in the U.S. workers’ compensation programs, but also involves private carriers. 
Much of the zeal for reform of PPD beneﬁts in the early 1990s can be traced to 
the signiﬁcant underwriting losses that workers’ compensation carriers experi-
enced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Whatever advantages may accrue to 
employers from more adequate beneﬁts, much of the cost of the workers’ com-
pensation program was being borne by carriers for whom higher workers’ com-
pensation insurance rates were harder to obtain from employers and regulators 
than were lower insurance rates resulting from legislative reforms that reduced 
beneﬁts.
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Issues in Workers’ Compensation 
Appeals System Reform
Douglas E. Hyatt
University of Toronto
The workers’ compensation system in North America is a result of 
discontent with tort litigation, an earlier mechanism used to resolve dis-
putes between workers and their employers over workplace injuries and 
diseases. Legislators and other policymakers in the United States and 
Canada concluded that tort suits favored the “propertied class” by plac-
ing a number of legal barriers in front of workers who sought restitution 
for workplace injuries. While legislative interventions began to erode 
traditional common law defenses of employers, it was still a widely 
held belief that, in the interests of societal peace, a more automatic ap-
proach to compensating injured workers needed to evolve outside of 
the courts.1 
Workers’ compensation statutes sought to create a set of rules that 
would be applied to the assessment of work injury claims for cash and 
medical beneﬁts. The result was a program that determined eligibil-
ity and beneﬁt amounts based not on fault but on whether the injury 
was related to work, and on an assignment of cash beneﬁts based on 
a schedule. This statutory approach was designed to reduce the cost, 
time, uncertainty, and adversarial proceedings that were hallmarks of 
tort compensation. One goal was to effectively remove litigation from 
the process.
Over time, however, litigation has been reintroduced into workers’ 
compensation, which, to some observers, has resulted in a replication of 
the woes of the tort system that workers’ compensation replaced. Dis-
content with the processes and, especially in Canada, with the outcomes 
of workers’ compensation appeals—which I will argue are often the 
result of other upheavals in the primary adjudication rather than prob-
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lems with the appeals process itself—have resulted in calls for reform 
to which policymakers have responded.
This chapter is written at a time when discontent with appeals sys-
tems in workers’ compensation is at an ebb. This is partially due to 
the slow pace in Canada of fundamental reforms in the way injured 
workers’ are compensated, and therefore confusion and uncertainty 
are reduced. It is also the case that there are fewer injuries, or at least 
workers’ compensation claims, than there were in the past. However, 
there are always new compensation issues brewing, and if history is any 
guide, the current calm is unlikely to last.
When discontent does ﬂare in Canadian provinces, a common re-
sponse is the formation of a commission to investigate the problems 
and make recommendations for improvement. I have been involved 
in several such commissions, including directing the research for two, 
and beneﬁted from the good counsel of my friend and colleague Terry 
Thomason in both instances. Often, the membership of the commis-
sion consists of people who have not been directly involved in workers’ 
compensation. There are two results: First, the commissioners quickly 
begin to appreciate the complexity of workers’ compensation, especial-
ly the interrelatedness of policies and procedures in various aspects of 
the program. It becomes evident very quickly that decisions taken to re-
solve one problem may very well undermine the foundation under other 
policies and procedures. The second reaction is that, given the obvious 
and serious failings in the jurisdiction’s program, every other work-
ers’ compensation system “must be dealing with the vexatious issues 
better than we are!” The commissioners soon discover, however, that 
there are very few twenty dollar bills lying on the sidewalk of workers’ 
compensation.
This chapter draws together the experiences of two commissions of 
inquiry into workers’ compensation in Canada—one in Ontario in 1995 
and the other in British Columbia in 1998. There are two main goals 
for the chapter: 1) to review what I believe emerged as the central driv-
ers of the reintroduction of litigation into the workers’ compensation 
system, and 2) to set out some central policy issues in workers’ com-
pensation appeals for which there has been little research. These policy 
issues were common to both inquiries and, as we discovered through 
our research, common to those confronted by workers’ compensation 
authorities around the globe.2
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REINTRODUCING LITIGATION TO WORK INJURY 
COMPENSATION
At its essence, a good workers’ compensation system delivers 1) a 
reasonably fair method of collecting funds for the purpose of providing 
medical and ﬁnancial support to injured workers, and 2) a reasonably 
fair method of distributing those funds. Discontent with the workers’ 
compensation system arises when the “fairness” in either of these ele-
ments is breached. An initial expectation for the workers’ compensation 
system was that it would deliver fairness to workers and employers in a 
way that the courts could not—on a timely, cost-effective basis. Work-
ers’ compensation claims adjudicators, armed with legislation, regula-
tion, and operational policy, would make decisions based on the merits 
of each claim, without undue regard to precedence and with no regard 
to fault.
However, as the nature of work evolved over the last 100 years, 
and the nature and relative importance of various work injuries and dis-
eases were transformed, the workers’ compensation system was slow 
to adapt. Discontent among the stakeholders with adjudication deci-
sions grew with the perceptions that some decisions were being made 
with little consultation between the adjudicators and the stakeholders, 
and that accountability for explaining the basis of decisions was absent. 
In this section, I argue that the increasing complexity of work-related 
injuries, the stakeholder demands for due process that have resulted in 
the introduction and expansion of appeal rights, and the inconsisten-
cies in the claims adjudication process brought to light by worker and 
employer appeals that give “economic value” to appeals, are intimately 
related to the growth of litigation involving work injury compensation. 
The Growing Complexity of Workplace Injuries
As has been well-documented, the deﬁnitions of a worker, the work-
place and an injury or a disease, as well as the guidelines that work-
ers’ compensation claims adjudicators have at their disposal to guide 
them in determining whether an injury or disease arose out of, or in the 
course of, employment have become more ambiguous as the nature of 
work and employment relationships have evolved. Thomason, Hyatt, 
and Roberts (1998, pp. 269–270) summarized these developments:
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. . . workers’ compensation programs have become increasingly 
litigious, adding substantially to costs. In part, these perceptions 
have been fueled by an expansion of the deﬁnition of disability. 
The scope of compensable conditions has broadened to include 
soft tissue injuries, repetitive strain syndromes, psychological dis-
orders, and a variety of occupational diseases. Accurate diagnosis 
of these conditions is problematic so that it is difﬁcult to establish 
the extent of disability. For soft tissue injuries, repetitive trauma 
syndromes, and psychological ailments, diagnosis is primarily 
based on subjective symptoms. For all these conditions, it is also 
difﬁcult to determine whether or not and to what extent the condi-
tion is work-related.
The traditional model of a worker employed in a manufacturing 
facility or on a construction site has represented fewer workers in each 
decade dating back to the advent of workers’ compensation. Workers 
are now more likely to suffer disabilities that did not have an immediate 
onset, such as repetitive strain and other soft-tissue injuries. Increas-
ingly, injuries and disease occur for which work may have been only 
one of many contributing factors. And, workers are now more likely 
to work outside of a traditional workplace, such as in their homes or 
out of their vehicles. Indeed, it may even be the case that some of the 
changes in the workplace (for example, hiring independent contractors 
for whom the employer may not be responsible for providing workers’ 
compensation coverage) have been driven to a degree by the costs to the 
employer of workers’ compensation. 
Workers’ compensation legislation and policy have lagged behind 
the evolution of work and work-related injuries. To a large extent, the 
statutory language and legal doctrines used to determine which workers 
are covered and which injuries and diseases are work-related are rem-
nants of the early twentieth century.
Policy vacuums in workers’ compensation often result in denials of 
claims that are unfamiliar, which then draws appeals from the injured 
workers, or by the acceptance of unfamiliar claims, which then draws 
appeals by employers (particularly experience-rated employers). Until 
the 1970s, access to appeals bodies was largely missing from Canadian 
workers’ compensation programs.
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The “Due Process Revolution”
Appeals bodies are relatively recent additions to Canadian work-
ers’ compensation systems. While formal appeals processes had been 
sought by injured workers and employers almost since the inception 
of workers’ compensation, such demands were resisted and rejected 
by workers’ compensation administrators, commissions of inquiry, and 
legislators. This changed most dramatically in the 1970s during what 
Law (2000) has termed the “due process revolution” in workers’ com-
pensation. 
It seems odd that workers’ compensation was largely without se-
rious appeals mechanisms, given that the system has now become so 
used to them, and in fact come to rely upon them. The central reason 
for the absence of an appeals structure during the pre-1970s period was 
that it ran contrary to what workers’ compensation was supposed to 
be—a purely administrative decision-making process in which the facts 
are collected, eligibility determined, and compensation paid based on 
legislations, policies, and procedures. As the Sloan Commission (1942) 
in British Columbia, Canada, concluded, opening up avenues for ap-
peal would impair the system’s delivery of “quick, summary and ﬁnal 
decisions.”3
When workers’ compensation authorities began to consider the 
structure of the appeals process, they were confronted with the same 
questions that are faced by policymakers today. How many levels of 
appeals should there be? Should higher levels of appeal be restricted to 
reviewing previous decisions and evidence, or should they be de novo 
hearings? In addition to the increasing complexity of claims resulting 
from changes in the workplace, the appeals structure brought a new 
level of procedural complexity, which required specialized knowledge 
in order to process claims.
Many Canadian workers’ compensation authorities responded in 
part to the need for specialized knowledge by introducing representa-
tion into the workers’ compensation system. The innovation this time 
(compared to the use of attorneys in tort suits prior to the introduction of 
workers’ compensation) was that the representation was largely free of 
charge. “Worker advisors” and “employer advisors” became common 
forms of representation provided by workers’ compensation systems to 
assist with the claims process and to provide representation at appeals 
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proceedings. Hyatt and Kralj (2000) found empirical support for what 
many participants in the Ontario workers’ compensation system conjec-
tured to be the case—that worker advisors were good at what they did. 
Hyatt and Kralj found that representation from the worker advisors not 
only increased the likelihood that workers’ appeals were granted, but 
worker advisors also achieved better results for injured workers than 
lawyers, union representatives, or any other form of representation.
The inﬂuence of worker and employer representation is not felt just 
at the stage of appealing an adjudicator’s decision. Indeed, advocacy 
can start from square one, the ﬁling of a claim. Anecdotal evidence 
from claims adjudicators in Canada suggests that both worker and em-
ployer advocates have become more active in trying to inﬂuence deci-
sions at the primary adjudication level. This can take the form of calling 
adjudicators to follow up on claims, and ensuring that adjudicators have 
all relevant information to adjudicate the claim. 
To the extent that this more aggressive form of advocacy puts useful 
information in the hands of the adjudicator, it can be enormously help-
ful, and may even further the timeliness of the process, if the adjudicator 
is not required to gather the information on his or her own. However, it 
was common in the commissions of inquiries in which I have participat-
ed to hear concerns that in many cases an advocate puts pressure on an 
adjudicator to expedite the decision process. Furthermore, an advocate 
may suggest that a decision contrary to the result he or she is advancing 
will result in complaints to the adjudicator’s supervisor or an appeal of 
the decision, and that these pressures and suggestions may cause the ad-
judicator to pay the claim (or not), and leave it to the appeals structure 
to mop up the mess left by a misadjudicated claim.
The due process revolution gave employers and workers recourse 
for adjudicative decisions that were either faulty or perceived as faulty. 
Further, the outcomes of the appeals process illuminated shortcomings 
in policy and adjudication processes that needed to be addressed by 
workers’ compensation authorities, including the need for remedial ac-
tion on previously mishandled claims. The availability of advocates 
well-versed in workers’ compensation matters gave the parties the nec-
essary expertise to realize the “economic value” of uncertainty that had 
been growing in the workers’ compensation system.
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The Impact of Inconsistencies in Adjudication and Appeals 
Outcomes
The due process revolution resulted in appeals bodies, which, like 
most other administrative law tribunals in Canada, are independent in 
the sense that panels of the tribunal are not bound by precedence and 
are mandated to decide appeals based on the merits of the case. Coupled 
with the changing nature of workers’ compensation claims (the uncer-
tainty with respect to beneﬁt entitlement—“no” does not necessarily 
mean “no” and “yes” does not necessarily mean “yes” when initial de-
cisions can be appealed) the stakes to the parties of disputing adjudica-
tors’ decisions were raised.
The absence of policy and legislation in the face of a changing com-
pensation environment means that primary claims adjudicators are of-
ten on their own in the claims decision process when claims involving 
unfamiliar fact patterns are ﬁled. A consequence is that different adjudi-
cators may reach very different results on whether similar claims should 
be accepted for payment, as well as the type and duration of the awards. 
This variability in claims adjudication and appeals outcomes creates an 
“economic value” to contesting decisions. Variations in the outcomes 
of otherwise similar claims are rapidly disseminated in the worker and 
employer communities, and encourage appeals, in contrast to the ab-
sence of economic value of appealing a decision that is consistent with 
legislation, policy, and previous decisions so that an appeal is certain to 
be denied. Empirical evidence of the inﬂuence of uncertainty on appeals 
has been advanced by Thomason (1991), Roberts (1992), and Thoma-
son and Burton (1993). These studies demonstrated that measures of 
award variability and the time between the date of the injury and receipt 
of payment (a proxy for uncertainty) were associated with an increased 
likelihood of a dispute (or a decrease in the likelihood of a settlement).
Uncertainty that encourages claims and appeals from initial deci-
sions can also arise from attention, or lack of attention, to cost consider-
ations. As described by Spieler and Burton (1998), recent decades have 
been characterized by a pendulum of workers’ compensation reform 
efforts in North America which have swung between an emphasis on 
adequacy of beneﬁts at one end and affordability at the other. From the 
perspective of the incentive to appeal, the issue is not whether it is inap-
propriate to make adjustments in the relative importance of adequacy 
Roberts.indb   123 6/7/2005   9:29:02 AM
124 Hyatt
and affordability, but rather that these types of pendulum swings simply 
cannot help but encourage appeals. 
Spieler and Burton (1998, p. 236) describe the focus on workers’ 
compensation costs and affordability that emerged in the 1990s.
The combination of rapidly increasing costs to employers and 
unproﬁtability for carriers beginning in the mid-1980s resulted 
in a backlash: affordability became the dominating criterion for 
reform during the 1990s. Employers and insurers mounted suc-
cessful political campaigns to reduce costs. We have documented 
the consequences in terms of cutbacks in beneﬁts, tougher eligibil-
ity standards, and new approaches to medical care and disability 
management.
Spieler and Burton (1998, p. 238) put the 1990s into a broader his-
torical context that highlights the pendulum swings in workers’ com-
pensation legislation and policy, as follows:4 
The history of the workers’ compensation program since 1960, in 
terms of achieving the compensation goal, has shown variation 
through time in the relative importance of the adequacy and af-
fordability criteria. Adequacy received the most attention in the 
1970s, and concerns for adequacy and affordability were roughly 
in balance during most of the 1980s. The 1990s have been domi-
nated by efforts to achieve affordability.
In recent times, the ability of workers’ compensation administrators 
to respond quickly to changes in ﬁnancial performance of the system 
was furthered with technology. The use of broadcast voicemail and elec-
tronic mail has made it very easy to transmit subtle changes to policy 
that may be induced by ﬁnancial considerations. Electronic monitoring 
of adjudicator decisions, and the ability to produce up-to-the-minute 
ﬁnancial reporting, means that pressure to more carefully consider cer-
tain types of claims at some times, or ease up at other times, is more 
easily implemented within shorter time frames than in the past.5
Experience Rating and the Economic Value of Employer Appeals
A factor that has encouraged increased appeals volumes in Canadian 
workers’ compensation has been the broader application of experience 
rating, which increases or decreases the workers’ compensation premi-
ums paid by employers on the basis of the beneﬁts paid to injured work-
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ers.6 Canadian workers’ compensation jurisdictions were much slower 
to embrace experience rating than were their American counterparts. 
While experience rating furthers the role of the workers’ compensation 
system as a reasonably fair method of collecting funds from employers 
to be distributed among injured workers by ensuring that employers 
responsible for the highest beneﬁt payments pay the highest rates, it 
focuses employer attention on claims costs, especially relative to those 
of industry competitors.
Experience rating raises the economic value (or marginal costs) of 
workers’ compensation claims outcomes to individual employers. Costs 
can be controlled by reducing the incidence and severity of workplace 
injuries and diseases, but also by claims management practices, which 
includes efforts to limit the number of claims that are approved by adju-
dicators and appeals bodies. This is not to suggest that employer moni-
toring of workers’ compensation claims induced by experience rating 
is necessarily inappropriate. In fact, experience rating may induce vigi-
lance on the part of employers that improve the long-run viability of the 
workers’ compensation system. Hyatt and Kralj (1995) show, using data 
from the province of Ontario, Canada, that experience-rated employers 
are more likely to appeal workers’ compensation claims, and that the 
likelihood of employer appeals increases with the size of the experience 
rating incentive. A recent study by Thomason and Pozzebon (2002) also 
found that high-wage ﬁrms were also more likely than low-wage ﬁrms 
to respond to experience rating by increasing their accident prevention 
efforts relative to their claims management efforts.
The Importance of an Efﬁcient Appeals Structure
As the appeals apparatus has grown and become more widely used, 
and while those in workers’ compensation advocacy roles have report-
edly become more aggressive at intervening at the primary adjudication 
level, the stakes to adjudicators of making faulty decisions have dimin-
ished. An efﬁcient appeals structure will ﬁx any errors. This reliance on 
the appeals structure allows busy claims adjudicators the opportunity to 
pass along difﬁcult ﬁles to the appeals system, especially those requir-
ing time-consuming investigation.7 The Royal Commission on Work-
ers’ Compensation in British Columbia (1999, p. 20) observed 
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The commission is deeply concerned that the current appeal sys-
tem appears to have become a substitute for quality decision mak-
ing at the claims adjudication level. Rather than ensuring that all 
the relevant information is gathered and that the resulting claims 
adjudication decision is correct, accurate and fair, the current ap-
peal system appears to provide the board with an opportunity to 
make insufﬁciently informed, inaccurate or incorrect decisions in 
the expectation that eventually the right decision will be made.
This observation highlights an important reality—what seems to be 
a problem with the appeals system may be reﬂecting a fundamental 
problem upstream in the adjudication process.
Summary
Law (2000, p. 304) provides a summary of the factors that have 
contributed to the litigiousness of work injury compensation.
Yet any observer of North American workers’ compensation to-
day knows that the non-litigious adjudicative model is at best a 
‘ﬁrst step’ in the life of a workers’ compensation claim. What has 
happened? In short, the following: workers enter a host of claims 
never envisioned at the outset of the twentieth century; employers 
vigourously defend the insurance funds against claims; insurers, 
public and private, have developed elaborate multi-stage decision-
making systems that include formal hearings. The result is a litiga-
tion-laden web of adjudicative and tribunal-based decision-mak-
ing, with radically reduced degrees of certainty and predictability 
in conjunction with increasing administration and party costs.
Uncertainty is a key factor that drives appeals. The causes of uncer-
tainty in the workers’ compensation system are legion but are frequent-
ly driven by inconsistencies in the adjudication process, the absence of 
policy with respect to “nontraditional” injuries or diseases, and major 
legislative or policy reforms that are not well understood by the parties 
or the adjudicators. The result is inconsistent adjudicator decisions. The 
potential to exploit this inconsistency gives economic value to appeals, 
and the use of representation by the parties—lawyers, advisors, and 
consultants (some of which may be paid for by the workers’ compensa-
tion system itself)—give the parties an informed advocate to capture 
this economic value. The result is an overwhelmed appeals system and 
the appearance that the problem is with the appeals structure.
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However, the problems with the appeals structure may often be 
more appropriately cast as reﬂecting problems throughout the adjudica-
tion process. Looking at the kinds of appeals and the issues raised there-
in provides a snapshot of the problems the system is facing as a whole, 
and the volume of appeals at a point in time is a good indicator of the 
magnitude of the problems in the system. Neither of these, however, is 
a particularly instructive indicator of the health of the appeals process 
itself. Indeed, paradoxically, an efﬁcient appeals structure may well re-
duce the incentives provided by the adjudicative process to reform in 
the basic design of the workers’ compensation program if mistakes or 
gaps in policy are efﬁciently handled through the appeals process.
CENTRAL ISSUES STILL FACING POLICYMAKERS:  
A RESEARCH AGENDA
Even though my view is that problems in primary adjudication 
caused by faults in the basic design of the workers’ compensation pro-
gram are the key source of deﬁciencies in the appeals system, nonethe-
less there are many direct changes that can be made to improve the ap-
peals process. Of course, answers to what constitutes “improving” the 
appeals process, like so many issues in workers’ compensation, depend 
on whom one asks the questions. 
One starting point is to offer a model of what a workers’ compensa-
tion appeals system should deliver. After extensive consultation with 
stakeholders, literature reviews, and deliberations, the Royal Commis-
sion on Workers’ Compensation in British Columbia concluded that an 
independent appeals structure should have ﬁve “intimately connected” 
features. The appeals process must
1)  apply legislation, rules and policy in a fair and equitable fash-
ion;
2)  make decisions based on all the relevant information, including 
new information only recently discovered or determined to be 
important;
3)  be an active participant in making inquiries and not the passive 
recipient of information;
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4)  have the capacity to revoke or vary an adjudication decision and 
substitute a new decision; and
5)  be able to monitor the implementation of its decisions and not be 
limited to simply referring the matter back with instructions.
The question that faced the Royal Commission, and which faces all 
workers’ compensation policymakers, is what design features should be 
built into the appeals process that would best ensure that these features 
will be present? While there has been considerable research on many 
aspects of the workers’ compensation appeals, there remain a number 
of gaps in the research. Some of the key questions necessary to address 
include: How many steps should there be in the appeals structure? What 
is the role of appeals jurisprudence in decision making? What is the 
role of alternative dispute resolution in workers’ compensation? And, is 
there a role for the courts?
How Many Steps Are Required in the Appeals Process?
Workers’ compensation must, as it has always done, balance the 
costs and the beneﬁts of providing due process. A central question is, 
how many levels of appeal are necessary to deliver due process but still 
be timely and cost efﬁcient? 
To many of the policymakers who designed the ﬁrst of workers’ 
compensation programs, an elaborate appeals structure was believed 
not to be warranted. While some adjudication decisions, and the com-
munication of the decisions and their justiﬁcations, were considered 
necessary, the prescribed “minimalist” solution involved a two-pronged 
response: require that written decisions be given to the parties that ade-
quately delineate how the decisions were reached, and provide a means 
by which ﬁles could be reviewed by someone whose only responsibil-
ity was to conduct such reviews (preferably by someone who was not 
involved in the original decision).
On its face, there is no obvious reason why this relatively simple ap-
proach to appeals could not deliver the “intimately connected” elements 
of an effective appeals system as outlined by the British Columbia 
Royal Commission. Lind et al. (1993) showed that workers who per-
ceive the process as fair are less likely to pursue appeals, independent 
of the outcome of the process. Roberts (1996) found that when injured 
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workers felt that the information decision makers had about their claims 
was accurate, they are also less likely to appeal. Clearly, however, this 
relatively simple approach failed to satisfy the perceptions of workers’ 
compensation system stakeholders of the procedural rules needed to 
assure fairness and justice, and has given way to more elaborate multi-
tiered appeals apparatus. It merits emphasis that, with all that research-
ers have learned about procedural justice, what has yet to ﬂow from that 
research is any speciﬁcity on the optimal number of steps in an appeals 
process, and the degree of separation from the original decision makers 
necessary to achieve independence. 
The Royal Commission on Workers’ Compensation in British Co-
lumbia recommended a two-step appeals structure. The ﬁrst step, the 
“internal review process,” would consist of a readjudication of the 
workers’ compensation claim to take into account any new information. 
The term internal means that the review would be conducted by work-
ers’ compensation board staff. The decision arising from the internal 
review could then be appealed to an independent appeals tribunal. In 
recommending a two-step appeals process, the Royal Commission on 
Workers’ Compensation in British Columbia (1999, p. 27) concluded 
that “. . . fewer appeals levels could reduce jurisdictional disputes (be-
tween the various appeals bodies), enhance the speed and consistency 
of decision making, and eliminate administrative duplication.”
An ancillary issue that arises as the number of levels of appeal 
grows is the relationship between the levels of appeal themselves. To 
what extent should lower levels of appeal be bound to the decisions 
of higher levels of appeal? This is part of a broader issue, which is the 
extent to which appeals systems should have the latitude to set policy 
where it is absent, and in so doing open or close access to beneﬁts, or to 
ﬁnd workers’ compensation legislation or policy to be illegal.
 
What Is the Role of Appeals Jurisprudence in Decision Making?
A common feature of Canadian legal systems involving adminis-
trative agencies, like workers’ compensation, is that decision makers 
are not bound by precedence, but rather should consider each case on 
its merits. While this approach asserts the independence of the deci-
sion maker, it can be a source of frustration to workers’ compensation 
system stakeholders when this freedom from precedence causes deci-
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sions to look less like they were independent and more like they are 
inconsistent. 
That workers’ compensation appeals structures should not be bound 
by precedence has led to problems, not only between levels of the ap-
peals structure, but also back to the primary adjudication process. If, 
at the appeals level, an adjudicator’s decision was found to be, for ex-
ample, a faulty interpretation of policy, it has frequently been the case 
that while the adjudicator’s decision might be overturned in that spe-
ciﬁc instance, the adjudicator may feel free to make the same faulty 
(in the eyes of the appellate structure) decision again. In other words, 
the jurisprudence that arises from appeals may have no impact on the 
adjudication of future claims with similar fact situations. What is left, 
then, is for the worker or employer to appeal in every instance of the 
same type of claim.
The Royal Commission on Workers’ Compensation (1999, p. 41) 
expressed a concern they frequently heard from stakeholders: “(t)his 
freedom from precedent has tended to promote inconsistent decisions 
throughout the claims adjudication and appeal process with the result 
that it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to predict how decisions will be 
made in the future or to use prior decisions to assert that subsequent 
decisions are unfair.”
Workers’ compensation systems in Canada have struggled to ﬁnd 
some sort of middle ground on the issue of precedence. An inﬂuen-
tial decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, Consolidated-Bathurst 
Packaging Ltd. v. International Woodworkers of America, Local 2-69, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 282, concluded that while administrative bodies may 
not be bound to slavishly follow precedence and should therefore re-
main independent, they must ﬁnd acceptable ways of achieving con-
sistency. To balance independence and consistency, the court proposed 
a three-pronged model for administrative law bodies in which 1) the 
decision-making panel must be free of outside interference; 2) while 
legal and policy issues can be discussed within the tribunal, the deci-
sion in a speciﬁc case must be entirely in the hands of the panel that 
heard the evidence and can assess the facts; and 3) a clear distinction 
must be made between discussions on legal and policy matters within a 
tribunal and discussions of factual matters in a particular case. Discus-
sions within the tribunal on legal and policy matters are not to be used 
to decide the appeals, but rather to delineate and assess standards which 
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could be adopted by the panel members hearing the matter. While rea-
sonable on the face of it, the approach suggested by the Supreme Court 
of Canada has not been followed by all workers’ compensation appeals 
bodies. One reason for this is the practical problem that consultative 
meetings between members of different panels of an appeals tribunal 
proposed by the Supreme Court are difﬁcult to schedule, especially in 
an environment of growing case loads.
As a consequence, alternative approaches have been adopted or 
proposed to deal with the issue of precedence. These include requiring 
panels to give reasons for decisions that depart from earlier decisions 
involving similar matters; having leading cases decided by panels made 
up of neutral members (that is, none of the members is a worker or 
employer representative) whose decision would set out the key con-
siderations for subsequent decisions to follow; and having a member 
of the appeals tribunal who did not hear the matter review a panel’s 
preliminary decision, and if appropriate, outline in writing where the 
panel has diverged from previous decisions (the panel would still ulti-
mately make the ﬁnal decision). Another approach encouraging the reli-
ance on precedence is to require that all decisions be published and/or 
all appeals hearings are open to the public. This latter approach adds 
transparency, but at the potential cost of compromising the privacy of 
injured workers and employers. Many of these approaches are being 
employed, providing useful variation necessary for fertile research on 
which approach achieves more consistent decision making, while main-
taining independence.
The issue of the independence of workers’ compensation appeals 
bodies extends further. A question with which policymakers constantly 
grapple is the role of the appeals body in reﬁning, or redeﬁning, work-
ers’ compensation policy. It is usually the case that legislation gives 
the provincial workers’ compensation agency the authority to determine 
policy for which it is, in turn, accountable. Appeals bodies are supposed 
to interpret policy and determine whether it has been applied properly. 
However, appeals bodies may also determine that a policy adopted by 
the agency is illegal because it is inconsistent with the provincial work-
ers’ compensation statute. The central issue is whether the appeals bod-
ies should be able to reject and replace workers’ compensation board 
policies that may be legal under the provincial statute but considered 
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inappropriate by the appeals board, or to create new policy where none 
exists?
This issue exposes an important paradox in workers’ compensation. 
Appeals bodies frequently assert that their decisions should be binding, 
not only on lower level appeals bodies, but also on primary adjudica-
tion process. Yet, because the decisions of the appeals bodies, which 
are supposed to be based on the merits of individual cases and are not 
supposed to be overly burdened by precedence, are by deﬁnition case 
speciﬁc, workers’ compensation authorities rarely wish to be bound by 
the decisions of appeals bodies. Moreover, workers’ compensation ad-
ministrators believe their authority is enshrined in legislation, and it is 
to the legislature that they are accountable, not to appeals bodies.
The tensions that arise as appeals bodies breach the border between 
policy interpretation and policy making have caused policymakers to 
try to more clearly deﬁne the roles of the workers’ compensation au-
thority and the appeals bodies. Approaches that have been followed 
include altering workers’ compensation legislation to reinforce the pri-
macy of the workers’ compensation authority to develop policy (and the 
role of the appeals bodies to interpret policy and assess its application in 
speciﬁc instances); where an appeals body has determined that a policy 
is illegal, the policy must be reviewed by the workers’ compensation 
board on a timely basis in consultation with stakeholders, and a revised 
policy substituted (or the initial policy reissued); and referring ques-
tions of law to the court.
What Is the Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Purely 
Adjudicative System?
It is hard to argue there is no room in workers’ compensation for 
processes, such as alternative dispute resolution (ADR), that seek to 
help parties understand the nature of their disputes and resolve them. 
Surely in workers’ compensation, where there are many opportunities 
for disputes, particularly after periods of signiﬁcant reform, when the 
actors are uncertain about the new rules and how they apply to their 
matter, ADR techniques have a natural home.
ADR has become more popular, both because the primary adjudica-
tion has become more complicated and the appeals process has become 
more accessible (and complicated). As a consequence, dealing with dis-
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putes takes a probably increasing share of real resources (though this is 
difﬁcult to measure). To the extent that ADR can reduce dispute costs 
and satisfy the parties, its attractiveness is obvious.
However, the proper place of ADR in workers’ compensation is not 
so straightforward. ADR evolved from situations where adversarial par-
ties owned a dispute and had conﬂicting interests in how the dispute 
was ultimately resolved. As Law (1998, p. 4) points out, this was not the 
situation envisioned for workers’ compensation, in which, “(t)he object 
of workers’ compensation was to lift the matter of injury compensation 
out of the lives of master and servant, converting what was a private 
dispute (before the advent of workers’ compensation) into a public ser-
vice.” Canadian law contends that workers and employers are not “par-
ties” to workers’ compensation disputes at all, and have no ownership 
of the adjudicative decision (although clearly they are not disinterested 
parties in the outcome). That is, workers’ compensation did not envi-
sion empowering employers and workers to substitute even a mutually 
agreed upon alternative outcome to the adjudicators’ decision, which 
was arrived upon by an application of legislation and established policy 
to the facts of the case.
Law (1998) identiﬁes four classes of alternative dispute resolution 
approaches within workers’ compensation. The ﬁrst class, case man-
agement, characterizes ADR as a way of expediting the collection of 
information to ensure timely decision making based on all of the infor-
mation relevant for the matter at hand. Law (pp. 24–25) describes this 
approach as, “. . . at once a ‘customer service’ initiative (the case moves 
faster through the system) and an ‘administrative beneﬁt’ (if it reduces 
the number of transactions and or resources required to be applied to 
the matter).”
The second class of ADR procedures is the “ﬂexibility for the deci-
sion maker” approach, in which the limited discretion an adjudicator 
normally has is supplemented by other remedies that are consistent with 
the facts. Law gives the example of an injured worker who is receiv-
ing temporary total disability beneﬁts, but for whom the weight of the 
evidence suggests that the worker is not mitigating his or her losses 
through sufﬁcient participation in vocational rehabilitation initiatives. 
In this instance, the prescribed outcome of adjudication would be to 
discontinue beneﬁts. However, the worker is likely to disagree with the 
adjudicator’s assessment of the mitigation efforts. An alternative ap-
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proach might be to set out the evidence for the parties, and instead of-
fer a solution which is to reduce the beneﬁt over the period where the 
extent of mitigation was in question. In such an instance, the solution 
arrived at by the parties is consistent with the evidence (and gives the 
worker the beneﬁt of the doubt) and may be preferable to the “normal” 
decision of terminating beneﬁts, if that decision would have only have 
dragged the parties into extended costly proceedings.
A third ADR approach, decision endorsement, allows the parties 
(worker and employer) to make a decision within a range of speciﬁed 
outcomes, but the agreement reached by the parties must be approved 
by the adjudicator. The fourth approach goes one step further, empow-
ering the parties to make decisions themselves on eligibility for and the 
quantum of beneﬁts, with no supervisory review.
If ADR procedures offer the opportunity to achieve outcomes that 
more closely reﬂect the needs and wishes of the parties, then they merit 
consideration. If they instead weaken the parties’ ability to obtain the 
results promised by statute, then ADR serves only to undue one of the 
advantages, relative to tort proceedings, that workers’ compensation 
promised—predictable beneﬁts for workers and predictable costs for 
employers.
Canadian and American workers’ compensation programs have 
come to different conclusions about which of the alternative dispute 
resolution approaches are appropriate in workers’ compensation. In 
reviewing ADR procedures in Washington State (which, like all Ca-
nadian workers’ compensation provinces, operates a monopoly fund), 
Law (1998, p. 21) aptly captures a ﬂavor of the contrasting approaches 
and philosophies.
This is the fundamental distinction between the Washington State 
and Canadian systems—in Canada the statutorily prescribed ben-
eﬁt is technically the only beneﬁt payable to the worker, and waiv-
ers or adjustments to that are prohibited. In the United States (and 
Washington speciﬁcally) the parties treat the insurance system as 
more of a menu, with a maximum number of choices.
The implication of this distinction is that ADR has a greater poten-
tial role in the U.S. because there are more opportunities to fashion so-
lutions that do not precisely adhere to statutory prescriptions. This is a 
little studied point of departure in U.S. and Canadian workers’ compen-
sation programs, and one that merits additional comparative research. 
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Is There a Role for the Courts?
As the nature of workplace injuries evolved and attribution to work 
or the workplace became, in some instance, much more difﬁcult, some 
policymakers chose to simply exclude certain injuries and diseases 
from coverage,8 rather than to modify legal rules to accept such claims 
into workers’ compensation or apportion beneﬁts based on the degree 
to which work contributed to the workers’ condition. In some instances, 
excluding injuries and diseases from coverage was at least partially mo-
tivated by the cost implications of doing otherwise (Spieler and Burton 
1998; Hyatt 2001). However, precluding coverage for certain condi-
tions under workers’ compensation threw open the question of whether 
workers could now sue their employers if they could establish that their 
excluded condition was linked to the workplace. Hyatt (2001) found 
that the courts in both Canada and the United States have generally been 
loath to disrupt the exclusive remedy doctrine of workers’ compensa-
tion, and have not granted workers and employers broad rights to sue. 
One exception is Oregon, where the Supreme Court held in Smothers 
v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 23 P.3d 333 (Or. 2001) that an effort by the 
Oregon legislature to preclude a worker from obtaining workers’ com-
pensation beneﬁts because the workplace injury was not the major con-
tributing cause of the worker’s disability while also denying the worker 
the right to sue the employer in a tort suit was unconstitutional.9
The “historical compromise” that workers’ compensation repre-
sents, in which workers gave up the right to sue their employer in return 
for beneﬁts paid with certainty and on a timely basis, came after ruinous 
tort litigation. Over time, employers, workers, and legislators were able 
to fashion some considerable degree of consensus for a major change in 
the legal remedies available for workplace injuries because the failure 
to compromise put at risk the sustainability of the industrial revolution 
(Hyatt and Law 2000). 
The beneﬁts of the workers’ compensation system compared to the 
tort approach are many. Those frequently cited among the most val-
ued include timeliness of the adjudication process; reduced costs, due 
fundamentally to the elimination of the burden of adjudication in the 
regular court system to determine fault and to the reduction in legal 
and other related costs of pursuing a claim; relatively nonadversarial 
procedures, again due to the no-fault nature of workers’ compensation; 
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and decision making that, because it is based on legislation and policy 
and administered by professional adjudicators who specialize in work 
injuries and diseases, generates predictable compensation and costs.
In the instances where workers are denied access to the workers’ 
compensation for certain injuries/diseases/conditions, and are also de-
nied access to the courts, potentially work-related injury claims are 
simply suppressed. This is not a situation that can persist in the long 
run, as the emergence of workers’ compensation some 100 years ago 
demonstrated.
While the virtues of the tort system are sometimes overlooked as 
a way of resolving some workplace disputes, such as charges that em-
ployers are discriminating against workers on the basis of race or gen-
der, a return to the tort system to provide the remedy for workplace 
injuries and diseases is rarely seriously considered. However, the court 
may be a useful forum to adjudicate matters for which policy moves 
too slowly.
Although frequently maligned because of cost, lack of timeliness, 
and adversarial nature, the courts and the process of tort litigation re-
main good mechanisms for eliciting the best evidence available and 
making decisions on that evidence. This is partly because resources are 
devoted to providing evidence, and the process is adversarial and is not 
rushed. It should be emphasized that legislators have also been slow 
to react to an evolving workplace environment for workplace safety 
and health. While the workers’ compensation system is likely faster 
and cheaper for dealing with routine work injury matters, it cannot be 
said that legislators are necessarily faster than the courts for addressing 
emerging issues, such as the proliferating evidence on the relationships 
between workplace exposures to toxic substances and the diseases af-
fecting workers.
It would appear, however, that given the general reluctance of courts 
to loosen the bar on tort suits for workplace injuries and diseases, leg-
islators would have to enact legislation allowing workers to sue their 
employers in instances where their conditions have been excluded from 
workers’ compensation coverage. Litigation raises the stakes to all of 
the parties. Perhaps even the “threat” of loosening the tort bar may be 
enough to encourage modern workers and employers to update the his-
torical compromise to better reﬂect modern conditions.
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CONCLUSION
The due process revolution that introduced litigation into Canadian 
workers’ compensation programs reﬂects recognition that there can be 
legitimate differences of interpretation of the facts before a claims ad-
judicator and that mistakes can be made. Principles of natural justice 
require that a forum be available, even within an administrative law 
regime, to address these situations. Perhaps more importantly, attention 
to due process is an acknowledgment that some ﬂexibility needed to be 
built into the workers’ compensation system to allow more timely reac-
tion to constantly evolving environment of work and work injuries than 
is afforded by legislative and policy reform processes.
However, to the extent that workers’ compensation appeals increas-
ingly becomes a substitute for quality decision making at the claims 
adjudication level, then the faith of injured workers and employers in 
the primary adjudication process will be compromised. Claims adju-
dicators and administrators reported to the provincial commissions of 
inquiry, referred to earlier, of instances in which employers and workers 
ﬁle the documentation to initiate an appeal of the adjudicator’s decision 
at the same time that the claim is ﬁled (and before the adjudicator had 
made any decisions). If workers and employers believe in sufﬁcient 
numbers that the only way to get the “right” decision is to appeal, then 
the advantages of workers’ compensation over tort are clearly dimin-
ished.
Policymakers, then, must continue to ensure that primary adjudica-
tion is maintained at a level such that the economic value of appeals is 
diminished, while still allowing an effective forum for legitimate differ-
ence to be considered and mistakes to be corrected.
Notes
 1.  Burton and Mitchell (2003, pp. 178–180) provide a brief history of the origins of 
workers’ compensation in the United States. Chaykowski and Thomason (1995, 
pp. 2–6) provide a similar introduction to the historical development of workers’ 
compensation in Canada.
 2.  This chapter does not provide a systematic review of past research on workers 
compensation appeals. Such reviews can be found in Thomason, Hyatt, and Rob-
erts (1998), Law (2000), and Hyatt (2001).
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 3.  For an excellent review of the history of appeals system, with particular refer-
ence to British Columbia, see Workers’ Compensation Board of British Colum-
bia (1997).
 4.  Law (2000) provides a description of a similar pattern in the Canadian context.
 5.  Even more worrisome is that economic considerations may affect the claims 
of some workers differently from others. Thomason (1994, p.76) found that, 
“. . . decisions concerning both liability and compensation are partially based on 
economic considerations,” and that “insurers are more likely to adjust the claims 
of those most vulnerable to ﬁnancial pressure: non-English speakers and claim-
ants who are not represented by legal counsel.”
 6.  Thomason (2003) provides a recent survey of studies of the effects of experience 
rating.
 7.  The problems associated with decisions based on inadequate investigation of the 
claims at the primary adjudication level are compounded when those decisions 
are not appealed.
 8.  Workers’ compensation policymakers have not warmed to trying to assess the 
relative contributions of work and nonwork factors, and provide partial beneﬁts 
based on the work contribution. Shainblum, Sullivan, and Frank (2000) provide 
a review of the issues involved, the feasibility of instituting such an approach, as 
well as alternatives.
 9.  The issue of whether a state can preclude a worker from having any remedy 
against an employer for a workplace injury or disease is examined in Willborn, 
Schwab, and Burton (2002, pp. 978–985).
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Performance Measurement in 
Workers’ Compensation Systems
H. Allan Hunt
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Interest in performance measurement and performance manage-
ment has expanded remarkably in the past 25 years. This interest has 
spawned many initiatives, both private and public. One of the most 
ubiquitous has been the “balanced scorecard.” This initiative developed 
out of the work of two professors at the Harvard Business School in 
the early 1990s (Kaplan and Norton 1992), and was based on the fun-
damental concept that there are (or should be) multiple objectives and 
thus multiple dimensions for performance measurement. Kaplan and 
Norton urged that the ﬁnancial perspective should be complemented by 
a customer perspective, an internal process perspective, and an organi-
zational learning and growth perspective. Only then could performance 
measurement fully serve the strategic objectives of the modern enter-
prise (Kaplan and Norton 2001). 
While the balanced scorecard was ﬁnding application in private 
business, nonproﬁts, and local government entities, the federal govern-
ment was conducting a National Performance Review, under the leader-
ship of Vice President Al Gore (1993). This gave a boost to a pending 
piece of legislation that was enacted under the title of the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993, or GPRA. This act is the latest in 
a series of government attempts at “performance budgeting,” including 
the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System of 1965, Management 
by Objectives of 1973, and Zero-Base Budgeting of 1977 (U.S. General 
Accounting Ofﬁce 1997). 
However, GPRA differs from those earlier efforts in that it also 
imposes a planning and evaluation process designed to inﬂuence pro-
gram effectiveness and budgeting decisions. Five-year strategic plans 
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are required from all federal agencies (with revision every three years) 
together with an annual performance plan that has credible outcome-
based goals. Further, these “good intentions” are enforced by the Ofﬁce 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART), which is being applied across all federal government agen-
cies and programs on a ﬁve-year cycle. In fact, OMB conducted PART 
evaluations on 234 federal programs during ﬁscal year 2002–2003 and 
plans to complete 411 during ﬁscal year 2003–2004.
PART rates programs as “effective, moderately effective, adequate, 
results not demonstrated, or ineffective” based on four criteria. Twenty 
percent of the evaluation is based on management, 20 percent on pro-
gram purpose and design, 10 percent on planning, and 50 percent on 
program results (U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce 2004). While it is too 
early to judge the success of PART and GPRA, these efforts certainly 
represent a manifestation of the growing interest in program effective-
ness and program evaluation in the federal government and elsewhere. 
(See U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁce 2004 for a critical view.) 
There are many other illustrations of the interest in performance 
measurement in public programs. The International City/County Man-
agement Association was an early advocate for more effective perfor-
mance measurement and management (see Morley, Bryant, and Hatry 
2001). Today the CPM Consortium project includes well over 100 par-
ticipating cities and counties who are seeking to improve their own per-
formance, partly through benchmarking to other similar entities.1 The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
published an occasional paper on performance measurement in 1994, 
which combined a “how-to” manual with speciﬁc examples of efforts in 
various countries. Paralleling the balanced scorecard approach, OECD 
listed the following “dimensions” of functional performance measure-
ment: economy measures, efﬁciency measures, effectiveness measures, 
service quality measures, and ﬁnancial performance measures (OECD 
1994).
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HISTORY OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Workers’ compensation systems have not historically been leaders 
in the adoption of performance measurement or performance manage-
ment techniques. In fact, one could argue that these programs have 
been somewhat of a backwater for performance measurement. Work-
ers’ compensation systems tend to be iconoclastic, with relatively little 
comparability across jurisdictions (see U.S. Department of Labor 2002 
for what can be easily compared). This is because such systems are the 
result of a complex interplay of statutory language, legal interpretation, 
and administrative practice, all of which are speciﬁc to each jurisdic-
tion. It is little wonder that the situation can be characterized as “a tower 
of babel.”
The lack of comparable performance measures among workers’ 
compensation systems also meant that it was difﬁcult to tell which 
policy initiatives worked across jurisdictions. Workers’ compensation 
reform was characterized by veering to one side or the other, depend-
ing upon whether the friends of labor or the friends of employers were 
in political control. It was frustration with this situation that led to the 
establishment of the Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) 
in 1983. 
The Workers Compensation Research Institute is an independent, 
not-for-proﬁt research organization providing high-quality, objective 
information about public policy issues involving workers’ compensa-
tion systems. It is funded by memberships with annual dues set accord-
ing to the size and type of organization. Membership includes workers’ 
compensation insurers, large employers, and employer associations. 
Associate members include many state and provincial workers’ com-
pensation administrative agencies in the United States, Australia, and 
Canada as well as a handful of labor organizations. 
One of the earliest research programs at WCRI was the “administra-
tive inventory” series. According to the ﬁrst of these, “This is the ﬁrst 
of a series of Administrative Inventories of state workers’ compensation 
systems. The purpose of the series is to describe and offer convenient 
data on how the different systems function, to allow interstate compari-
son” (Barth 1987, p. 3).
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Administrative inventories have now been performed in some 24 
U.S. jurisdictions, several of them more than once (see WCRI 2003). 
While they may not have been as effective in allowing interstate com-
parisons as originally thought, they have gone a long way toward fa-
cilitating communication across systems and increasing general under-
standing of different workers’ compensation systems. 
Another objective of WCRI was to determine “best practice” 
among workers’ compensation systems, which of necessity implies a 
comparative perspective. The motivation for this is to provide guid-
ance for reform; one has to know what works if one is to improve the 
performance of a workers’ compensation system. “Our past research 
has shown that public ofﬁcials and stakeholders in a particular state 
generally understand how their own system performs, but their abil-
ity to make meaningful and credible comparisons between their system 
and those of other states is severely limited” (Telles, Wang, and Tanabe 
2004, p. 3).
The earliest work that included explicit interstate comparisons at 
WCRI involved a review of medical cost trends in 43 jurisdictions 
(Boden and Fleischman 1989). This was followed by a study of cost 
drivers in six state systems (Victor et al. 1992). The development of 
a multistate database for the express purpose of making comparisons 
among state systems followed logically from these efforts and the ﬁrst 
CompScope™ multistate comparison study appeared in 2000 (Fox, 
Casteris, and Telles 2000). 
Recently the fourth edition of this reference work was released 
(Telles et al. 2004). It provides detail on nearly 60 performance measures 
for 12 states over the period 1996–2001. Comparable deﬁnitions have 
been used and the data have been standardized for wage levels, industry 
employment, injury mix, and beneﬁt waiting period. Thus, the empha-
sis of this effort is on comparing “apples to apples” even if that causes 
some tension with unadjusted system statistics that may be published 
elsewhere. As the fourth edition puts it, “The annual benchmarks of sys-
tem performance collected here enable policymakers and stakeholders 
to better manage and continuously improve their systems and avoid the 
historic cycles of crisis-reform-crisis that have frequently characterized 
workers’ compensation systems” (Telles et al. 2004, p. 3).
Most recently, WCRI has initiated a new series of comparative stud-
ies of self-reported outcomes for injured workers (Victor, Barth, and 
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Liu 2003). These telephone surveys of injured workers in four states 
compare critical outcome dimensions, including physical recovery; sat-
isfaction with, access to, and quality of medical care; and durability of 
return-to-work results. We look forward to the expansion of this series 
to additional states in the future. 
Predating WCRI was the series of workers’ compensation employer 
cost studies conducted by John F. Burton, Jr. and various collaborators 
over the years. These studies began with Burton’s Ph.D. dissertation at 
the University of Michigan in 1965, partly sponsored by the W.E. Up-
john Institute for Employment Research. The most thorough descrip-
tion of the methods used in this research is in Thomason, Schmidle, and 
Burton (2001). Burton and his coauthors have replicated and reﬁned 
this study over the years to provide a more or less continuous record 
of employers’ cost of workers’ compensation coverage over several de-
cades. 
Burton’s measures are developed from National Council on Com-
pensation Insurance data that are used for rate-making for workers’ 
compensation insurance policies written by private insurers in ap-
proximately 40 states, and supplemented by comparable data in other 
states with available information. An expanded version that includes 
data from public funds, self-insured employers, federal workers’ com-
pensation programs, and including adjustments for additional technical 
problems (like large deductibles) is published annually by the National 
Academy of Social Insurance (NASI); the most recent version is Work-
ers’ Compensation: Beneﬁts, Coverage, and Costs, 2001 (NASI 2003). 
Another workers’ compensation cost study, the Oregon Workers’ 
Compensation Premium Rate Ranking study, is performed biannually 
by the Oregon Department of Consumer & Business Services. It pro-
vides explicit comparisons of premium levels for the 50 largest work-
ers’ compensation classiﬁcations in Oregon across all 51 states. This 
study was developed to track Oregon premium rates relative to other 
states, and therefore qualiﬁes as an aggregate performance measure. 
Finally, there is a “workers’ compensation report card” developed 
and promoted by the Work Loss Data Institute.2 It is composed of data 
elements from Occupational Safety and Health Administration log 
reports, and awards letter grades to state workers’ compensation sys-
tems depending upon the state’s performance on the aggregate injury 
incidence rate, the percentage of injuries that involve lost workdays, 
Roberts.indb   145 6/7/2005   9:29:07 AM
146 Hunt
the median duration of disability, the proportion that are long duration 
cases, and state experience with low back strain and carpal tunnel in-
juries. 
So there is the beginning of a performance measurement movement 
in workers’ compensation. While not all these workers’ compensation 
measures were developed with performance management in mind, they 
do constitute performance measurement for some purpose. The distinc-
tion is between measures that are or may be under the control of some 
entity, as opposed to those that seem to simply express the outcome 
of some process without a speciﬁc controlling entity. For instance, it 
would be difﬁcult to hold some particular individual or organization 
responsible for the level of workers’ compensation costs in a jurisdic-
tion. But it would be reasonable to hold a claims administration agent 
responsible for the timely payment of wage replacement beneﬁts. Let 
us turn our attention now to collective efforts at measuring the perfor-
mance of workers’ compensation systems that are presumably designed 
to improve that performance. 
BENCHMARKING WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
Canadian Benchmarking
The Canadian workers’ compensation boards have led the way 
in developing system benchmarks and making them available to the 
general public. The Association of Workers’ Compensation Boards of 
Canada (AWCBC) maintains a Web site where anyone can view some 
24 performance measures and 6 “indicator ratios” for each of the 12 Ca-
nadian provincial systems.3 The chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcers of the Canadian 
boards have developed a common set of deﬁnitions for key statistical 
measures (KSMs) and indicator ratios which can be used to describe 
the workers’ compensation insurance systems in Canada, and to provide 
comparisons across jurisdictions. This effort dates to the mid-1990s and 
has been gradually reﬁned over the past decade. 
The KSMs are published in both tabular and graphical format, with 
extensive explanatory detail. The AWCBC data also include self-insured 
employers, which are reported separately. While the measures reported 
may have a ﬁnancial bias, there are also measures of incidence, time-
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liness of payment, duration, and severity. Furthermore, the consistent 
reporting of these measures across jurisdictions and across time means 
that judgments can rather easily be made about relative performance. 
This is demonstrated in Figure 6.1, which shows the injury frequen-
cy rate by province. It shows that injury frequency is relatively high in 
Manitoba and low in New Brunswick and Ontario. Further, the three 
years of trend data demonstrate that the overall Canadian injury fre-
quency was declining from 2000 through 2002. This was also true for 
most, but not all, provincial systems.
Figure 6.2, however, indicates that the severity of injury was rela-
tively high in New Brunswick, with more than 10 percent of claims 
receiving impairment beneﬁts, compared to Manitoba, where less than 
2 percent of all claims did. So it seems that Manitoba has many minor 
injuries, which accounts for its higher overall injury frequency. This 
observation might lead one to look at the differences in beneﬁts from 
a policy perspective. Are these two provincial systems trying to do the 
same thing, or something different? 
Figure 6.2 shows that the percentage of claims receiving impair-
ment beneﬁts was also relatively high in Quebec and Nova Scotia. Fur-
thermore, the proportion of claims that received impairment beneﬁts 
was rising for the median province, i.e., injuries appear to be growing 
more severe, even as their number is being reduced. 
Figure 6.3 indicates that the cost of workers’ compensation cover-
age for Canadian employers hovered around C$2 for the period from 
2000 to 2002, ending at C$1.95 in 2002. Costs were higher than aver-
age in the Maritime provinces and lower than average in Alberta, Mani-
toba, Northwest Territory, Saskatchewan, and Yukon Territory. In the 
population centers of British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec, workers’ 
compensation costs were close to the weighted average. 
Figure 6.4 refers to the timeliness of payment by the workers’ com-
pensation board in Canadian workers’ compensation systems. It shows 
the average calendar days from the date of injury to the date of the ﬁrst 
payment for all jurisdictions except Quebec. There are clear differences 
among the systems, with Alberta and British Columbia being on the 
quicker side with performance in the 20- to 25-day range; Ontario and 
Prince Edward Island are on the slower side at about 40 to 45 days. 
There are obviously many more performance measures available 
from this source. Taken together, they convey a fairly detailed picture of 
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Figure 6.1  Injury Frequency (per 100 workers of assessable payrolls)
SOURCE: AWCBC (2003).
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Figure 6.2  Percentage of Claims Awarded Impairment Beneﬁts, 2000–2002
SOURCE: AWCBC (2003).
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Figure 6.3  Actual Average Assessment Rate for Assessable Employers, 2000–2002
SOURCE: AWCBC (2003).
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
AB BC MB NB NL NWT/NU NS ON PE QC SK YT Median
Province
R
a
t
e
 
(
$
)
 
2000 2001 2002
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
w
a
g
e
s
R
oberts.indb   150
6/7/2005   9:29:09 A
M
   151
Figure 6.4  Average Calendar Days from Injury to First Payment Issued, 2000–2002
NOTE: n/a = data not available.
SOURCE: AWCBC (2003).
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the performance of Canadian workers’ compensation systems. Because 
the deﬁnitions have been developed jointly, we can also be relatively 
conﬁdent that they are comparable, although there are always qualiﬁca-
tions that reﬂect unique system aspects. 
AUSTRALIAN BENCHMARKING
In Australia, the Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (represent-
ing Workplace Relations Ministers from each state) publishes a Com-
parative Performance Monitoring report for the occupational health and 
safety and workers’ compensation schemes in Australia and New Zea-
land. See Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (2003) for the ﬁfth 
such report.
There are 103 ﬁgures presented and classiﬁed under the categories 
of occupational health and safety (25 ﬁgures), workers’ compensation 
(21 ﬁgures), return to work (9 ﬁgures), and industry-speciﬁc indicators 
(48 ﬁgures). The presentation is particularly thorough, with multiple 
views of the same or similar information displayed in several different 
ways. 
Australia has exclusive fund states (Queensland), traditional pri-
vate insurance jurisdictions (Western Australia, Tasmania, and North-
ern Territory), and three states (New South Wales, South Australia, 
and Victoria) have mixed systems of public-sector underwriting and 
private-sector claims administration that have been dubbed “the third 
way” (see Barth et al. 2000). Because of this institutional variety, there 
has been a great deal of national interest in comparing the performance 
of the different jurisdictions. 
Figure 6.5 shows the unadjusted incidence of compensated injuries 
and diseases that resulted in at least one week off work for seven Aus-
tralian jurisdictions.4 It appears that the Northern Territory, Victoria, 
and Western Australia had relatively low workers’ compensation claims 
incidence in 2001–2002. New South Wales and South Australia had 
higher claims incidence than the Australian average. 
Australian jurisdictions do not report severity in a comparable way 
to Canadian systems, but Figure 6.6 shows the incidence of claims in-
volving at least 26 weeks off work. These would be serious injuries, 
and certainly a much more restrictive deﬁnition than used for Canadian 
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Figure 6.5  Incidence Rate of Compensated Injuries and Diseases, by 
Jurisdiction, 2000–2002
SOURCE: Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (2003).
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Figure 6.6  Incidence of Claims with 26 Weeks or More off Work, 
 by Jurisdiction, 2000–2001
SOURCE: Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (2003).
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Aus Av NSW NT NZ Qld SA TAS Vic WA
Jurisdiction
Ca
ses
 pe
r 1
,00
0 e
mp
loy
ees
Roberts.indb   153 6/7/2005   9:29:11 AM
154 Hunt
jurisdictions in Figure 6.2. Figure 6.6 shows a twofold variation in the 
incidence of claims with 26 weeks or more of wage loss. Queensland 
and Tasmania are low, while New South Wales reports 3.3 claims per 
1,000 employees. The Australian average was 2.6 claims per 1,000 em-
ployees in 2000–2001. 
The cost of workers’ compensation coverage in Australia is pre-
sented in Figure 6.7. It shows the average premium rate for the latest 
three years, standardized for variation in industry mix, pension cov-
erage, employer excess, and coverage of self-insurers in some juris-
dictions. Costs demonstrate a twofold variation between the lowest in 
Queensland and the highest in New South Wales. The Australian aver-
age premium level rose from A$2.39 per 100 in 1999–2000 to A$2.47 
per 100 in 2001–2002. 
Figure 6.7  Average Standardized Premium Rates, by Jurisdiction,  
2000–2002
SOURCE: Workplace Relations Ministers’ Council (2003).
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U.S. BENCHMARKING
As discussed earlier, in the United States there has not been the 
same degree of national interest in benchmarking workers’ compensa-
tion systems as in Australia or Canada. However, the Workers Com-
pensation Research Institute (WCRI) has developed a series of detailed 
benchmark measures for a subset of 12 large U.S. states that represent 
more than 50 percent of the nation’s workers’ compensation beneﬁt 
payments. 
The major reason for this lack of interest may be that in most U.S. 
jurisdictions, the majority of workers’ compensation policies are writ-
ten by private insurance companies. These companies compete vigor-
ously with each other and do not welcome the opportunity to “tell their 
secrets” to the competition, or even to admit that they are doing well or 
poorly, since this could affect marketing results. Given the competitive 
atmosphere, even the public funds that compete with private insurers 
are loath to reveal their operating results. Yet, historically the workers’ 
compensation insurance industry has been regulated by public entities. 
The net effect of this environment was a data reporting system that 
was narrowly construed to enable public regulation without conveying 
much information. 
The CompScope™ effort of WCRI is a welcome break from this 
tradition. However, the CompScope™ measures themselves reveal a 
different bias. They are designed to compare the operation of workers’ 
compensation systems, but tend to focus on claims administration issues 
rather than overview measures. For instance, CompScope™ includes 
measures of average medical cost containment expenses per claim, but 
does not include the incidence of claims for the system as a whole. 
Figure 6.8 shows the proportion of all claims with more than seven 
days of lost time that involve 26 weeks of disability or more. This mea-
sure is presented to maximize comparability with the Australian ﬁgures 
reported earlier. Among these 12 states, Wisconsin and Indiana have 
the lowest proportion of extended duration claims, closely followed 
by Tennessee and Illinois. California, Texas, and Louisiana have the 
highest proportion of extended duration claims, each at 25 percent or 
more of all wage-loss claims. For the 12 states, the median is 18 percent 
of wage-loss claims that extend for 26 weeks or more. Although the 
numbers were presented as incidence rates for Australian jurisdictions, 
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Figure 6.8  Proportion of Claims with More Than 26 Weeks Paid Duration for Selected U.S. Jurisdictions
SOURCE: Telles, Wang, and Tanabe (2004).
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an average of 14 percent of claims involved extended wage loss. So, 
American injuries appear to be comparable at least for this sample of 
12 states. 
Analogous to the data presented on Canadian systems in Figure 6.2 
would be the proportion of wage-loss claims that receive permanent 
partial disability (PPD) payments in U.S. jurisdictions. These numbers 
are presented in Figure 6.9. It shows that 14 to 38 percent of wage-loss 
claims receive PPD payments, with a 12-state median of 23 percent. 
States with a low proportion of PPD payments include Pennsylvania, 
Massachusetts, Louisiana, Connecticut, and Indiana. High PPD propor-
tions are found in Texas, California, and Florida. Thus, the proportion 
of claims receiving PPD payments in U.S. jurisdictions appears to sub-
stantially exceed the proportion receiving impairment beneﬁts in Cana-
dian provinces.
Unfortunately, there is not a source of state workers’ compensation 
cost data that compares directly to the Canadian and Australian ﬁgures 
presented earlier. Figure 6.10 shows the average workers’ compensa-
tion beneﬁts paid per $100 in covered wages for 2001 reported by the 
National Academy of Social Insurance. High beneﬁt–cost states were 
California, Pennsylvania, and Florida. Low beneﬁt–cost states were 
Massachusetts and Indiana. The median beneﬁt–cost for the 12 states 
listed was $0.91 per $100 of covered payroll. 
Finally, Figure 6.11 shows the timeliness of ﬁrst indemnity payment 
for the selected U.S. jurisdictions. These data from the CompScope™ 
database indicate that the median state needs 63 days from the date of 
injury to the ﬁrst indemnity payment. This is signiﬁcantly slower than 
the Canadian average at 35 days from injury to ﬁrst payment in 2002. 
Massachusetts was the quickest at 50 days, and North Carolina was the 
slowest at 77 days. 
Benchmarking of workers’ compensation systems has come a long 
way in the past decade. None of these measures was available 10 years 
ago. And some very preliminary judgments can be made about com-
parative system performance. However, there is still a great deal of 
haze surrounding system performance assessment as represented in the 
benchmarking efforts. Let us turn now to the state of the art in perfor-
mance measurement in individual workers’ compensation systems. 
Roberts.indb   157 6/7/2005   9:29:12 AM
158  
Figure 6.9  Proportion of Wage-Loss Claims that Receive PPD Payments for Selected U.S. Jurisdictions
SOURCE: Telles, Wang, and Tanabe (2004).
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STATE-OF-THE-ART PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION SYSTEMS
As discussed earlier, workers’ compensation systems have not been 
among the leaders in developing performance measurement tools. How-
ever, many jurisdictions now appear to be catching up and are able to 
take advantage of the experience that has accumulated in other types of 
organizations. Workers’ compensation is a “data rich” environment, and 
that has been the source of many problems. In the old paper processing 
systems, the sheer volume of paper documents was simply overwhelm-
ing. But with modern scanning and character recognition technologies, 
it has become possible to compile data more expediently and more eco-
nomically. 
The International Association of Industrial Accident Boards and 
Commissions (IAIABC), the professional association for administra-
tors of workers’ compensation systems, began encouraging consistency 
in electronic data collection in the early 1980s. As many workers’ com-
Figure 6.10  Workers’ Compensation Beneﬁts Paid Per $100 of Covered 
Wages for Selected U.S. Jurisdictions
SOURCE: NASI (2003).
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Figure 6.11  Time from Date of Injury to First Indemnity Payment, Selected U.S. Jurisdictions
SOURCE: Telles, Wang, and Tanabe (2004).
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pensation systems began investigating the possibility of migration from 
paper to electronic record keeping, the electronic data interchange stan-
dards of IAIABC provided guidance and reassurance. However, as of 
September 2002 (latest available statistics), only 24 states were using 
the claims reporting standards (since revised twice) and 5 more were 
planning to use them. That left 21 states that were not yet using the 
standard format after nearly two decades of experience.
There are, however, a number of impressive performance measure-
ment systems currently in place throughout the workers’ compensation 
world. These performance measurement systems are speciﬁcally de-
signed to support the management of the workers’ compensation func-
tion. They include targets or goals, with an accountability standard that 
deﬁnes acceptable levels of performance. They also are measured with 
greater frequency, to support operational requirements. Let’s begin with 
the IAIABC Information Product Award winner in 2003 for “program 
improvement.” 
NOVA SCOTIA WCB
The Nova Scotia WCB Performance Measurement and Manage-
ment System (PMMS) emphasizes empowering WCB employees by 
giving them the necessary information to align their personal work goals 
with organizational objectives. This is illustrated by Figure 6.12, which 
shows the performance model underlying the PMMS. It indicates that 
the goals of the organization are deﬁned from the top down, but perfor-
mance is measured from the bottom up. Individual performances add up 
to team performance, which in turn cumulates to unit and then depart-
ment performance. All departments taken together constitute corporate 
outcomes. 
The PMMS system uses performance bands to deﬁne expected per-
formance norms based on past experience. These “dashboard indica-
tors” deﬁne adequate (green), marginal (yellow), and unacceptable (red) 
performance for each performance measure and at each organizational 
level. In this way, individuals or teams with performance problems can 
be identiﬁed and targeted for additional training or assistance as deter-
mined by management.  
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The primary performance indicators are
• timeliness,
• return-to-work outcomes,
• claim durations,
• claim costs,
• staff availability, and
• stakeholder satisfaction.
The system is a proprietary, Web-based application designed so that 
each user is assigned an appropriate level of access as well as the neces-
sary performance level indicators. Thus, individual caseworkers may 
access their own monthly performance results, as well as their team, 
unit, and department performance results, but they cannot access anoth-
Corporate
Outcomes
Department
Performance
Unit Performance
Team Performance
Individual Performance
Measurement & Management
Key Performance Measures
Corporate Goals/Objectives
G
oa
ls
/O
bj
ec
tiv
es
-d
ef
in
ed
to
p/
do
w
n
(w
ith
st
ak
eh
ol
de
r
co
ns
ul
ta
tio
n)
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
-m
ea
su
re
d
bo
tt
om
/u
p
Figure 6.12  Performance Model for Nova Scotia PMMS
SOURCE: IAIABC (2004).
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er individual’s results. Similarly, a team manager has access to results 
for her/his department, unit, and team, plus the individuals in the team, 
but not for other teams or individuals. There are seven distinct levels of 
security access built into this system. 
For each performance area, the software permits “drill-thru” to 
more reﬁned or speciﬁc measures. For example, the corporate timeli-
ness of payment measure allows drill-thru to the ﬁve different client 
service units, which are organized geographically. Data (and dashboard 
indicators) are displayed for the current month and the previous month, 
as well as the threshold levels for green, yellow, and red indicators. A 
human contact for more information is also listed. Additional drill-thru 
to teams and individuals on this measure is also available. When you 
get to the individual worker level, data are displayed for the last eight 
measurements (typically months). This permits easy identiﬁcation of 
performance problems and enables quick intervention for remedial ef-
forts or workload rebalancing. 
The PMMS system also delivers management information reporting 
that supports day-to-day operational management. For instance, there 
is a “Medium High Caseload Report,” which identiﬁes units, teams, 
or individuals with relatively high caseloads. The report assigns each 
claim a status and weight, based on speciﬁc activities happening with 
the claim. The system is designed to represent the amount of effort that 
would typically be required for a case of that status. Management can 
then work with this list to maintain more equitable ﬁle distribution and 
resultant work effort. 
The WCB of Nova Scotia reports that users indicate that the soft-
ware tool is “intuitive and relevant to their work.” Eighty-ﬁve percent 
of staff surveyed in 2002 indicated that they understood how they could 
meet their personal performance targets. The board of directors has also 
expressed a high level of satisfaction with the information they receive 
monthly from the PMMS. The bottom line is that timeliness for ﬁrst 
payment improved from 60.5 percent in May 2002 to 81.5 percent in 
May 2003. 
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WCB OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
Another state-of-the-art performance measurement system is that 
of the WCB of British Columbia. Their Web-based system is called 
“Decision NET,” which was developed as a balanced scorecard system 
operating through ordinary Web browsers. The Decision NET system 
reports at the corporate level (complete with dashboard indicators) and 
the divisional level, which in British Columbia includes assessments, 
compensation, and prevention. This performance measurement system 
follows more of a “top down” approach than that in Nova Scotia. In 
fact, it was developed partly from an earlier key performance indicator 
(KPI) system used by management at the WCB of British Columbia. 
There are 15 performance measures included at the corporate ex-
ecutive view, with dashboard indicators for ﬁnancial, human resources, 
operations, and customer perspectives. There are three indicators to 
represent the ﬁnancial perspective, ﬁve indicators for the human re-
sources perspective, four indicators for the operational perspective, and 
three indicators for the customer perspective. Of course, one can drill 
down for more detail within each broad area. 
For example, in the ﬁnancial perspectives domain there are three 
performance measures: 1) the unﬁnalled claims liability index, 2) ad-
ministration expenses, and 3) surplus (deﬁcit) from operations. In 
late 2003, two of these dashboard indicators were at acceptable levels 
(green) and one was unacceptable (red). Against a budgeted deﬁcit of 
$405.5 million year to date, actual performance was a deﬁcit of only 
$13.9 million, resulting in a green dashboard indicator. A caption ex-
plains that if either the operating surplus (deﬁcit) or actual fund balance 
are below budget for the year to date, the entire indicator is negative. 
The fund balance showed an actual deﬁcit of $420.6 million against 
a budgeted level of $812.2 million, so both measures were better than 
budgeted and the dashboard indicator is green. The ﬁgure for last period 
(previous year to date in this instance) is also reported for comparison 
purposes. This provides a sense of the trend in the performance measure 
which may be important in interpreting the indicator. 
An unfavorable (red) dashboard indicator was shown for unﬁnalled 
claims liability. As explained in a caption, claims costs were unfavor-
able due to higher incidence and older long-term disability claims than 
planned. Older claims generally result in larger “catch-up” payments 
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and, hence, higher average current costs for LTD claims. This unfavor-
able trend was not sufﬁciently offset by favorable trends in short-term 
disability, health care, and vocational rehabilitation costs. 
There are similar displays for the other performance measures in 
the Decision NET system. Most indicators are reset monthly, but on dif-
ferent schedules according to the reporting cycle of the underlying data. 
Thus, the entire reporting system is renewed monthly, but is not held 
hostage to one late reporting number or one data veriﬁcation problem. 
There are other performance measurement systems in the workers’ 
compensation universe that have very good reputations. These include 
those of the New York WCB and the State Accident Insurance Fund of 
Oregon. No doubt, private sector insurers have some sophisticated per-
formance measurement systems as well. However, these two Canadian 
systems illustrate the state of the art of performance measurement that 
is possible today. 
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
There is one additional measure that should be cited. The Ofﬁce of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs (OWCP) in the U.S. Department of 
Labor has developed what may be the ultimate single outcome mea-
sure for a workers’ compensation agency. In response to the pressures 
generated by the Government Performance and Results Act discussed 
earlier, OWCP decided to measure production days lost due to workers’ 
compensation claims in the federal employing agencies, and to evaluate 
OWCP performance in terms of reduction in average lost production 
days.5
Lost production days may be the ultimate performance measure for 
a workers’ compensation agency, because it represents both the inci-
dence of claims and their duration. A reduction in lost production days 
is clearly a good thing for both workers and employers. 
This system was implemented originally as a way to track per-
formance under the Quality Case Management program, a nurse case 
management system designed to return long-term Federal Employees’ 
Compensation Act (FECA) claimants to employment. The average re-
duction in lost production days has been nearly 20 percent from 1997 
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to 2004. Using this measurement to manage performance over time ap-
pears to have been very productive for those involved in the program. 
This is demonstrated in the fact that the lost production day (LPD) mea-
sure was extended to the entire FECA program in ﬁscal year 2001. It 
has subsequently been adopted under the President’s Safety, Health and 
Return-to-Employment initiative for all federal employees for 2004–
2006. OWCP reports results on this and other performance measures by 
agency on their Web site (http://www.dol-esa.gov/share/).
CONCLUSIONS
Performance measurement has clearly gained at least a tenuous 
foothold within some workers’ compensation systems in North Ameri-
ca. One gets the impression that the “state of the art” is better in Canada 
than in the United States. But that impression could be mistaken; per-
haps it results from the more competitive workers’ compensation envi-
ronment in the United States, which leads insurers to think of perfor-
mance measurement systems as a part of their competitive advantage. 
This could lead in turn to a more secretive approach to these issues. 
The performance measurement systems in Nova Scotia and British 
Columbia are impressive. They incorporate multiple dimensions and 
show considerable innovation in measuring very complex outcomes. 
Nova Scotia’s PMMS seems particularly well suited to their objective 
of bringing corporate goals into play at each worker’s desk. We look 
forward to seeing how performance measurement might translate into 
performance management over the next several years. 
The benchmarking efforts in Australia, Canada, and the United 
States also seem promising. The measures are generally appropriate 
and cover many of the most important dimensions of workers’ compen-
sation system performance. Benchmarking may represent an approach 
that is closer to “the least common denominator” than to “state of the 
art.” But one can certainly see how the knowledge that a system is lag-
ging in performance behind its peers could be politically embarrassing. 
It remains to be seen whether laggard performers will mount an effec-
tive effort to improve. This may depend more upon stakeholders’ at-
titudes than on the benchmarking results, but at least the benchmarking 
can provide some impetus for change. 
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On the other hand, there are also limits to the role of performance 
measurement in workers’ compensation systems. First must come the 
dictum that “what gets measured gets done.” To a large degree this is 
true, especially if compensation or other personal beneﬁts are tied to 
achievement of measured results. However, another question is, “what 
is not measured?” It seems clear that concentration on achieving one 
goal of complex systems like these will likely come at the expense of 
other goals. It may not be evident immediately, but the time and energy 
that goes into achieving the stated goal will be diverted from some ac-
tivity with an unstated goal. This may or may not be a problem, but the 
issue should be carefully examined to make sure that the net result is 
not unintended. 
Recent accounting scandals in private industry (Enron, Global 
Crossing, etc.) show another danger of performance measurement. 
Sometimes people cheat to make sure they achieve the goals. Measure-
ment systems are only as good as the underlying data, and if anyone 
has the incentive and the opportunity to inﬂate performance data for 
personal advantage, it is a serious threat. The surprising aspect of recent 
scandals is how few people it apparently takes to successfully corrupt a 
performance measurement system. 
The other question is, “what happens when things go bad?” The 
savvy executive knows that is the time to change the performance mea-
surement system. On the other hand, corporate and public governance 
systems should be capable of dealing with this issue. Performance goals 
must be realistic and achievable, or they will not motivate performance. 
But this means they must reﬂect the underlying reality, and that reality 
may change rapidly. So performance goals must also be ﬂexible.
Since forces like economic conditions, demographic trends, policy 
changes, etc., are outside the control of workers’ compensation admin-
istrators, it is unfair to expect that their inﬂuence should be controlled 
by management. Thus, it seems critical that some agreed upon process 
for setting and modifying system goals be established. Otherwise, the 
performance measurement system may come to be seen as simply an 
apologist for management. 
Finally, observers ask whether performance measurement is just 
“the ﬂavor of the month?” This seems unlikely, since it is part of a much 
broader trend in government, education, and private enterprise. But ul-
timately, performance measurement must be adopted by stakeholders 
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as an important part of system management and governance if it is to 
truly reach its promising potential. It is still early in the history of per-
formance measurement in workers’ compensation; it remains to be seen 
how much performance management it will lead to. We look forward to 
watching this process unfold over the next several years. 
Notes
Many thanks to Tim Schmidle, Karen Roberts, and Terry Bogyo for reading and cri-
tiquing an earlier draft of this paper. All errors remaining are the responsibility of the 
author. 
 1.  See http://www2.icma.org/CPMParticipants/ for current list. 
 2.  See http://www.worklossdata.com.
 3.  See http://www.awcbc.org/english/board_data.asp.
 4.  The published version of the report also includes New Zealand, the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT) system, the Seacare system, and the Comcare system for 
Australian government employees.
 5.  It should be noted that OWCP maintains a number of other performance mea-
sures that are not covered here. See U.S. Department of Labor (2004).
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The Structure of and 
Incentives from Workers’ 
Compensation Pricing
Karen Roberts
Michigan State University
Workers’ compensation was originally designed to deal with an as-
pect of the employment relationship, that of work-related illness and 
injury. As such, it is viewed as a transaction between two primary stake-
holders, the employer and the employee. Examination of the pricing of 
workers’ compensation requires a shift in orientation. In addition to the 
employee–employer interaction, the transaction in pricing is also be-
tween the employer and the insurer. As is the case in the employee–em-
ployer relationship, the two parties have somewhat different interests 
with respect to the purchase of insurance. Unlike the literature that ex-
amines the injury, beneﬁt, and return to work, where the interests of the 
employer and insurer are treated as coinciding, examination of workers’ 
compensation pricing is often modeled as a principal–agent problem 
where information imperfections distort behavioral incentives (Dionne 
and Harrington 1992).1 Principal–agent refers to conditions when one 
party, the principal, either because of a lack of skills or for reasons of 
cost, contracts with another party, the agent, to perform a particular 
function. The principal–agent problem arises because the principal is 
unable, due to costs or other factors, to perfectly monitor the agent. 
The problem facing the principal is how to structure incentives for the 
agent to perform the function in the absence of complete monitoring 
(Sappington 1991).
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how workers’ compen-
sation prices are determined, the incentives embedded in that pricing 
process, in what ways the employer and insurer perspectives coincide 
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and where they diverge, and the policy implications of the different 
perspectives. 
Much of the literature about workers’ compensation pricing is 
framed in terms of its effect on workplace safety. The theoretical frame-
work is based on commonly made economic assumptions about ratio-
nality and utility maximization (Thomason 2003). As is the case with 
most positive economic models, actor behavior can be understood in 
terms of a response to beneﬁts and costs (Ehrenberg and Smith 2003). 
Workers’ compensation is sometimes described as a payroll tax. Em-
ployers are seen as trading off between the cost of providing safety and 
the cost of insurance in the form of workers’ compensation premium. 
Similar to unemployment insurance, the cost of workers’ compensation 
insurance is designed to vary with the employer’s use of the insurance, 
and can thus be seen as lowering the relative cost of safety and provid-
ing an incentive to maintain a safer workplace. Employers are therefore 
seen as engaging in a cost-minimization strategy.
In contrast to unemployment insurance, however, the actor that gen-
erates the safety incentive is a proﬁt-maximizing insurer rather than a 
welfare-maximizing government. Examination of the incentives to in-
surers shows that the loss-minimizing strategy insurers use is designed 
to minimize uncertainty around losses rather than minimizing the losses 
themselves. Economic theory suggests that the workers’ compensation 
bargain is voluntarily entered into and results in a mutually welfare en-
hancing arrangement (McCluskey 1998). One question raised in this 
chapter is whether that is true given the nature of the objective functions 
of employers and insurers. 
The next section of this chapter includes a brief description of how 
workers’ compensation prices are determined. Subsequent sections dis-
cuss the incentives embedded in the price determination process and 
the research that examines the effectiveness of those behavioral incen-
tives.
PREMIUM DETERMINATION IN WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION
Premium determination in workers’ compensation is a several-step 
process, and states vary in the degree to which they regulate the various 
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steps. Up until the early 1980s, most states used what is called admin-
istered pricing to determine workers’ compensation rates. Under ad-
ministered pricing, states fully regulate prices by issuing basic rates 
and allowable adjustments that all carriers in the state must use, includ-
ing the state fund if there is one. Over the past 20 years, many states 
have deregulated the pricing process to varying degrees (Thomason, 
Schmidle, and Burton 2001, pp. 39–41). Some states permit carriers to 
deviate from the basic rates, although these deviations must be applied 
uniformly across policyholders, and some states permit carriers to set 
their basic rates independently rather than as a deviation from the state 
issued rates. Additionally, various states permit carriers to use schedule 
credits (or debits), which are percentage adjustments to premium that 
can be applied to individual insurance purchasers and do not have to be 
offered to all customers. At a minimum, all states require that carriers 
ﬁle their rating plans with the state insurance bureau, but some differ in 
their policies on whether a carrier must wait for state approval before 
using their ﬁled rates. For example, ﬁle-and-use states permit carriers to 
use rates as soon as they have been ﬁled with the state bureau, whereas 
use-and-ﬁle states permit carriers to use rates prior to ﬁling. Others re-
quire a waiting period to permit the bureau to review the rating plan.
All production activity in the workplace is divided into rating clas-
siﬁcations (McGavin 2001). Most states use the classiﬁcation system 
devised by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), 
which includes over 600 categories. These categories or class codes are 
a mix of industry and occupation that are intended to be homogenous 
with respect to risk. Employers are assigned to these class codes based 
on their payroll. Class assignment is proportional to payroll distribu-
tion. 
In each state, a base rate is associated with each of these class codes, 
expressed in terms of dollars per hundred dollars of payroll. These base 
rates are developed by rating organizations that collect loss and expense 
data from insurers, incorporate trend estimates (possibly including a 
claim adjustment expense factor) and generate rates that are meant to 
equal expected losses across the state in each of these rating categories 
(Parry and Math 1993). Workers’ compensation is unique among in-
surance lines in that all insurers in a state are required to be members 
of the rating organization (Carroll and Kaestner 1995). There is varia-
tion across states in what is included in these base rates. These rates 
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are referred to as pure premium if they reﬂect only expected losses. In 
some states, factors to include loss adjustment expenses are added in 
to generate what are called loss cost rates. In other states, a proﬁt load-
ing is applied that includes underwriting expenses, commissions and 
proﬁts, creating what are termed advisory rates (Thomason, Schmidle, 
and Burton 2001, p. 61). These can be thought of as fully developed 
manual rates.
In regulated states, the rating organization submits these rates to an 
insurance bureau or other state agency responsible for insurance indus-
try regulation for approval. This can be a politically charged process 
as the insurance bureaus are responsible for assuring both statewide 
insurance industry solvency and employer access to insurance, and may 
fail to approve rates which the rating organization views as adequate on 
behalf of its members (Danzon and Harrington 1998). In administered 
pricing states, once these base rates are approved they become the man-
ual rates all carriers in the state are required to use, with the exception 
of some states where carriers may apply for approval of an across-the-
board deviation. In open competition states, the rating organization is 
responsible for generating pure premium, loss cost, or advisory rates for 
insurance commissioner approval. Once approved, these rates become 
the basis for carriers to independently develop their own manual rates. 
In open competition states, manual rates are an aspect of price on which 
carriers can compete for business. Each employer’s manual premium 
is equal to the manual rate for the class code multiplied by employer 
payroll in that class code divided by 100.
The next step in the pricing process is experience rating. There are 
two prevailing descriptions of the purpose of experience rating. One 
that comes primarily from the insurer perspective is that it is “a pro-
cedure that utilizes the individual risk’s past loss experience to fore-
cast future losses. It is an effort to modify the ratemaking process by 
recognizing an individual risk’s potential for incurring claims” (Parry 
and Math 1993, p. 658). The other description is framed in terms of 
providing safety incentives to employers where employers are viewed 
as responding to an economic incentive to operate a safe workplace: 
“To the extent that a ﬁrm’s own injury experience is reﬂected in its 
premium, there is an induced incentive for it to consider investing in 
safety. If its injuries fall, so will its workers’ compensation premium” 
(Smith 1993, p. I-152). The distinction between the two descriptions 
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is that one emphasizes accurate prediction of future losses in order to 
collect sufﬁcient premium, while the other emphasizes safety-related 
behavior incentives.
Most states use a standard formula developed by NCCI, although 
some states permit carriers to develop their own. The basic formula for 
the experience modiﬁcation factor is (Chelius and Smith 1993):
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Actual and expected losses are calculated over a three-year period. 
It is frequently noted that the experience modiﬁcation formula gives 
more weight to frequency than severity of injury and that the smaller 
the ﬁrm, the less self-rated it is. The weighting of frequency above se-
verity is accomplished by the separation of losses into actual primary 
and excess losses. Actual primary losses are equal to actual losses but 
capped at $5,000. Losses over that amount are included but weighted 
by ﬁrm size. The addition of a ballast factor in both the numerator and 
denominator reduces the effect of experience rating for smaller ﬁrms 
such that they tend to pay as though they had experienced losses equal 
to the industry average. Larger ﬁrms, on the other hand, face a premium 
that is adjusted to more closely reﬂect their true loss experience. The 
W factor is termed ﬁrm credibility and refers to the degree to which a 
ﬁrm’s loss history can be relied upon to predict future losses. Loss his-
tories of larger ﬁrms have greater predictive value than smaller ﬁrms so 
W varies with payroll (Parry and Math 1993). There have been several 
revisions to the experience rating formula that truncated the true range 
for W. For example, in Michigan, the possible range for W is between 
0.04 to 0.8 (Compensation Advisory Organization of Michigan 2004). 
The experience modiﬁcation factor, X
j
, is multiplied by the manual pre-
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mium to calculate the ﬁrm’s modiﬁed, or standard earned, premium 
(McGavin 2001).
There are several other adjustments that can be made to premium. 
The most common include premium discounts, schedule credits (or 
debits), and allowance for deductibles. Actual premium may also be 
adjusted by dividend payments after the close of the policy period; 
however, in states that permit ex ante adjustments, evidence suggests 
that the use of dividends is declining (Yates and Burton 2003, p. 3). 
Premium discounts are essentially volume discounts and depend on the 
level of premium generated. In most states, carriers that offer premium 
discounts are required to apply them uniformly across policyholders.
Schedule credits (debits) are percentage reductions (increases) ap-
plied to modiﬁed premium. These are considered an underwriting tool 
in that they allow carriers to adjust premium based on information 
about expected losses that they do not believe is captured by modi-
ﬁed premium. In particular, schedule credits or debits give insurers a 
mechanism for rewarding employers for improved safety or penalizing 
for deteriorating safety conditions more rapidly than experience rating 
permits. Their use also acts as a mechanism for carriers to compete for 
business on the basis of price. 
There are two types of deductible programs, small and large deduct-
ible policies. Their use varies by state but nearly all states allow for 
the use of one or both types of policy. Both types of deductible policy 
can be seen as a form of “co-insurance” in that they involve explicit 
sharing of the risk of injury between the insurer and employer (Arrow 
1971). Under small deductible policies, employers pay an initial $500 to 
$2,500 per claim. States vary as to whether they include the deductible 
amounts in a ﬁrm’s loss history. Large deductibles range from between 
$100,000 to $5 million per accident (Shields, Lu, and Oswalt 1999).
INCENTIVES TO EMPLOYERS
The basic framework for understanding incentives to employers be-
gins with the production cost-minimization framework. Injuries impose 
production costs in the form of lost productivity and perhaps lost human 
capital investment. Injury costs can be reduced by employer investment 
in safety, and employers use the efﬁciency condition such that they 
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invest in safety up to the point where the marginal beneﬁt equals the 
marginal cost. The beneﬁt of safety is foregone injury and the cost is an 
investment cost in equipment, training, or other safety measures. Work-
ers’ compensation beneﬁts are seen as increasing the costs of injuries to 
employers and thus decreasing the relative cost of safety (Boden 1995). 
To the extent that employers bear the costs of those workers’ compensa-
tion beneﬁts, they will be motivated to invest in safety. The next section 
discusses the incentives to employers embedded in the various compo-
nents of workers’ compensation premium determination.
Manual Rates
Arguably there are safety incentives for employers embedded in 
the determination of manual rates (Burton and Chelius 1997). Those 
rates are determined by the losses experienced by the state’s employers. 
Better statewide loss histories result in lower manual rates. The use of 
manual rates as a safety incentive is diluted, however, by free-rider ef-
fects, where safer employers subsidize more risky ones who enjoy the 
lower manual rates without incurring safety costs (Burton and Chelius 
1997). Further, it is unlikely that employers understand the possible 
link between their individual safety records and statewide manual rates 
(Roberts 2003). There is little research on the effect of manual rates on 
employer safety behavior. Durbin and Butler (1998) perform national 
and state-level analyses that separate the effects of manual rates, expe-
rience rating, small and large deductibles and OSHA on fatality rates. 
Using national data, they report that a 10 percent increase in manual 
rates would lead to a 0.6 percent decrease in fatalities, suggesting that 
poor understanding and/or issues of cross subsidies undermine poten-
tial manual rate safety incentives.
Firm-Level Experience Rating 
There is a considerable research literature on the effects of experi-
ence rating on employer behavior. Existing studies fall into two broad 
categories: 1) those that use ﬁrm size as a proxy for degree of experi-
ence rating, and 2) those that examine the effect of experience rating on 
fatalities.
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Firm size–beneﬁt interaction studies 
The theory underlying the ﬁrm-size studies is based on moral haz-
ard that arises due to information asymmetries in workers’ compensa-
tion. Two sorts are considered in the literature: 1) ex ante “risk-bearing” 
moral hazard, where employees reduce their safety efforts because the 
cost of injury has decreased due to workers’ compensation beneﬁts; and 
2) ex post “reporting” moral hazard, where employees know the true 
nature of their injuries, such as whether the injury is truly work-re-
lated, how serious it is, and/or whether it genuinely is preventing return 
to work, but employers do not (Bolduc et al. 2001; Durbin and But-
ler 1998). As a result, as beneﬁt levels increase, workers’ compensa-
tion claims and/or duration will rise due to both types of moral hazard 
(Krueger 1990). For the ﬁrm, therefore, beneﬁt increases raise the mar-
ginal savings from injury prevention efforts as long as costs are passed 
back to ﬁrms in a form such as experience rating (Chelius and Smith 
1983). The ﬁrm size–beneﬁt studies make use of the feature of the ex-
perience rating formula that increases the degree of sensitivity to the 
ﬁrm’s own loss experience directly with payroll. Therefore, ﬁrm size is 
treated as a proxy measure for the level of experience rating.
Other than one of the earliest studies by Chelius and Smith (1983) 
that failed to ﬁnd support for an experience-rating effect using the ben-
eﬁt–ﬁrm size interaction, most studies using this approach do ﬁnd sup-
port for experience rating as a mechanism for reducing claims rates. 
Ruser (1985) uses data from 25 three-digit manufacturing industries 
over the 1972–1979 period to test for the beneﬁt-ﬁrm size interaction 
on both frequency and severity of injury. His evidence supports the ex-
perience rating effect on the frequency of injury but not for severity. In 
a later study using establishment data, Ruser (1991) ﬁnds strong sta-
tistical support for the ﬁrm-size effect on injury rates that is robust to 
several different estimation approaches. 
Worrall and Butler (1988) also examine the effect of beneﬁt increas-
es framed as result of two countervailing forces: 1) the employee effect, 
where higher beneﬁts raise claims costs; and 2) the employer effect, 
where employers invest in safety to reduce claim costs. They note that 
if ﬁrms were perfectly experience rated, workers would be indifferent 
between buying their own insurance and a wage adjustment that reﬂects 
the compensating wage differential but that reality is plagued with in-
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formation failures. Using two-stage least-squares estimation, they esti-
mate the effects wages (result of stage one regression), expected beneﬁt 
levels, ﬁrm size, beneﬁts and ﬁrm size squared and the interaction of the 
two on permanent partial, temporary total, and all indemnity claims.2 
The sign on the ﬁrm size–beneﬁt interaction is negative as they expect-
ed, but is not statistically signiﬁcant in the temporary total beneﬁt claim 
regression. In a separate study (Butler and Worrall 1988), they examine 
the effect of experience rating on claim duration using ﬁrm size as their 
indicator of experience rating. Estimating hazard rates, they ﬁnd that 
the ﬁrm size coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁcant, but when used to cal-
culate elasticity, they ﬁnd that the elasticity of duration with respect to 
experience rating is substantively small.
Chelius and Smith (1993) take advantage of a unique feature of the 
Washington State workers’ compensation system, which in addition to 
conventional experience rating also offers small ﬁrms a supplemental 
experience-rating credit if there are no compensable losses during the 
rating period. Their prediction is that if experience rating is providing 
safety behavior incentives, small ﬁrms in Washington will have lower 
injury rates than small ﬁrms in other states. The experience rating cred-
it was measured using a dummy variable for the state of Washington. 
Their results did not support their hypothesis. Arguably, their measure 
of small ﬁrm credit was too imprecise and captured countervailing ef-
fects.
Fatality Rate Studies
As noted above, one of the difﬁculties in measuring the effect of 
experience rating on employer safety behavior is the countervailing 
effect of beneﬁts on employee claim propensities. The use of fatality 
rates as an indicator of safety efforts is thought to be free of the effect 
of both types of moral hazard (Moore and Viscusi 1989). For the most 
part, studies using this approach ﬁnd support for a safety effect from 
experience rating. Moore and Viscusi (1989) use data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics and the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health to estimate the effect of workers’ compensation ben-
eﬁts on fatality rates. They use the ﬁrm size–beneﬁt generosity measure 
of experience rating described in the studies above. They ﬁnd a large 
negative and statistically signiﬁcant effect of their measure of experi-
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ence rating on fatality rates. Using the same data, they also investigate 
the extent to which premium costs are passed back to employees in 
the form of lower wages. They ﬁnd evidence of positive compensat-
ing wage differentials but also that higher wage workers are somewhat 
more likely to pay for the costs of their beneﬁts. These results indicate 
that employers enjoy a substantial savings in labor costs by improving 
safety because much of the cost of safety improvement is ﬁnanced by 
employees in the form of lower wages.
Taking advantage of natural experiment presented by the introduc-
tion of experience rating in Ontario, Bruce and Atkins (1993) examine 
the effect of experience rating on fatality rates over a 10-year period. 
Experience rating is measured by a dummy variable, and industry was 
the unit of observation. Their results suggest that experience rating in 
the forestry and construction industries (those subject to experience rat-
ing under the Ontario system) led to a permanent (that is, long-run equi-
librium) decrease in fatalities in those industries. Further, they found 
that the magnitude reduced the fatality rate by 20–40 percent.
After providing descriptive evidence that workplace safety was im-
proving despite increases in workers’ compensation costs, Durbin and 
Butler (1998) examine the effect of several features of insurance pric-
ing on fatalities. They ﬁnd a large and signiﬁcant effect of experience 
rating on the national fatality rate: a 10 percent increase in the cost of 
experience rating will lead to a 12.3 percent reduction in the number of 
fatalities.
Potential Weaknesses of the Experience-Rating Studies
There are several potential difﬁculties with the ﬁrm size–beneﬁt in-
teraction approach. One is that the countervailing effect of increased 
employee claiming may overwhelm empirical evidence of experience-
rating effects (Lanoie 1992). The strength of the empirical results sug-
gests that employee efforts may reduce estimates of experience-rating 
effects, but they do not eliminate them, thus complicating efforts to 
estimate the magnitude of the effect of experience rating on safety. 
A related difﬁculty is the application of the prevailing assumption 
about the functioning of reporting moral hazard—that is, that work-
ers’ claiming rates increase with beneﬁt levels. More recent evidence 
suggests that there is signiﬁcant underclaiming on the part of injured 
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workers and that the replacement rate is weakly related to claim behav-
ior (Biddle and Roberts 2003; Shannon and Lowe 2002). This research 
suggests that there may be countervailing effects other than safety that 
mitigate against reporting moral hazard.
A third difﬁculty is determining the true employer safety behav-
iors in response to experience rating. While the evidence suggests that 
claims rates do decrease with experience rating, claims rates may de-
crease due to increased safety investments by employers or by claims 
management (Thomason 2003). While claims management may entail 
positive strategies for keeping an injured worker able to work, such as 
accommodation or rehabilitation, there is also potential for less posi-
tive behaviors, such as retaliation for claiming or disputing legitimate 
claims (Thomason 2003). There is some evidence that experience-rated 
employers are more likely to dispute claims, though without the ability 
to measure claim legitimacy, it is not clear that employers are engaging 
in that behavior (Hyatt and Kralj 1995). In a study of employer response 
to experience rating, Thomason and Pozzebon (2002) investigate the 
extent to which employers engage in safety investment and/or positive 
claims management (accommodation, rehabilitation, and monitoring 
worker recovery). They ﬁnd that experience rating leads to more of 
both safety investment and claims management but that larger ﬁrms are 
more likely to use safety over claims management.
A fourth difﬁculty arises out of the complexity of the experience-
rating formula itself. Arguably, it is sufﬁciently complex that few em-
ployers truly understand the incentives embedded within it (Kralj 1994; 
Roberts 2003; Spieler 1994). Evidence suggests that the better the ﬁrm 
understands the experience-rating formula, the more likely there will be 
a safety response, and that understanding increases with ﬁrm size (Kralj 
1994). This suggests that understanding may be a mediator between 
experience rating and safety.
Another difﬁculty is speciﬁc to the fatality approach. While the evi-
dence from the fatality rate studies is compelling, the question remains 
as to whether those results can be safely generalized to the ability of 
experience rating to reduce the likelihood of nonfatal injuries. These 
studies appear to implicitly assume that the probability distribution un-
derlying fatal injuries is the same as that for nonfatal. While this may 
be true in some workplaces, 46.1 percent of lost-time claims in 1999 
were sprains, strains, or repetitive motion injuries (U.S. Bureau of La-
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bor Statistics 2001), injury types that are unlikely to ever result in death 
in the extreme. This suggests that results from the fatality studies might 
be generalizeable to prevention of traumatic injuries such as cuts and 
lacerations but not to injury rates in general.
Finally, none of these studies actually include a direct measure of 
the experience-rating modiﬁcation factor and have to rely on proxies 
for it, either a ﬁrm-size measure or a dummy variable. It is quite pos-
sible that those measures are capturing other, unobserved factors that 
affect injury rates and severity.
Other Adjustments
The preponderance of the research on incentives to employers has 
revolved around experience rating, however; two studies examine the 
role of deductibles. After a period of rapid growth in workers’ compen-
sation costs during the 1980s, use of large deductible policies increased 
beginning in the early 1990s (Danzon and Harrington 1998). One study 
examined the question of whether the use of large deductibles gener-
ated incentives for employers to prevent injuries. Taking advantage of 
a unique research opportunity in Texas, where the use of large deduct-
ibles was permitted a year before self-insurance legislation was enacted, 
Shields et al. (1999) used ﬁrm-level data to examine whether permitting 
deductibles lowered claims rates and claim costs. Their results showed 
an immediate effect on claim costs, which dropped by 12 percent dur-
ing the ﬁrst year after the introduction of large deductible policies. De-
creases in claims rates did not appear until the third year. One possible 
weakness in their study, which they mention but do not address, is that 
there is likely selection bias due to more risky ﬁrms electing to purchase 
large deductible policies. They also do not discuss what effect the avail-
ability of self-insurance a year after the start of their observation period 
might have had on their sample. However, their results are consistent 
with those found by Durbin and Butler (1998), who ﬁnd that small and 
large deductibles decrease fatality rates by 3.2 percent and 10 percent, 
respectively. 
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INSURER PERSPECTIVE
The insurer perspective is commonly modeled as a resource alloca-
tion problem, where insurers need to determine the optimal insurance 
contract. Under the assumption of insurer risk neutrality, the optimal 
contract is adequate to covering a risk if the policy price is set equal 
to the expected indemnity plus a loading factor. There are several ob-
stacles to setting this contract, speciﬁcally, moral hazard, adverse selec-
tion, and regulation (Dionne and Harrington 1992).
Moral hazard, as is the case in its application to claiming behavior, 
is an artifact of information asymmetry. Again, there are two types of 
moral hazard, ex ante and ex post. In this context, opportunities for ex 
ante moral hazard arises because although the insurer can observe that 
an accident occurred, it can not observe what safety efforts were made 
to avoid it. The two possible solutions to this are to either provide in-
complete coverage against loss or for the insurer to perfectly observe 
whether the risk is taking care. Only if the latter condition holds is full 
coverage optimal (Shavell 1979).
Ex post moral hazard refers to understanding of the true nature of 
the accident once it occurs. In most insurance contracts, it is assumed 
that the insured fully understands the extent of the damage but the in-
surer does not, and, again, it is costly for the insurer to collect that in-
formation. In the context of workers’ compensation, this sort of moral 
hazard is complicated by the employee’s ability to incompletely dis-
close the extent of the injury. Adverse selection is also a problem of 
imperfect information. Resources are misallocated because the insured 
has no incentive to reveal the true extent of risk and it is expensive for 
the insurer to observe it (Dionne 1983).
These difﬁculties with setting the optimal insurance contract pro-
vide the logic for three structural features of insurance premium: 1) the 
creation of risk classes, 2) the use of experience rating, and 3) partial 
coverage (or deductibles) (Dionne 1983). Because workers’ compensa-
tion insurance pricing is regulated, another aspect of the discussion of 
the optimal insurance contract is how regulation prevents optimality 
and the unwanted consequences of regulation.
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Features of Premium Adjustment
As noted in the description of how premium is determined, manual 
premium is calculated based on how the ﬁrm’s payroll is distributed 
across rating classes, that is, categories of work activities. The use of 
rate classiﬁcations is one mechanism insurers can use to prevent ex ante 
moral hazard: although the insurer may not be able to perfectly observe 
safety efforts on the part of the insured, it can approximate risk by clas-
sifying the ﬁrm’s activities and use market average risk levels for each 
category to estimate expected losses for the future. Using the argument 
that to the extent that ﬁrms are less able to engage in ex ante moral 
hazard, workplaces will be safer, Lanoie (1992) examined the effect 
of the number of risk classes on the frequency and severity of injury. 
The coefﬁcients for the number of rating classes were negative but not 
statistically signiﬁcant in the frequency models, and positive and sig-
niﬁcant in the severity model. These results failed to support his expec-
tation that greater insurer ex ante ability to observe true risk, as implied 
by the ability to assign payroll to detailed rate classes, should reduce 
the frequency and severity of claims because it is harder for insureds to 
engage in moral hazard.
Experience rating is used to deal with adverse selection, where 
ﬁrms know how risky their workplace is but insurers do not (Gal and 
Landsberger 1988). From the insurer perspective, experience rating is 
functioning well when standard loss ratios (ratio of losses to standard 
premium) are the same across a recognized risk group (Harrington 
1988). In practical terms, this refers to best predicting a risk’s loss for 
the coming policy period (Sherman 1990). This could be accomplished 
by manual rates if the risk class were truly homogeneous such that all 
employers with payroll within each class code maintained equally safe 
workplaces, but in reality ﬁrms are heterogeneous even within rating 
classes, necessitating additional adjustments. 
This perspective on experience rating puts its emphasis on collect-
ing sufﬁcient premium, not on the provision of safety incentives to em-
ployers. From the insurer’s perspective, one of the problems with full 
coverage is that the insured has no motivation to avoid loss and thus 
will shift all costs of risk to the insurer. For the employer, avoiding loss 
translates into implementing safety measures, thus incurring costs of 
safety. Assuming that employers want to minimize costs, they will want 
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to minimize accidents to the extent that the cost of the losses are passed 
back to them. However, for the insurer, the key problem is knowing in 
advance (ex ante) how large the loss will be so they can price accord-
ingly. The size of the prospective loss is not the issue for the insurer, but 
rather ex ante information about the size of the expected loss. In other 
words, employers are motivated to minimize loss in order to minimize 
operating costs, whereas insurers want to minimize uncertainty about 
the size of the prospective loss.
There are two broad threads in the insurer perspective literature on 
experience rating: 1) the development of theoretical models that exam-
ine the assumptions and conditions under which experience rating gen-
erates an optimal contract, and 2) empirical examination of the ways in 
which the application of experience rating is distorted either by features 
of the formula itself or through regulation.
The theoretical discussion notes that the way experience rating is 
incorporated into insurance contracts is based on the Law of the Iter-
ated Logarithm. When applied to the insurance contract, this law pro-
vides an understanding of insurance as a set of multi-period contracts. 
Repeated observation over the length of the relationship approximates 
perfect observation, thus eliminating the opportunity for moral hazard 
(Dionne 1983; Dionne and Harrington 1992). 
One model suggests that repeated contracts are not necessary for op-
timality. According to this model, at the end of each period, the insurer 
offers a contract where premium paid at the end of the period depends 
on the number of claims submitted until then (Gal and Landsberger 
1988). Insureds know that the premium will depend on the number of 
claims submitted by the end of the period and so recognize there is some 
uncertainty about the premium since they do not know in advance what 
their claims rate will be. Thus, uncertainty is shared; but, by paying 
premium that reﬂects actual claims made in the last period at the start of 
the next period, the contract allows for the eventual coverage of losses. 
The model requires the insured to renew the contract and that losses be 
accurately reported. The former requirement is probably reasonably ac-
curate for workers’ compensation where insurance is compulsory, but 
problems with injury underreporting in workers’ compensation suggest 
that the latter assumption cannot be made safely.
The less theoretical work examining the effect of experience rating 
examines the accuracy of the formula in adjusting premium so that poli-
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cyholders with equal risk produce equal expected loss ratios (Parry and 
Math 1993). Several criticisms have been leveled against the standard 
(NCCI) experience rating formula, including 1) a lack of precision in 
incorporating the tendency for larger ﬁrms to have lower loss ratios that 
result in insufﬁcient manual rates, potentially resulting in availability 
problems for small ﬁrms (Harrington 1988); 2) a tendency to obscure 
commonality within a risk class (the argument here seems to be that ex-
perience rating permits overly heterogeneous risks to be included in one 
rating class through the process of off-balancing); and 3) an inability 
to adequately handle shifts in ﬁrm ownership that change the underly-
ing riskiness (Parry and Math 1993). Revisions of the standard experi-
ence-rating formula in 1993 and again in 1997–1998 along with the 
use of additional adjustments such as schedule credits, were designed 
to ameliorate these problems (Compensation Advisory Organization of 
Michigan 2004; Gillam 1995). In addition, the most recent revision of 
the formula reduced the effect of medical-only claims on the experience 
modiﬁcation factor (Compensation Advisory Organization of Michigan 
1998). Again, the reason for this change can be interpreted in two ways. 
For the employer, this revision arguably provides an incentive to either 
keep injured workers at work or return them before the waiting period 
expires. However, for the carrier, a medical-only claim has more pre-
dictable future losses, that is, less uncertainty. 
THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION
Pricing in the insurance industry is heavily regulated, and because 
coverage is required for nearly all employers, workers’ compensation 
pricing is more regulated than most other lines (Carroll 1993). Over 
the past 20 years, however, pricing in workers’ compensation has un-
dergone signiﬁcant reform so that 37 states have enacted some form 
of open competition since the early 1980s (Thomason, Schmidle, and 
Burton 2001 p. 42). However, even under open competition, some regu-
lation in the form of rate approval is often required (Hunt, Krueger, and 
Burton 1988; Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton 2001). The mandate of 
the state insurance bureaus is to assure insurer solvency, rate afford-
ability, rate fairness, and universal access (Carroll and Kaestner 1995). 
Typically, workplace safety is not part of the insurance bureau portfo-
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lio unless the claims portion of the state regulatory structure is housed 
there. One of the questions investigated with respect to the effects of 
regulation in workers’ compensation is the extent to which it creates 
cross-subsidies that damage both employer and insurer incentives.
One reason that regulation can be thought of as a barrier to the 
optimal insurance contract is due to the regulatory objectives, which 
include both a healthy insurance market and affordable rates consis-
tent with a positive economic development climate, and thus require a 
balancing of competing interests. If, through regulation, insurance bu-
reaus set rates and permit adjustments that are actuarially fair, then the 
optimal contract will be possible (Schmidle 1995). However, political 
pressures from employers to lower rates or from insurers to raise them 
can distort contract incentives and threaten either of the core regulatory 
objectives.
Typically, there are two primary forms of rate regulation: 1) limit 
the percentage experience modiﬁcation factors applied to class rates; 
and 2) restrict the class rates themselves (Harrington and Danzon 2000). 
As described earlier, in every state, the rating organization issues basic 
manual rates (e.g., pure premium, loss cost, or advisory rates). In theo-
ry, the rating organization is submitting rates that reﬂect state average 
expected losses in each rating class and are actuarially fair. In regulated 
states, these rates go to the insurance commissioner for approval before 
being issued for carrier use. In open competition states, carriers use 
these as guidelines but ﬁle their own rates. In principle, each carrier’s 
rates reﬂect its own underwriting experience, cost structure, and mar-
keting strategy.
That regulation is beneﬁcial rests on two arguments. One is that 
government may possess information either not available to the parties 
or that would be inefﬁciently costly for each party to uncover for itself, 
such as insurer solvency or workplace safety. Because of the cost of 
acquiring that information, data collection and distribution in the form 
of rates is treated as a public good. The second is a welfare argument 
that insurance access is important, even if its guarantee involves some 
inefﬁciencies (Carroll and Kaestner 1995).
There are several reasons, however, why regulation may be undesir-
able. Because rate regulation is partially a political process, there may 
be pressure to suppress overall rates in the name of economic com-
petitiveness. Further, some employers may be more able to inﬂuence 
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the regulatory process leading to the suppression of some rates and a 
possible compensating inﬂation of others (Carroll and Kaestner 1995). 
In addition, it is sometimes argued that the insurance bureau becomes 
“captive” of the insurance industry and excessively raises rates (Har-
rington 1984).
A primary criticism of regulation is its potential for generating in-
equitable and welfare reducing cross-subsidies (Danzon and Harrington 
1998). The research on possible cross-subsidies argues that regulation 
results in subsidies from safer to more risky employers, often in the 
form of cost shifting from the residual to the voluntary market. The 
central premise to the cross-subsidy discussion is that if rate regulation 
results in rates that are insufﬁcient relative to claims costs, distortions 
will occur that will in fact lead to even greater cost growth (Danzon and 
Harrington 1998). 
Noting that the insurance market is segmented into two portions, 
the voluntary market and the residual market, one premise that under-
pins this discussion is that the larger the residual market share, the more 
troubled the state’s insurance market. All states except those that are 
exclusive state funds have a residual, or assigned risk, market. Risks 
that fail to meet the underwriting standards of the voluntary market, are 
uniquely dangerous, have no loss experience, have had a recent signiﬁ-
cant loss, or have a loss experience that lacks credibility are typically 
insured in the residual market. To some extent, the boundary between 
the two markets is ﬂuid. To the extent that rates are suppressed below 
actual expected losses in the voluntary market, insurers will be unwill-
ing to insure some of the less safe ﬁrms at the margin, forcing them into 
the residual market. In most states, a cohort of servicing carriers writes 
the policies and pays the claim but does not bear the underwriting risk 
in the residual market. Rather, losses incurred in the residual market 
are shared out among the voluntary market carriers according to each 
carrier’s share of the state’s premium. 
It is this sharing out process that creates the most common form of 
cross-subsidy (Danzon and Harrington 1998). To the extent that regula-
tion suppresses rates in the residual market in order to assure access to 
coverage for those ﬁrms in the assigned risk pool, aggregate residual 
market premium will not cover the actual losses along with expenses 
and fees, generating an excess loss that needs to be capitalized into 
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premium for those insured in the voluntary market (Kwon and Grace 
1996). 
Regulators have several different tools for manipulating rates in 
the residual market, including price differential programs (employers 
charged a ﬁxed percentage higher than comparable risks in the volun-
tary market); risk-adjustment programs (ARAP, or Assigned Risk Ad-
justment Programs, where employers in the residual market are sur-
charged up to 49 percent of base premiums); restrict residual market 
access (where employers are denied residual market coverage if they 
have refused any voluntary market carrier’s legitimate rating plan); re-
moval of premium discount plans (employers in the residual market 
cannot receive premium discounts even if they would qualify in the vol-
untary market); and take-out credit programs (where voluntary insurers 
receive credits for offering residual market ﬁrms the same coverage 
for at least one policy period). Each of these tools acts as a ceiling on 
residual market rates (Kwon and Grace 1996). Additional variations in 
the structures of residual market prices include the use of loss-sensitive 
rating plans that enhance the effect of the individual employer’s loss 
history, and additional surcharges on employers in the pool (Thomason, 
Schmidle, and Burton 2001, p. 338).
As residual market losses are passed back to the voluntary market, 
costs in the voluntary market are expected to increase, and safety in the 
workplace is expected to deteriorate for several reasons. One is that as 
premium in the voluntary market increases due to the residual market 
losses, the larger and safer ﬁrms in the voluntary market will self-in-
sure, leaving the less safe in the voluntary market where costs will in-
crease (Danzon and Harrington 1998). This can become a vicious circle 
if regulation of voluntary market rates does not adjust to take this into 
account, leading to the more marginal employers in the voluntary mar-
ket being forced into the residual market. During the 1980s, the markets 
in several states, notably Maine, Rhode Island, and Louisiana, were 
caught in this cycle that ended with an inordinately large share of the 
workers’ compensation market in the assigned risk pool, creating true 
crises for workers’ compensation in their states (Thomason, Schmidle, 
and Burton 2001). According to this view of market dynamics, both the 
size of the gap between premium and expected losses and uncertainty 
about what that will be lead to a reduction in supply of insurance in the 
voluntary market, leading to an availability problem and higher rates.
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This cycle not only creates availability problems but also dilutes 
safety incentives. Because regulated premium in the residual market 
does not correspond to expected losses, those in the residual market 
will lose the incentive to invest in safety, increasing their loss rates. 
Again, because these costs are passed to the voluntary market, the cycle 
described above will be triggered. 
Several forms of cross-subsidies are possible, but in all cases, safer 
employers are subsidizing riskier ones. If all rate class prices are sup-
pressed, those employers in the residual market will be subsidized by 
those in the same rate class in the voluntary market, as described above. 
This subsidy will worsen as the higher risk employers are forced into 
the residual market and the lowest risk employers go to self-insurance, 
leaving the middle risk employers to subsidize the riskiest. If regula-
tion varies across rate classes, those with payroll in the suppressed rate 
classes will be subsidized by those in the other classes, whose rates will 
have increased so that total premium will, on average, cover total losses 
(Danzon and Harrington 1998). 
Because cross-subsidization is difﬁcult to observe, the empirical 
work examines the broader predictions of these models. Danzon and 
Harrington (1988) examine the effect of rate regulation on total and 
indemnity loss growth using three measures of regulation: 1) lagged 
residual market share, 2) lagged ﬁled to approved rate ratio, and 3) 
lagged underwriting margin for the ﬁled to approved rate ratio. Their 
results show a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between 
residual market share and loss growth but do not support such a rela-
tionship for the other, more direct, measures of regulation. However, 
using a different speciﬁcation, they do ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects of the 
lagged ﬁled to approved rate ratio on total loss growth (Harrington and 
Danzon 2000). 
While these results do suggest that regulation adversely affects loss 
growth, they do not necessarily indicate the presence of cross-subsi-
dies. As an alternative test for cross-subsidies, Danzon and Harrington 
(1998) develop a model of political inﬂuence, which predicts that if 
regulation of rates is the outgrowth of political inﬂuence, patterns of 
rate suppression should persist over time. Using data from 150 class 
codes in seven states, the null hypothesis that they test empirically is 
that ﬂuctuation of manual rates should be random over time. Rejection 
of the null hypothesis would be viewed as evidence of political inﬂu-
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ence in the regulatory process. They examine several potential sources 
of political inﬂuence. They ﬁnd support for persistent cross-subsidies 
along three dimensions: 1) between rating classes (larger classes are 
subsidized), 2) between low- and high-risk employers (high-risk, low-
wage employers are subsidized), and 3) between policyholders and in-
surers (policyholders are subsidized).
Kwon and Grace (1996) examine the magnitude of the cross-sub-
sidy of low risk to high risk employers by examining the share of re-
sidual market assessments carriers can pass on to voluntary market 
policyholders. They ﬁnd that operating losses in the residual market do 
raise premium in the voluntary market, but that only about 27 percent 
of the residual market assessment on carriers is passed on in voluntary 
premium. They also ﬁnd that few of the policy measures designed to 
reduce the size of the residual market are effective. Thomason, Schmi-
dle, and Burton (2001) cite the importance of the Danzon–Harrington 
perspective in that it examines the distributional consequences of regu-
lation and not just the effect on price levels. However, they also cite 
the weaknesses of the measures of regulation, in particular, the lack 
of differentiation among the different regulatory regimes. In addition, 
their empirical test ﬁnds weak support for increased injury rates under 
administered pricing (the most regulated scheme) and a lack of support 
for a relationship between deregulation and injury (p. 264). Both the 
Kwon and Grace study and those by Danzon and Harrington cite the 
health of the insurance market as the policy focus, but only Danzon and 
Harrington also mention safety implications. 
In their study of the effect of differing insurance arrangements on 
various workers’ compensation outcomes, Thomason, Schmidle, and 
Burton (2001, p. 245) ﬁnd support for full deregulation as being more 
efﬁcient at reducing employer costs. However, they qualify for this con-
clusion because of the difﬁculty of accurately characterizing prederegu-
lation conditions and with evaluating the sustainability of the effects of 
deregulation.
CONCLUSION
This chapter provided a description of how workers’ compensation pre-
mium is determined and then examined the research literature on pric-
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ing from two perspectives, that of the employer and that of the insurer. 
There are some differences between these two perspectives that may 
have welfare implications. What becomes evident in the research is that 
the focus in the employer-based literature is on safety incentives em-
bedded in workers’ compensation premium, whereas the emphasis in 
the insurer-based literature is on generating sufﬁcient premium to cover 
losses. The signiﬁcance of this difference is that while the purpose of 
the premium setting mechanism may be seen as to promote safety from 
one point of view, from the other it is not to minimize injury but rather 
to estimate it accurately. 
In an unfettered market, this difference in objective functions might 
not matter: the invisible hand would keep costs low, promote safety, 
and protect insurer solvency. But the evidence on the safety effects of 
experience rating (the feature of pricing that has received the most em-
pirical attention) is mixed and potentially quite ﬂawed by the absence 
of a direct measure of experience rating. Further, the only research that 
directly examines whether employers understand the incentives work-
ers’ compensation is designed to promote suggests that the formula is 
not universally well understood (Kralj 1994).
The weaknesses in the experience-rating literature best frame the 
directions for future research. One particularly weak aspect of this re-
search is the lack of studies that actually include the experience-rating 
modiﬁcation factor as the measure of experience rating. Because the 
experience modiﬁcation is observable, this seems a feasible research 
direction. A second research area that would beneﬁt from further inves-
tigation is the role that employer understanding of the structure of their 
insurance premiums plays in safety behavior. With the exception of the 
few studies cited above, little survey research of employer understand-
ing of or response to safety incentives in workers’ compensation has 
been done. 
The important question that this raises is whether it is sound policy 
to rely on market forces to the extent that we do to promote safety at 
work. It appears that U.S. workplaces are becoming safer (Durbin and 
Butler 1998), with the number of nonfatal illnesses and injuries per 
10,000 full-time workers dropping from 304.7 in 1992 to 169.1 in 2001 
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2004). However, the extent to which 
improved safety can be attributed to employers responding to the eco-
nomic incentives from prices has not been established. It may be more 
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plausible that employers provide a safe workplace for other reasons, 
such as a belief that it is a good investment (Spieler 1994). Failure to 
understand the underlying motivational mechanisms will limit effective 
policy development should the trend toward lower injury rates change.
Notes
 1.  The discussion in this chapter describes what is referred to as the voluntary mar-
ket, where employers purchase workers’ compensation insurance from insur-
ance carriers. Depending on the year, approximately 20–25 percent of workers’ 
compensation insurance beneﬁts are paid by self-insured, that is, employers who 
choose to pay workers’ compensation beneﬁts directly (Mont et al. 2001, p. 9). 
The principal-agent framework would not apply to the self-insured portion of the 
workers’ compensation market.
 2.  Two-stage least-square estimation is an econometric method used to address pos-
sible problems with endogeneity—where what is being treated as an independent 
variable is correlated with the residual and thus is not truly exogenous.
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Terry Thomason’s career was marked by his interest in the economic 
consequences of workers’ compensation policies across North America, 
including both the observed variations within U.S. states, as well as the 
differences that emerged over time between the Canadian and the U.S. 
policy contexts. One important difference between these two jurisdic-
tions has been the divergent trends in health care expenditures. Gross 
domestic product (GDP) expenditure shares for health care in Cana-
da and the United States began a long-term trend of divergence in the 
1970s. This story is now well known to scholars and policymakers who 
maintain a weather-eye on comparative trends in national health care 
expenditure. In the period 1970–1975, expenditures on medical care 
were equivalent in Canada and the United States, at about 7.5 percent 
of GDP in both countries. By 1995–2000, GDP share allocated to health 
care in Canada had increased to 9.5–10.0 percent. In the United States, 
by contrast, total health spending as a share of GDP was 13.0 percent. 
These divergent developments occurred in a period in which average 
economic growth was stronger in the United States than Canada. Over 
the period 1990–2000, GDP per capita grew by 1.7 percent in Canada 
and health care spending increased in parallel, with an annual average 
growth in health care spending of 1.8 percent. In contrast, over this 
period U.S. health care spending increased at an annual rate of 3.2 per-
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cent, a rate of increase more rapid than the 2.3 percent average growth 
in GDP (Anderson et al. 2003).
The divergent Canadian and U.S. trends in health care expenditure 
growth is but one area of policy research interest arising from the natu-
ral experiment of the very different principles underlying the design of 
the two systems. The consequences arising from the differences in the 
ﬁnancing and organization of health care services in Canada and the 
United States has been the subject of longstanding research attention 
(Anderson et al. 2003; Detsky et al. 1990; Evans 1984; Evans, Bar-
er, and Hertzman 1991; Fuchs and Hahn 1990; Redelmeir and Fuchs 
1993; Woolhandler, Campbell, and Himmelstein 2003). A comparison 
of health care systems in Canada and the United States invites observa-
tions of the relative efﬁciency of the two systems, one based on markets 
and one based on public governance and insurance monopolies. (This 
same policy contrast describes the ﬁnance and administration of work-
ers’ compensation insurance in the two countries.) This research tells 
an important story about the potential limits of private markets in efﬁ-
ciently providing goods of value to the health of populations. Although 
less thoroughly studied, the comparison of workers’ compensation sys-
tems in Canada and the United States is an important opportunity to 
understand the relative performance of private markets versus public 
administration in achieving outcomes that are efﬁcient, equitable, and 
of the highest possible quality. 
Aside from the very substantial differences between the two coun-
tries in the ﬁnancing of health care, there are otherwise broad similari-
ties in the organization and delivery of health care services to general 
populations. Within this broad similarity of the two health care systems, 
there are some useful distinctions to note in the provision of health care 
services to injured workers receiving compensation from workers’ 
compensation programs. In most U.S. states, the employer or insurer 
chooses the treating physician and other health care providers for the 
treatment of workplace injury or disease compensated by workers’ com-
pensation. Provider reimbursement is provided directly by the employ-
er or the compensation insurance carrier. In Canada, the injured worker 
has the right to choose his or her treating physician (who is typically the 
regular provider of health care). In most Canadian provinces, the treat-
ing physician is reimbursed by the provincial single-payer health care 
insurance plan, which in turn bills the workers’ compensation author-
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ity for the reimbursement of the costs of care. Care provided by allied 
health professionals, hospital care, and pharmaceuticals are reimbursed 
directly by workers’ compensation agencies. 
A SUMMARY OF THE THOMASON/BURTON STUDY
Terry Thomason and John Burton collaborated on a study of the 
employers’ costs of workers’ compensation insurance in two Canadian 
provinces, Ontario and British Columbia, relative to costs in several 
jurisdictions in the United States over the period 1975–1995 (Thoma-
son and Burton 2000). The key ﬁnding from this study suggested that 
the costs of workers’ compensation insurance are lower in jurisdictions 
with single payer, publicly owned insurance providers (“monopolistic 
public funds” in the language of Thomason and Burton). However, the 
authors noted very real challenges in accurately adjusting for differenc-
es in the design and administration of the Canadian and U.S. programs 
and argued for the importance of a more reﬁned study methodology.
Thomason and Burton subsequently revised their methodology to 
address some of the limitations they identiﬁed in their earlier study 
(Thomason and Burton 2001). Among the more important revisions 
included 1) the addition of three U.S. states with exclusive state fund 
insurance provision, 2) adjustments to inter-jurisdictional differences 
in rate group classiﬁcation and in payroll calculations, 3) adjustments 
to more accurately account for unfunded liabilities in the Canadian ju-
risdictions, and 4) examining in more detail the possibility that health 
care costs may be shifted from the workers’ compensation program to 
the universal single payer health care insurance programs in Canadian 
jurisdictions. 
Consistent with the results of their earlier study, the revised Thoma-
son and Burton study reported that Ontario workers’ compensation in-
surance costs were equal to or lower than the costs in the median cost 
jurisdiction in the United States over the time series, and that in re-
cent years, actual Ontario costs were in the lowest quartile of workers’ 
compensation jurisdictions included in the study sample. While per-
forming as one of the four lowest cost jurisdictions in North America, 
the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board in Ontario also achieved a 
higher wage replacement rate than most U.S. jurisdictions, experienced 
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a lower rate of permanent partial disability awards, and incurred lower 
medical care expenditures as a proportion of premium revenue.
Building from the observation that the Ontario workers’ compensa-
tion system incurs lower medical care expenditures, the objective of 
this chapter is to examine factors that may account for this important 
difference in resource allocation between Canadian and U.S. workers’ 
compensation programs. Among the factors that appear to be respon-
sible for these differences are 1) lower medical care prices in Canada, 
2) lower medical care price inﬂation in Canada, and 3) higher inten-
sity of health care services in the United States. We argue three central 
points in this chapter. First, contrasting the U.S. model of market-based 
health insurance provision with the universal tax-ﬁnanced single-payer 
model in Canada suggests the latter is substantially more efﬁcient (both 
in general health services and in services purchased to treat compen-
sible work-related injury and disease). Second, the greater intensity of 
health care treatment typically provided in the United States does not 
appear to result in substantially better health outcomes for U.S. patients 
relative to Canadian patients. Third, both the Canadian and U.S. health 
care systems have struggled to align incentives to consistently improve 
the efﬁciency and the quality of health care.
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED
After 30 years of North American policy experiment and reform in 
the ﬁnance and delivery of health services, we have learned a number of 
lessons about the efﬁciency of different insurance funding models and 
the effectiveness of different health care ﬁnancing models in purchas-
ing quality. 
Efﬁciency in the Financing and Funding of Health Care
In their study of workers’ compensation program cost differences 
between Canada and the United States, Thomason and Burton (2001) 
directly compared prices for 10 common medical procedures used in 39 
U.S. state compensation programs and the province of Ontario. In this 
comparison, after adjusting for differences in the values of the Cana-
dian and U.S. dollars, they found that the price for medical procedures 
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in the United States is substantially greater than the price for similar 
procedures in Ontario, with the ratio of the median fee in the United 
States to the fee in Ontario ranging from 1.6 to 7.1. Taking a simple 
average of fees across the 10 procedures, the average median fee in the 
United States was found to be 4.6 times greater than the average fee in 
Ontario. 
The observation that health care prices are generally higher in the 
United States relative to Canada has been extensively reported in the 
health services research literature (Detsky et al. 1990; Fuchs and Hahn 
1990; Redelmeir and Fuchs 1993). Anderson et al. (2003), for example, 
have recently reported ﬁndings from a cross-national comparison of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
economies, examining evidence for the proposition that the higher U.S. 
spending on health care (as a percent of GDP) is primarily due to higher 
relative prices for health care goods and services in the United States, 
rather than a greater intensity of use of equivalently priced health care 
resources. In 2000, the United States spent 13 percent of GDP on health 
care, Switzerland 10.7 percent, and Canada 9.1 percent. The OECD 
median was 8.0 percent. Paradoxically, however, the United States had 
fewer of each of the following than the median OECD country: physi-
cians per 1,000 population, physician visits per capita, acute beds per 
capita, hospital admissions per 1,000 population, and acute care days 
per capita. Anderson et al. (2003) conclude that higher average prices is 
the likely explanation for the paradoxical pattern observed in the United 
States of lower aggregate utilization of health care services and higher 
per capita expenditures on health care. 
Thomason and Burton’s observation of very substantial medical 
care price differentials between Ontario and the sample of 44 U.S. states 
for a selection of 10 common procedures is based on fee information 
at the end of the 20-year observation period of their study. It is impor-
tant to note that this differential in the price of medical care in the two 
countries has emerged over the 20-year period 1975–1995. As shown in 
Figure 8.1, in the period 1975–1979, prices for medical care purchased 
by workers’ compensation insurance providers were essentially identi-
cal in Canada and the United States.
Medical care price inﬂation has been a persistent policy challenge in 
the United States. In addition, there is good evidence that medical care 
expenditures for the treatment of occupational conditions in the United 
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States exceed those for the treatment of similar conditions insured un-
der general health insurance plans (Baker and Krueger 1995; Baldwin, 
Johnson, and Marcus 2002; Durbin, Corro, and Helvacian 1996; John-
son et al. 1993; Johnson, Baldwin, and Burton 1996). In contrast, medi-
cal care price changes in Canada have been more tightly aligned to the 
macroeconomic growth proﬁle of the country. There are a number of 
explanations for the difference in medical care price growth between 
the two countries. The most prominent explanation is the price-setting 
power of the monopoly universal health insurance programs in Cana-
dian provinces relative to the fragmented and competitive structure of 
private market health care insurance in the United States (Evans 2000; 
Evans, Barer, and Hertzman 1991).
The Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) has 
legislated authority to function as a health insurance provider and to 
purchase health care services for the treatment of work-related injury 
Figure 8.1  Real Medical Beneﬁt Costs, 1975–1995 ($)
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and disease. This authority predates the establishment of the single-
payer universal health insurance programs in Canada in the period 
1960–1970. The federal legislation creating public single-payer health 
care insurance agencies in Canadian provinces created insurance mo-
nopolies by explicitly prohibiting private insurance carriers from pro-
viding health plans that covered services insured by the single payer 
plans. Provincial workers’ compensation programs in Canada function 
as a parallel health insurance provider. They are, however, a minor pur-
chaser. In the province of Ontario, the WSIB purchases approximately 
$350 million of health care services annually in a publicly funded health 
care system of $10 billion. The health care costs of work-related inju-
ries range between 2 and 5 percent of total health care costs, although 
this proportion is larger when total public health care expenditures are 
restricted to working age populations (Association of Workers’ Com-
pensation Boards of Canada 2001). With limited exceptions, workers’ 
compensation authorities purchase care for injured workers within the 
structure of the publicly funded system (Association of Workers’ Com-
pensation Boards of Canada 2001). The workers’ compensation authori-
ties in Canada, by buying within the publicly funded health care system, 
have been able to beneﬁt (free-ride) from the price-setting power of the 
large universal single-payer health insurance plans. 
There appear to be very substantial administration costs associated 
with the provision of health care insurance through multiple insurers in 
private markets. Woolhander and colleagues have documented a dura-
ble pattern of higher administrative expenditures in the U.S. health care 
system relative to Canada (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1986; Wool-
handler, Campbell, and Himmelstein 2003; Woolhandler and Himmel-
stein 1991, 1997). They have estimated that 31 percent of U.S. health 
care expenditures in 1999 were allocated to administration functions 
($US1,059 per capita) compared to 16.7 percent of Canadian health 
care expenditures ($US307 per capita). Between 1969 and 1999, the 
share of the U.S. health care labor force engaged in administrative tasks 
increased from 18.2 percent to 27.3 percent. During the same period 
in Canada, the health care labor force engaged in administration grew 
from 16.0 percent to 19.1 percent. Insurance overheads in Canada are 
estimated to be 1.9 percent of health care system expenditures. In the 
United States, private insurance provider overheads are estimated to be 
11.9 percent, Medicare overheads to be 3.6 percent and Medicaid over-
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heads to be 6.8 percent. Clearly, the challenges of technical and alloca-
tive efﬁciency decisions within the complexity of contemporary health 
care systems require a commitment to intensive and sophisticated man-
agement. What remains uncertain is the optimal level of administration 
expenditure in a health care system.
Greater medical care price inﬂation and higher administrative costs 
in the United States will account for an important fraction of the higher 
average U.S. expenditure on health care services in the treatment of 
injuries and disease compensated by workers’ compensation insurance. 
A number of researchers have noted, in addition, that medical care ex-
penditures for the treatment of occupational conditions exceed those for 
the treatment of similar conditions insured under general health insur-
ance plans (Baker and Krueger 1995; Baldwin, Johnson, and Marcus 
2002; Durbin, Corro, and Helvacian 1996; Johnson et al. 1993; John-
son, Baldwin, and Burton 1996). By way of explanation, Himmelstein 
et al. (1999) note that the coverage of both medical care and wage-loss 
beneﬁts distinguishes workers’ compensation insurance from typical 
health insurance plans. The dual responsibility for medical care costs 
and wage-loss costs creates stronger incentives for insurance provid-
ers to select therapeutic options that may expedite earlier recovery and 
earlier return to work. As Himmelstein et al. (1999, p. 430) observe, 
“Where a traditional insurer or HMO might seek costs savings by de-
laying or denying medical tests or treatments, workers’ compensation 
insurers might seek to accelerate appropriate medical care,” or be re-
ceptive to the promise of more intensive medical care. In general, these 
incentives can be understood to inﬂuence to a similar degree both single 
payer Canadian insurers and U.S. private market insurers. However, as 
noted earlier, the Canadian single-payer compensation insurers in gen-
eral have purchased health care services within the fee schedules of the 
publicly funded health care system. There is some evidence that work-
ers’ compensation insurers in the United States have offered more lucra-
tive provider fees in the interests of purchasing expedited care (Baker 
and Krueger 1995; Baldwin, Johnson, and Marcus 2002; Durbin, Corro, 
and Helvacian 1996; Johnson et al. 1993; Johnson, Baldwin, and Bur-
ton 1996).
The theory of neoclassical economics predicts that the private 
health care insurance market will be a more efﬁcient instrument than 
a public monopoly insurance provider. Market competition will dis-
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cipline insurance prices and the efﬁciency of the insurance function. 
However, as suggested by the Thomason and Burton comparison of 
Canadian and U.S. workers’ compensation health care expenditures, the 
empirical evidence appears to indicate that public single-payer health 
insurance may be more efﬁcient than private markets. Robert Evans, 
who authored an important early treatise on economic behavior in the 
health care industry, has provided a thoughtful analysis of some of the 
trade-offs in the design of health insurance (Evans 1984). In particular, 
he has emphasized the risks of market failure in private health insurance 
markets. These risks arise from economies of scale, adverse selection, 
and moral hazard. 
The provision of health insurance is subject to economies of scale, 
rendering economic advantage to large insurers. In addition, there are 
diseconomies arising from private health insurance markets. Health 
care providers face compliance costs in dealing with many different in-
surance providers. Insurance providers face marketing and commission 
expenses associated with market competition. A “public utility” insur-
ance model, relying on a monopoly provider, captures the economies of 
scale and avoids the costs of compliance, marketing, and proﬁt-making 
associated with private markets. There are a number of examples of 
insurance market failure in the United States (the numbers of uninsured 
citizens and the withdrawal of providers from workers’ compensation 
insurance markets in some states), which may be related to the inability 
of markets to capture economies of scale. 
Adverse selection is a clearly understood phenomena in private in-
surance markets, where people of different risk statuses are more or 
less likely to buy insurance. Segmenting health insurance products by 
beneﬁt coverage, copayment conditions, and risk status will result in in-
surance coverage costs for high-risk groups being more expensive than 
insurance provided under a community-rating model. Insurance market 
failure occurs when groups or individuals wish to purchase coverage 
but are priced out of the market. The moral hazard risk of insurance has 
received a great deal of attention from health economists. Moral hazard 
in the context of health insurance refers to a risk that the existence of 
insurance coverage will increase the probability or intensity of health 
care use. Moral hazard appears to be an equivalent risk for health insur-
ance provided by private markets or by public monopolies. 
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Efﬁciency in the Organization and Delivery of Health Services
A number of features of the organization and delivery of health 
services are frequently contrasted in comparisons of the Canadian and 
U.S. health care systems. The Canadian system is often characterized, 
for example, as having a more constrained supply of some medical care 
services than the United States. One perspective views supply con-
straints as having large potentially negative effects, arising from un-
met medical care needs or in delays in the receipt of effective care. An 
alternate perspective notes that a supply-constrained system will more 
likely be more efﬁcient in each treatment encounter than a system with 
substantial surplus human and physical capital. In this section we con-
sider some of the evidence for efﬁciency differences in the organization 
and delivery of health services in the two countries. 
The health effects of delays in the provision of care or barriers to 
access to care have been a focus of health services research attention 
in both the United States and Canada. In the United States, concern 
focuses on the health effects arising from barriers to accessing medi-
cal care among persons without health care insurance. In the Canadian 
system, with universal insurance coverage, concern has focused on the 
health effects of delays in the provision of care arising from a less gen-
erous supply of health care providers and health care services relative 
to the United States. 
Research studies designed to compare the structure, process, and 
outcome of health care in Canada and the United States can be infor-
mative. One example is a study comparing the clinical management 
of acute myocardial infarction in a sample of 2,600 U.S. patients and 
a group of 400 Canadian patients with very similar clinical and de-
mographic proﬁles (Mark et al. 1994). Patients in both countries were 
interviewed by telephone 30 days, six months, and one year after myo-
cardial infarction to determine their use of medical care and quality of 
life. The clinical management of Canadian patients was less intensive 
than provided to U.S. patients. Canadian patients had a lower rate of 
cardiac catheterization (25 percent versus 72 percent), coronary angio-
plasty (11 percent versus 29 percent) and coronary bypass surgery (3 
percent versus 14 percent). At one year, 24 percent of the Canadian pa-
tients and 53 percent of the U.S. patients had undergone angioplasty or 
bypass surgery at least once. Despite these differences in the intensity 
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of invasive procedures, unadjusted survival rates for the U.S. cohort 
at 30 days (93.2 percent) and one year (90.7 percent) were equivalent 
to survival rates in the Canadian cohort (92.4 percent at 30 days and 
90.3 percent at one year). While there were no important differences in 
functional status at 30 days between two patient cohorts, the study did 
report marginally better average quality of life among U.S. patients at 
one year compared to Canadian patients. Although this study did not 
report the precise measures of the economic value of the differences in 
health care utilization between the two cohorts, these expenditure dif-
ferences must be substantial. The large differences in resource utiliza-
tion observed in this study were not associated with strong differences 
in clinical outcome.
The provision of health care services in the treatment of acute low-
back pain is a second example of a dissonant pattern, where the intensity 
of health care service use is not directly related to the duration of dis-
ability. Disabling back pain is common and, whether caused by work-
related exposures or non-work-related exposures, is one of the most 
frequent reasons that patients visit primary care physicians. Patients 
with acute low-back pain may seek care from among several types of 
health care providers: primary care physicians, specialty-qualiﬁed phy-
sicians (particularly orthopedic specialists), or chiropractors. A number 
of studies in both Canada (Côté et al. 2001) and the United States (Car-
ey et al. 1995; Deyo et al. 1991; Deyo and Tsui-Wu 1987) have docu-
mented wide variation in the intensity of treatment for low-back pain, 
both within clinical professions and between clinical professions. For 
example, Carey et al. (1995) followed a group of 1,500 adults in North 
Carolina who presented symptoms of low-back pain to one of six types 
of practioners: 1) urban primary care physicians, 2) rural primary care 
physicians, 3) urban chiropractors, 4) rural chiropractors, 5) orthopedic 
surgeons, and 6) primary care physicians in a group-model health main-
tenance organization. At the six-month follow-up, the times to func-
tional recovery, return to work, and complete recovery from low-back 
pain were similar among patients seen by all six groups of providers. 
Despite the similarities in clinical and functional outcomes, there were 
marked differences in the intensity of health service utilization. Mean 
total direct outpatient costs per episode of low-back pain ranged from 
$435 for patients seeing an HMO provider to $783 for patients seeing 
an urban chiropractor. Given the high prevalence of acute back pain in 
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working-age populations, these differences in health care resource use 
will be substantial. The absence of evidence of clinical beneﬁt associ-
ated with more intensive clinical resource use suggests that intensive 
treatment of acute low-back pain is inefﬁcient. 
As a ﬁnal example, we summarize a study that used an identical 
study protocol to measure the prevalence of mental health disorder in 
representative samples of U.S. residents and residents of the Canadian 
province of Ontario (Katz, Kessler, Frank, Leaf, and Lin 1997; Katz, 
Kessler, Frank, Leaf, Lin, and Edmund 1997). This study has produced 
a fascinating series of ﬁndings. Among the ﬁndings salient for the pur-
poses of this chapter was the observation that the use of mental health 
services by persons without detectable mental health morbidity or dis-
ability in the U.S. sample was 75 percent higher than observed among 
well-functioning Ontario respondents in the sample. This ﬁnding sug-
gests that the probability of inappropriate use of mental health services 
(treatment where no treatment was indicated) may be more likely in 
a health care system with generous service supply. The study ﬁnding 
also suggests that the moral hazard potential of a universal single-payer 
ﬁrst-dollar insurance program (also known as Canadian health care) 
may be overstated. In an important parallel ﬁnding, the study reported 
that persons with detectable mental health disorder were more likely to 
be provided mental health treatment services if resident in Ontario than 
in the United States.
Effectiveness in Purchasing Quality Care
Contemporary health care systems face persistent deﬁcits in deliver-
ing health care of the highest quality. For example, one of the most con-
sistent ﬁndings in health services research is the gap between evidence 
and practice (Grol and Grimshaw 2003). Studies of health care systems 
in the developed economies typically ﬁnd that about 30–40 percent of 
patients do not receive care according to current scientiﬁc evidence, and 
that about 20–25 percent of care provided is not needed or is potentially 
harmful (Schuster, McGlynn, and Brook 1998). In the United States, 
only one-half of the population receive needed preventive care; 70 per-
cent receive recommended care for acute problems, such as colds or 
stomach pain; and just 60 percent of those with a chronic illness such as 
diabetes or hypertension get the care they need. In addition, about one-
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ﬁfth of the care given to persons with chronic conditions is unnecessary 
and possibly harmful (McGlynn and Brook 2001).
Evidence of uneven quality performance in health care systems is 
frequently suspected when different treatment rates or variations in treat-
ment intensity are observed between similar geographic populations. As 
one example of high variation in treatment across populations, Lavis et 
al. (1998) described trends in hospital use for neck and back problems 
(common conditions in workers’ compensation claims) in Ontario and 
the United States. Between 1982 and 1992, the hospital admission rate 
for medically treated cases (without surgery) decreased by 52 percent in 
Ontario and by 75 percent in the United States. Over the same period, 
the admission rate for surgically treated cases increased by 14 percent 
and by 35 percent respectively. By 1992, the admission rate for medi-
cally treated cases in the United States was 23 percent higher than in 
Ontario, whereas the rate for surgically treated cases was 164 percent 
higher. In this study, the reduction in hospital admission for medically 
treated cases would appear to be consistent with evidence that bed rest 
and traction, two common forms of inpatient medical treatment, were 
not effective. In contrast, the relatively strong increase in the frequency 
of surgical treatment for neck and spine disorders in the United States 
would appear to be more related to the more ample supply of surgical 
specialist and diagnostic imaging facilities in the United States than to 
clear evidence of the effectiveness of surgical intervention.
Over the past two decades, there has been more experimentation in 
alternate approaches to the purchasing, organization, and delivery of 
health services in the United States than in Canada. Most of these orga-
nizational reforms have been motivated by the twin goals of improving 
efﬁciency and improving effectiveness of health care services. Bald-
win, Johnson, and Marcus (2002) have recently reported on health care 
costs and service differentials between preferred provider networks and 
nonnetwork providers in the treatment of work-related injuries in the 
United States. A sample of approximately 38,000 workers’ compensa-
tion claims with work absences of less than seven days that were pro-
vided care by network providers were compared with a matched sample 
of 64,000 workers’ compensation claims provided care by nonnetwork 
providers (claims were matched on type of injury, age, and gender). The 
motivation of this study was to clarify how networks succeed in reduc-
ing costs, by examining evidence for cost reductions arising from three 
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alternate strategies: 1) reducing the quantities of services provided to 
injured workers, 2) shifting to more economical services, or 3) simply 
reducing per unit prices. 
In this sample of injured workers, the study found that average health 
care costs are lower for network claims than for matched nonnetwork 
claims. Price discounts explain the largest part of the cost differential, 
with reductions in service utilization also being important for under-
standing resource use differentials in the treatment of acute back inju-
ries and the treatment of cumulative stress injuries. Given that network 
savings primarily reﬂect price discounts for the same services provided 
by nonnetwork providers, network strategies result in an increase in the 
efﬁciency and, therefore, the cost-effectiveness of care.
McGlynn and Brook (2001, p. 84) document the persistent failure 
of public and private policymakers in the United States and elsewhere 
to identify and solve the factors underlying the inconsistent quality per-
formance of contemporary healthcare. 
Serious deﬁcits are also manifest in how skilfully care is deliv-
ered. Coronary angiography is an invasive test used to diagnose 
cardiac disease and determine what treatment is appropriate for a 
patient. Analysis of a random sample of angiographies performed 
in one state showed that only half of the tests were done compe-
tently enough to be accurately interpreted. When the tests were 
reread by a group of expert cardiologists, one-quarter of patients 
determined by the original reading to have the most severe disease 
did not have it. Six percent of persons who were told that their test 
results were not severely abnormal actually had severely abnormal 
results. One third of persons whose bypass surgery was considered 
necessary or appropriate based on the original interpretation of the 
angiography results underwent surgery that was of uncertain ben-
eﬁt or inappropriate based on the gold-standard review. Nearly 1.3 
million coronary angiographies were performed in 1998 nation-
ally. If the results of this study held nationally, nearly 650,000 tests 
would be difﬁcult to interpret accurately; at $12,450 per test, that 
is more than $8 billion in wasted expense. 
Suboptimal health care quality is both inefﬁcient and ineffective. 
McGlynn identiﬁes the following factors which, in their view, account 
for the absence of a strong policy commitment to quality improvement 
in contemporary health care. First, the responsibility for quality is dif-
fuse, distributed among professional regulatory bodies, health protec-
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tion agencies, accreditation bodies, regulators, health care purchasers, 
(and lawyers who bring malpractice suits alleging substandard care). 
An unfortunate consequence of this diffusion of responsibility is a per-
sistent policy failure to respond to substandard care practices. Second, 
health care is characterized by outmoded system design, where quality 
performance protocols well-established in other ﬁelds have either been 
resisted or not adopted in much of contemporary health care. Finally, 
there are very large information voids. There is, for example, no regu-
lar, ongoing surveillance of the quality of health care encounters, and 
no monitoring of the progress across the system in adopting practices 
with demonstrated effectiveness to improve quality. These problems are 
as prevalent in the organization and delivery of health care services to 
workers’ compensation beneﬁciaries as they are in the general health 
care system. McGlynn and Brook argue that improvements will come 
from policy initiatives which 1) create quality champions (presumably 
with some authority to set ﬁnancial rewards and penalties); 2) create 
functional information systems, and 3) routinely monitor and report on 
the quality performance of the health care system.
LESSONS LEARNED
Thomason and Burton’s study of the economic performance of 
workers’ compensation programs in Canada and the United States is an 
excellent example of the potential of comparative cross-national stud-
ies to inform our understanding of the implications of different policy 
choices. A comparison of the efﬁciency and effectiveness of health care 
services purchased by workers’ compensation insurance providers in 
Canada and the United States is an important case study of the more 
global question of the relative beneﬁts and limitations of private mar-
kets and public monopolies in the provision of health care insurance.
Canadian workers’ compensation agencies purchase health services 
within the publicly funded, single-payer health care insurance programs 
in each province. In the United States, workers’ compensation insurance 
is provided through private markets in a substantial number of state ju-
risdictions, and health services for injured workers are purchased in 
competitive provider markets.
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In comparing the experience of the two systems over the past 30 
years, it is clear that the publicly funded, single-payer health care in-
surance programs have been more successful in limiting medical care 
price inﬂation. In addition to less success in disciplining medical care 
prices, the U.S. reliance on private insurance markets appears to result 
in a substantially higher proportion of health care resources allocated 
to administrative functions. This higher expenditure on administrative 
functions does not appear to increase the relative efﬁciency of the U.S. 
health care system.
There is evidence that the more constrained supply of human and 
physical capital in the Canadian health care system is associated with 
less intensive medical care treatment compared to the United States. 
There also is some evidence, however, that more intensive medical care 
treatment does not result in signiﬁcant health beneﬁts for many classes 
of morbidity.
Finally, both the Canadian and U.S. health care systems have strug-
gled to align incentives to consistently improve the efﬁciency and the 
quality of health care. Brook (1998) has argued that a systemic com-
mitment to quality improvement in health care will require a stronger 
commitment to ensuring that effective medical care is appropriately de-
livered to patients with need for care, and that care is provided to a high 
standard of technical excellence. Aligning incentives to improve quality 
is a challenge shared by health care purchasers in both Canada and the 
United States. 
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Over the last 30 years a number of theoretical and empirical ad-
vances have emerged in the study of how the risk of injury in the work-
place inﬂuences labor market transactions. Economists have focused 
particular attention on mechanisms that compensate individuals for 
risk, primarily higher wages or workers’ compensation beneﬁts, and 
how these compensation mechanisms inﬂuence the level of workplace 
safety. These issues have not only been the focus of considerable at-
tention by academics, but have also been applied to important public 
policy issues such as evaluating the beneﬁts of safety programs and 
determining the optimal levels of workers’ compensation beneﬁts.
As with most applications of economic theory, however, a number 
of these results have relied on very speciﬁc assumptions about the ways 
in which individuals obtain and use information about risk. Informa-
tion plays a critical role in economic theory. While economists have 
studied the role of information asymmetries in great detail, they have 
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paid less attention to how individual agents accumulate information 
and implement it in decision making. The standard economic model is 
one in which people process information perfectly, fully comprehend-
ing (and using) all information available to them. Gradually, however, 
economists have become increasingly interested in deviations from the 
perfect rationality model, particularly with regard to the processing of 
information about risk and uncertainty. We refer to the study of this is-
sue broadly as behavioral economics.
For obvious reasons, the ability of individuals to accumulate and 
process information about risk is particularly important for economists 
studying occupational safety and health. If we fail to properly model 
the ways in which individuals perceive, value, and respond to risk, it is 
unlikely that we will be able to accurately predict behavioral responses 
to changes in the risk of workplace injuries. This has important implica-
tions not only for economic research, but also for policies designed to 
promote workplace safety.
The objective of this chapter is to both explore how past research 
in the economics of occupational safety has dealt with deviations from 
the perfect rationality model, and to ask how the standard predictions 
change when we incorporate some of the key results of behavioral eco-
nomics. Economists since Adam Smith have recognized that deviations 
from the perfect rationality model would inﬂuence the way individuals 
respond to occupational risk. However, most recent studies use the ba-
sic framework from the standard perfect rationality model and study the 
effect of introducing a relatively small perturbation to the model, almost 
always by adding a subjective probability function that underestimates 
the true risk of occupational injuries. We attempt to incorporate some 
of the richer and more complex elements of behavioral economics into 
the analysis in the hopes of isolating some areas where current research 
might provide either misleading or incomplete conclusions about the 
role of occupational risk in employment and safety decisions.
Before proceeding we would like to note that this chapter is intend-
ed to be suggestive, and we do not presume to provide a comprehen-
sive integration of behavioral economics with the economic analysis of 
workplace safety. Both ﬁelds are vast and complex, and we focus our 
attention on just a small sample of the possible set of issues. Neverthe-
less, we believe that the issues we focus on are important and illustrate 
both that occupational safety is a natural place to apply (at least some 
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of) the principles of behavioral economics, and that these principles can 
have a profound impact on our predictions. 
We proceed as follows. In the next section we outline the standard 
model of occupational risk in an expected utility framework. We focus 
on two key issues from the economics literature: the existence of com-
pensating wage differentials for job risk, and the relationship between 
workers’ compensation beneﬁts and workplace safety. Our discussion 
focuses on the derivation of the main results in the perfect rationality 
model and some of the empirical evidence. In the third section, we then 
review some basic principles of behavioral economics. Our goal with 
this section is to summarize some of the evidence on how individu-
als perceive, value, and respond to risk differently than in the standard 
economic model. In the fourth section we discuss the extent to which 
the behavioral model alters the predictions of the standard model. In the 
ﬁfth section we discuss the possibility that employers might be subject 
to some of the same behavioral phenomena that affect workers, and we 
discuss how this could inﬂuence the predictions of the model. The sixth 
section then draws out some of the policy implications from our inte-
grated model, and the ﬁnal section concludes with recommendations 
for future research.
THE CLASSICAL APPROACH TO WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION
In this section we outline some of the basic results that have been 
obtained from applying economic analysis to workplace safety. We fo-
cus our analysis on two central topics that have been studied in the 
literature: the existence of compensating wage differentials for job risk, 
and the relationship between the insurance for occupational injuries and 
the level of workplace safety. These topics are particularly useful for 
our purposes because they comprise many of the most important results 
in the ﬁeld and, as we demonstrate later on, because they are sensitive 
to assumptions about how individuals perceive, value, and respond to 
risk.
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Compensating Wage Differentials for Job Risk
Adam Smith ﬁrst introduced the concept of compensating differ-
entials for job risks in An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. Smith (1937) argued that individuals faced with two 
identical jobs would, all other things equal, require more compensation 
to accept the job that involved a higher risk of personal injury or illness. 
Nearly 200 years later, Rosen (1974) formalized this intuitive notion 
and provided an empirical methodology to estimate the implicit “price” 
that workers charge for bearing the risk of injury on the job. Rosen’s 
work spawned a large literature dedicated to estimating this price using 
labor market data.
The intuition behind the empirical methodology is straightforward. 
Consider the empirical model relating individual wages to job charac-
teristics:
 
(9.1)  w
i
 = δ + X
i
β + Z
i
ζ + αq
i
 + ε
i 
 ,
 
where w
i
 represents the wage offer w for worker i, X represents a vector 
of individual characteristics such as age, gender or education, Z repre-
sents a vector of characteristics of individual i’s job, q represents the 
probability of injury on the job and ε is a random, mean zero error term. 
Note that for simplicity we consider a single injury type here, but in 
practice the model has been extended to include vectors of both fatal 
and nonfatal risks.
For our purposes the chief parameter of interest in this regression 
equation is α, which represents the compensating wage differential. As-
suming that the parameter estimate of α is well identiﬁed (generally 
that α is uncorrelated with ε), then we can literally interpret it as the 
marginal increase in wages an individual would require to make him 
or her indifferent to a marginal increase in job risk. This parameter is 
important, because in theory the price individuals charge to bear risk 
should be synonymous with their willingness to pay to reduce risk. The 
ability to estimate the willingness to pay to reduce risks is of critical 
importance for public policy, because this information is necessary if 
we wish to monetize the beneﬁts of policies designed to increase safety. 
With the wealth of available data on individual wages, the estimation of 
compensating wage differentials for job risks has played a key role in 
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cost–beneﬁt analysis for many environmental and health policies.
Numerous empirical studies have used Rosen’s approach to esti-
mate α, beginning with Thaler and Rosen (1976). In general, the empiri-
cal results have shown evidence of a compensating wage differential 
for fatal injury risk, but only mixed evidence of a wage differential for 
nonfatal injury risk (Viscusi 1993). A number of explanations have been 
posited for why the estimated differentials for nonfatal risks are difﬁcult 
to estimate. From an empirical standpoint, the general problem is that 
the parameter of interest α might be negatively correlated with the er-
ror term ε, which causes a negative bias in estimates of α. The primary 
reasons for this suspected correlation presented in the literature are a 
confounding effect of workers’ compensation beneﬁts, selection bias, 
and measurement error. 
A failure to include workers’ compensation beneﬁts in the vector 
Z could bias α toward zero because these beneﬁts reduce the expected 
cost of injuries, so workers with higher beneﬁts demand a lower com-
pensating wage differential. To eliminate this bias, a number of studies 
have included a measure of workers’ compensation beneﬁts and have 
increased the size of the estimated compensating wage differential (Vis-
cusi 1993).  
Selection bias can result because the level of job risk may be a 
choice variable for the worker. Individuals with a greater tolerance for 
risk might be more willing to accept employment at a risky job, a ten-
dency that would bias the compensating differential downward. Brown 
(1980) used a ﬁxed-effects estimator to control for this selection and 
found little evidence of compensating differentials for job risk. Garen 
(1988) used an instrumental variables approach and found evidence of 
relatively large compensating differentials. Measurement error is one 
possible explanation for why Brown (1980) found no evidence of com-
pensating differentials. Black and Kniesner (2003) found evidence of 
signiﬁcant, nontrivial measurement error in published job-risk variables 
that was correlated with other observable variables, making it impos-
sible to consistently estimate compensating differentials with ordinary 
least squares.
These are all plausible explanations as to why it is difﬁcult to es-
timate compensating wage differentials for nonfatal, or even fatal, job 
risks. However, each of these can be overcome given the appropriate 
econometric technique and the availability of instrumental variables. 
Roberts.indb   223 6/7/2005   9:29:28 AM
224 Seabury et al.
Later, when we discuss compensating wage differentials in the context 
of behavioral economics, we will see how certain elements of the be-
havioral model will call into question our ability to obtain estimates that 
are meaningful for policy analysis.
Optimal Workers’ Compensation Beneﬁts and Safety Incentives
In the United States, the primary relief for workers injured on the 
job comes from workers’ compensation. One of the key features of 
workers’ compensation is that it offers only partial compensation for 
workplace injuries. Whereas an individual with a valid cause of action 
suing for damages in the tort system would be eligible to recover full 
economic losses as well as noneconomic losses (pain and suffering), 
workers’ compensation provides only partial replacement for lost in-
come and no compensation for noneconomic losses. On the other hand, 
because individuals can recover damages regardless of whether or not 
there was negligence, compensation occurs with much greater frequen-
cy than it would in the tort system.
A common justiﬁcation for the use of partial coverage in workers’ 
compensation is the potential impact of beneﬁts on safety incentives. 
One facet of this argument supposes that individual workers have the 
ability to take precautions that reduce the risk of injury but are unob-
servable (or unveriﬁable) to employers. If workers can control the level 
of risk they face, and if safety precautions involve some cost, then no-
fault insurance will give workers the incentives to take fewer precau-
tions and thereby reduce the overall level of safety. By only providing 
partial income replacement, workers’ compensation beneﬁts reduce 
any disincentive by workers to take care.1 It may also reduce employer 
efforts to oppose reporting of legitimate claims, because such efforts 
would yield greater savings (Chelius and Kavanaugh 1988; Azaroff, 
Levenstein, and Wegman 2002). Note that there are other dimensions 
of this problem that may be mitigated by partial insurance coverage 
that might have little or no direct impact on actual safety levels, such 
as fraudulent claiming or extending injury duration past the true recov-
ery period. In addition, workers’ compensation may lead employers to 
reduce safety precautions if they are imperfectly experience rated or if 
workers do not demand the “optimal” level of precautions (Rea 1981; 
Smith 1992).
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Worker safety precautions are not the only mechanism through 
which workers’ compensation can inﬂuence the risk of occupational 
illnesses or injuries. A natural argument against removing occupational 
injuries from the tort system and restricting compensation is that it will 
reduce the incentives of employers to invest in safety precautions that 
reduce the frequency and/or severity of occupational injuries.  Workers’ 
compensation provides incentives for employers to improve safety, as 
fewer and less severe injuries will result in lower beneﬁt payments (and 
correspondingly, lower workers’ compensation insurance premiums).
The effect of workers’ compensation beneﬁts on workplace safety 
is the subject of debate in the literature. Studies such as Krueger (1990) 
and Ruser (1993) generally ﬁnd evidence in support of the notion that 
higher workers’ compensation beneﬁts lead to higher injury rates (for a 
review of the literature see Butler 1994). Less evidence has been found 
to support the claim that ﬁrms respond to incentives to improve work-
place safety (see Roberts 2005). Later in this chapter, we explore how 
behavioral economics changes our predictions about the relationship 
between workers’ compensation and workplace safety, and ask if it of-
fers any guidelines for public policy.
THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY
In this section we brieﬂy review how behavioral scientists have 
thought about decision making under uncertainty, with a particular eye 
for the decision elements relevant for the study of occupational safety. 
We focus much of our discussion, at least in a broad sense, on the work 
of Kahneman and Tversky, which has exposed some critical assump-
tions that have led economists traditionally to mischaracterize human 
behavior (Rabin 2003). Speciﬁcally, we utilize the framework of pros-
pect theory, introduced in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
One of the most important contributions of behavioral economics 
is to demonstrate that people make predictable judgment errors when 
faced with uncertainty (Rabin 2003).2 Individuals frequently employ 
rule-based, decision making techniques when they cannot calculate the 
costs and beneﬁts of a choice. People may lack the time or the ana-
lytic skills necessary for the evaluation. For some, the dearth of cru-
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cial information regarding the choice, such as objective probabilities 
and outcome values, hinders the rational decision-making process. For 
others, the dizzying array of information simply overwhelms. The fre-
quent practice of substituting heuristics, or cognitive rules of thumb, for 
structured analysis helps to explain why normative theory tends to fall 
short of reality. It also demonstrates the importance of considering the 
bounds to human rational decision making.
Prospect theory provides a systematic methodology for reconciling 
individual decision making with some of these errors. As a descriptive 
theory of choice, prospect theory illustrates decision making under risk 
as a selection among particular gambles or prospects. It distinguishes 
between two stages of the decision making process: an editing phase 
in which an individual organizes the problem into a choice between 
changes in wealth (or utility), and a choice phase in which the indi-
vidual chooses whichever outcome has the highest value. In this section 
we discuss how individuals might “edit” the problems associated with 
job risk. In particular, we focus on three aspects of the problem where 
this editing is of key importance: the perception of risk, the valuation 
of risk, and the response to risk. In the next section we then consider 
how these edited problems produce results that are different from the 
classical model.
Before moving on, we identify some subtle differences in what 
we mean by “risk” in these three aspects of individual behavior. When 
we discuss how individuals perceive risks we are generally referring 
to their perception of the probability of an injury or illness occurring. 
When discussing how individuals value risk we are talking more about 
the magnitude of the loss in utility individuals face if an injury or ill-
ness occurs. Finally, when we discuss how individuals respond to risk 
we refer to the behavior of individuals in response to the probability of 
an injury, the size of the loss, or, most often, the expected value of the 
loss.
How Do Individuals Perceive Risks?
In this section we are interested in the ways in which individuals 
perceive risks to health. Perhaps the most important question is whether 
or not individuals perceive risks accurately, i.e., does an individual’s 
subjective assessment about the likelihood of some adverse event oc-
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curring equal the “true” likelihood on average. Evidence supports the 
notion that individuals do not perceive risk accurately, and has led be-
haviorists to identify a number of cognitive biases that disturb an indi-
vidual’s information processing about risk. Below we discuss three of 
these biases that we feel are most relevant to the study of occupational 
risk: the availability bias, the optimism bias and the accumulation bias. 
We review the empirical evidence on each of these biases as they per-
tain to the workplace if such evidence is sufﬁciently available, and to 
health risks more generally if it is not.
The availability bias
Biased predictive judgments and subjective probabilities frequently 
result from the common use of the availability bias. Humans tend to 
judge the likelihood of an event by its ease of recall: we tend to dis-
proportionately weigh salient and memorable events even when bet-
ter sources of information exist (Rabin 2003). To illustrate, consider 
the fact that a substantial number of people have avoided ﬂying since 
the 9-11 terrorism attacks but continue to drive at high speeds on the 
nation’s highways, where physical injury is far more likely to occur. 
Additionally, we observe that people tend to be overly inﬂuenced by 
friends’ remarkable mishaps with certain car brands, ignoring the em-
pirical evidence readily available from publications such as Consumer 
Reports (Rabin 2003). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) further illustrate 
this phenomenon as follows: 
The subjective assessment of probability resembles the subjective 
assessment of physical quantities such as distance or size. These 
judgments are all based on data of limited validity, which are pro-
cessed according to heuristic rules. For example, the apparent dis-
tance of an object is determined in part by its clarity. The more 
sharply the object is seen, the closer it appears to be. This rule 
has some validity, because in any given scene the more distant 
objects are seen less sharply than nearer objects. However, the re-
liance on this rule leads to systematic errors in the estimation of 
distance. Speciﬁcally, distances are often overestimated when vis-
ibility is poor because the contours of objects are blurred. On the 
other hand, distances are underestimated when visibility is good 
because the objects are seen sharply. Thus, the reliance on clarity 
as an indication of distance leads to common biases. Such biases 
are also found in the intuitive judgment of probability.
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While some workers demonstrate a fairly accurate perception of 
risk (for example, see Ostberg 1980; Singleton, Hicks, and Hirsch 
1981), empirical studies provide some evidence of workers’ reliance 
on availability for occupational risk perceptions. For instance, in his 
survey of 915 workers on eight Norwegian oil rig platforms, Rundmo 
(1992) found that people most frequently perceived risk in connection 
with disasters and major accidents rather than with their routine tasks. 
This result also indicates the “ﬂipside” of the availability bias—that 
workers may grow accustomed to their frequent and routine occupa-
tional dangers. In so doing, these risks may lose their “remarkableness” 
and are then underestimated as being “normal.” 
Organizational behavior scholars have provided us with substantial 
evidence of workers in familiar, highly risky work situations who un-
derestimate their risk levels in comparison to workers in unknown situ-
ations with comparable risk proﬁles (Mearns and Flin 1996). For exam-
ple, Zimolong (1985) found that workers in the construction industry 
typically overestimate the risks involved in tasks that they perform in-
frequently or do not understand fully, while commonly underestimating 
the risks involved in performing their routine tasks. In a subsequent 
study, Zimolong (1991) found that railway shunters, who are respon-
sible for coupling and uncoupling train cars, overestimate the risks for 
tasks that have a reputation for being dangerous and underestimate the 
risks involved with routine activities. Rundmo (1992) found similar re-
sults in his work concerning Norwegian oil rig personnel; workers fre-
quently perceived risk in connection with disasters and major accidents 
rather than in their common work responsibilities. 
The optimism bias 
Another form of bias that has commonly been demonstrated in per-
ception of risk is the optimism bias. The optimism bias simply states 
that people tend to underestimate their own injury risk compared to the 
average risk. Health behavior researchers have found that people gener-
ally think that they are less vulnerable to adverse health outcomes than 
the rest of the population. Speciﬁc examples appear frequently in the 
AIDS risk perception literature.
One such study focused on people’s comparative AIDS risk assess-
ments (van der Velde, van der Pligt, and Hooykaas 1994). The research-
ers surveyed four groups in Amsterdam, listed roughly in the order of 
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their increasing risk of contracting AIDS: a nationally representative 
sample (n = 437), heterosexuals with multiple private sex partners (n = 
241), homosexual men with multiple sex partners (n = 147), and het-
erosexuals with multiple prostitution partners (n = 493). They asked 
the participants to assess their personal risk (i.e., the likelihood that the 
subject himself or herself becomes infected) and average risk (i.e., the 
likelihood that a random person in their age group becomes infected). 
They found that people with more objective risk factors perceive them-
selves to be at greater risk. However, the subjects rated their personal 
risk substantially lower than that of others and were extremely optimis-
tic about their own chances of avoiding the virus (see Figure 9.1). 
A similar form of the optimism bias appears in workplace-related 
health risks. The more direct experience workers have with occupa-
tional hazards without adverse outcomes, the more conﬁdent they are 
in their ability to control the risk (Weyman, Clarke, and Cox 2003). For 
instance, a study of mine bunker operations reported that there was a 
“widespread faith in their ability to respond to dangerous incidents” 
(Rushworth et al. 1986). It thus appears that there is a kind of “Lake 
Woebegon” effect: when it comes to evaluating one’s own ability to 
avoid adverse health outcomes, everyone feels above average.
The accumulation bias
Other inaccurate risk perceptions result from the tendency of hu-
mans to form incomplete problem representations. Researchers have 
Figure 9.1  Mean Scores of AIDS Risk Perceptions, Own versus Others
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observed that people do tend to learn about risks in ways that change 
their original assessments of risk. In a study concerning 130 manufac-
turing workers, Cree and Kelloway (1997) found that accident history 
as well as perceptions of others’ commitment to health and safety were 
predictive of workers’ risk assessments. They also found these risk per-
ceptions related to the workers’ willingness to participate and turnover 
intentions. However, their risk perceptions may still fall short of the 
real level of exposure occurring in their workplace because of the ac-
cumulation bias.
People have the tendency to perceive risks “in isolation” rather than 
as a sequence of similar decisions or one that accumulates over a life-
time (Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff 1993). Researchers have found 
that people typically do not perceive a difference between the likeli-
hood of injury occurring when a risky action is taken once versus the 
likelihood that ensues through multiple exposures. For example, people 
may understand that the chance of being injured in a car accident is 
about 1 in 10,000 each time they drive. However, they typically fail to 
realize that this statement is equivalent to a 33 percent probability of 
being in an injurious accident at least once during their lifetime (Slovic, 
Fischoff, and Lichtenstein 1978). 
Researchers have observed this tendency in a variety of psychology 
experiments related to health behaviors. Doyle (1997) found that people 
underestimate the cumulative risk of contraception use by failing to use 
the binomial probability model, where the probability of an unintended 
pregnancy is equal to 1 minus the probability of an intended pregnancy 
in one encounter raised to the number of sexual encounters. Likewise, 
Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff (1993) found that peoples’ risk esti-
mates for being infected with AIDS in more than 10 encounters were 
far too small when considering the risk they perceived in one encoun-
ter. Their subjects’ median risk perception of transmitting AIDS from a 
male to female when using a condom was 5 percent in one encounter, 
10 percent in 10 encounters, and 20 percent in 100 encounters. If the 
subjects had appropriately applied the binomial probability model, they 
would have argued that the risk was 40.1 percent in 10 encounters and 
99.4 percent in 100; these values differ with statistical signiﬁcance.
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Summary
Here we have discussed three important biases about the ways in 
which people perceive risks. It is important to note that the biases are 
not mutually exclusive, and often work together. For instance, in the 
AIDS perception study by Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff (1993) it was 
found that individuals underestimate lifetime risk given their own esti-
mates of the risk from a single exposure. However, they found that in-
dividuals substantially overestimated both the single exposure risk and 
lifetime risk. This is easily explained by the availability bias; the risk of 
HIV infection is highly publicized and easy to recall, thus individuals 
tend to overestimate it. When taken in concert with the results of van 
der Velde, van der Pligt, and Hooykaas (1994), we can see how all three 
biases can be present with an individual’s perception of a single risk to 
health.
These misperceptions can inﬂuence individual behavior and poten-
tially lead to poor health decisions, including those precautions taken 
and protective equipment used to ensure occupational safety. For exam-
ple, workers may neglect to wear a mask in a dusty warehouse because 
the risk of developing asthma from a single day of inhaling pollutants 
is relatively low. On the other hand, Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff 
(1993) found that individuals overestimate the ability of condoms to 
protect them from a sexually transmitted disease. This suggests that 
in some cases individuals may place too much faith in protective tech-
nologies, and may avoid other kinds of precautions that are necessary 
to minimize the risk of injury.
How Do Individuals Value Risks?
Prospect theory suggests that it is important not only to consider 
how individuals perceive risks, but also the ways individuals value risks. 
More precisely, it suggests that we should pay attention to the relative 
weights that individuals place on the gains and losses that are at stake. 
Standard economic theory predicts that people should value gains and 
losses symmetrically. In general, prospect theory suggests that this sym-
metry does not hold, particularly when the gains and losses are uncer-
tain. If true, this might cause us to not only change our predictions about 
behavior, but to change the way we interpret observed behavior.
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More speciﬁcally, individuals frequently display signs of loss aver-
sion, suggesting that they dislike losses more than they like gains of 
equal magnitude (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahne-
man 1991). While there are many implications of loss aversion, for our 
purposes we can illustrate the key concepts with the following hypo-
thetical scenario. Consider a risk averse individual who receives util-
ity from some good y according to the function U(y), where U is in-
creasing and concave. Now suppose the individual faces two lotteries: 
one (which we call A) in which she begins with y = 2,000 and faces a 
gain of 1,000 with probability 0.25, and the other (called B) in which 
she begins with y = 3,000 and faces a loss of 1,000 with probability 
0.25. In this example the expected utility for the lottery A is equal to 
0.75U(2,000) + 0.25U(3,000) and the expected utility for lottery B is 
equal to 0.75U(3,000) + 0.25U(2,000). It is a simple enough matter to 
show that the gain in expected utility from beginning with 2,000 and 
participating in lottery A is equal to the loss in expected utility from 
participating in lottery B.3 This is an important point, because expected 
utility theory implies that the amount individuals would be willing to 
pay to participate in lottery A should be equal to the amount they would 
pay to avoid lottery B.
As we have stated, we would not expect this symmetry to hold un-
der prospect theory. Prospect theory generally supposes that individu-
als evaluate changes based on gains and losses. Moreover, individuals 
evaluate these changes in welfare using a value function, which we de-
note V(·), that assigns a subjective value to a given gain or loss. Suppose 
we ignore the problems discussed in the previous section and assume 
that individuals perceive the probability of gain and loss accurately. If 
we let a = [U(3,000) − U(2,000)] and b = [U(2,000) − U(3,000)], we can 
deﬁne the value of lottery A as V(a) and the value of lottery B as V(b). 
Under expected utility theory, we would have V(a) = − V(b), but under 
prospect theory we expect that V(a) < − V(b). The subjective value that 
individuals place on a loss is greater than the value placed on an equiva-
lent gain. Thus, we can say that if individuals are loss averse, then the 
amount they would be willing to pay to participate in lottery A will be 
less than the amount they would pay to avoid lottery B.
We should note that the concept of loss aversion is distinct from 
the concept of risk aversion, which is fundamental to the neoclassi-
cal theory of insurance demand. Risk aversion essentially states that 
Roberts.indb   232 6/7/2005   9:29:39 AM
Behavioral Economics and Research on Workplace Injuries   233
individuals dislike risk, and will require a premium to accept a lottery 
with an uncertain outcome but the same expected value as one with a 
certain outcome. Mathematically, risk aversion is incorporated under 
the standard model through the assumption that the utility function, rep-
resented by U(y) is concave (so the marginal utility of income increases 
at a decreasing rate). Although the two concepts sound similar, they 
refer to two very different behavioral phenomena. Simply put, an indi-
vidual who is risk averse dislikes uncertainty, even uncertainty between 
two positive outcomes. Someone who is loss averse dislikes a shortfall, 
whether it occurs with certainty or not. In general, an individual can 
be loss averse and risk averse at the same time. However, an interest-
ing implication of loss aversion pointed out by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) is that loss averse individuals will be risk loving with respect to 
avoiding losses (in other words, they will prefer an uncertain loss to a 
certain one with identical expected value).
There is a great deal of experimental evidence to support the exis-
tence of loss aversion in individuals (e.g., see Knetsch 1989; Kahne-
man, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; and Bateman et al. 1997). Most of the 
studies we are aware of focus on actual consumption goods, and have 
not established whether or not individuals are averse to losses of health. 
Nevertheless, the evidence supporting loss aversion in empirical studies 
is certainly strong enough to suggest that it is a phenomenon worthy of 
further study in the context of job-related health risks. As we shall see 
later on, the possibility that individuals are averse to health losses will 
have substantial implications for the economic analysis of workplace 
safety.
How Do Individuals Respond to Risk?
While the ways individuals perceive and value risks are important 
considerations for studying human behavior with regards to workplace 
injuries, in some sense they are both merely elements in the decision 
process that drives individual choices. McFadden (1999) deﬁnes a cog-
nitive process as “the mental mechanism that deﬁnes the cognitive task 
and the role of perceptions, beliefs, attitudes preferences and motives in 
performing this task, to produce a choice.” Therefore, we can think of 
risk perception and the value placed on risky options as speciﬁc compo-
nents in the larger problem of individual decision making. 
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Economists generally rely on the principle of utility maximiza-
tion as the cognitive process that drives behavior. Taking preferences 
as given, the economic model predicts that individual behavior can be 
well explained by a process by which individuals choose whatever al-
location of resources provides them with the highest overall beneﬁt. 
While there can be no question that the utility maximization model has 
proved extremely useful and provided countless valuable insights into 
human behavior over the years, it has been criticized by behaviorists as 
ignoring many other important principles that inﬂuence behavior. This 
criticism is an important one for our purposes, because even if we make 
the right assumptions about subjective probability and subjective value 
we may still ﬁnd it difﬁcult to predict behavior if individuals do not 
respond to risk as assumed in the standard economic model. 
If individuals fail to (always) act as rational utility-maximizing 
agents, then what principles do we expect to govern the choices that 
they make? Prelec (1991) argues that individuals create decision rules 
to guide choices in cases where ordinary cost–beneﬁt analysis is prob-
lematic. It is important to distinguish between these rules and the more 
common bounded rationality model. Prelec explicitly distinguishes 
rules that override cost–beneﬁt analysis even when the analysis is rela-
tively straightforward from the rules associated with bounded rational-
ity, which are used exclusively when cost–beneﬁt analysis is difﬁcult 
and costly. For our purposes, bounded rationality would lead to similar 
results if the cost–beneﬁt analyses associated with workplace safety de-
cisions are sufﬁciently complicated.
Prelec suggests three cases in which cost–beneﬁt analysis might 
fail. The ﬁrst case is that of a temporal mismatch, whereby individuals 
have difﬁculty assessing the net gain or loss of a particular action when 
its cost(s) and beneﬁt(s) are separated by a substantial period of time. 
The second refers to a saliency mismatch, in which one of the pair (i.e., 
either the costs or the beneﬁts) is vivid and easy to understand or imag-
ine while the other is vague or uncertain. The ﬁnal case is that of a scale 
mismatch, in which either there is a large disparity between the costs 
and beneﬁts or if one of them is only realized if the action is repeated 
many times. Prelec argues that cost–beneﬁt analysis fails under each of 
these because it leads to an asymmetry in the weight assigned to either 
the cost or beneﬁts associated with the action.4
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Risks to health resulting from workplace injuries may be subject to 
any of the three mismatches that confound cost–beneﬁt analysis. For 
example, determining the level of care to exert when using certain ma-
chinery that may pose a risk of loss of limb potentially suffers from the 
scale mismatch. The scale effect could arise because the cost of using 
a machine carefully is relatively small while the beneﬁt of not suffer-
ing a loss of limb is large. Faced with the similar decision of whether 
or not to wear a seat belt, Prelec (1991) argues that individuals may 
develop a simple rule that governs use regardless of small permutations 
of the problem (such as whenever it rains or whenever driving on the 
highway).
The scale mismatch is only one example of how behavior related 
to workplace risks might be subject to these cost–beneﬁt asymmetries. 
Repetitive stress disorders represent a set of common occupational in-
juries that may suffer from the temporal mismatch, given that they only 
develop over long periods of time. The saliency mismatch could arise 
in cases where workers felt ﬁnancial pressure to take risk. Faced with 
the threat of job loss because of low productivity, for example, workers 
may take unsafe shortcuts or work too fast because the potential for job 
loss seems more “real” than the possibility of injury. These mismatch-
es need not be mutually exclusive; decisions relating to activities that 
might involve exposure to toxic chemicals potentially may be subject 
to all three mismatches (the cost of injuries are likely to be delayed, of 
unknown severity, and probably occur only after multiple exposures). 
In general, if individuals create rules that govern behavior with re-
gard to workplace activities that inﬂuence the likelihood of workplace 
injuries, then these rules will have several implications for the predic-
tions of the standard model laid out in the second section. We explore 
these implications in the following section. 
INTEGRATING THE STANDARD MODEL AND THE 
BEHAVIORAL MODEL
Here, we come back to the results of the standard model and ex-
amine how they are affected by the principles of behavioral econom-
ics. We follow the same outline as in the second section, focusing ﬁrst 
on compensating wage differentials and then moving on to the optimal 
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workers’ compensation beneﬁts and levels of workplace safety. We con-
sider how the results of the behavioral model affect both the theoretical 
predictions of the standard model and the empirical studies estimating 
these predictions.
Compensating Wage Differentials for Job Risk
Generally speaking, integrating the principles of behavioral eco-
nomics with the standard model has relatively little impact on the 
theory of compensating wage differentials. The standard model states 
that workers will require higher compensation to accept employment 
in occupations associated with increased risk of workplace injuries or 
illnesses, ceteris paribus. In the behavioral model, we need only reﬁne 
this statement to say that individuals will require higher compensation 
to accept employment in occupations in which there is perceived to be 
a greater likelihood of an injury or illness.
The distinction between actual and perceived risks is an important 
one. The standard economic model predicts that individuals will respond 
to the actual level of risk. Economists interested in workplace safety 
have generally understood that individuals may not perceive risks accu-
rately, however, and it is often assumed that individuals underestimate 
the risk of job injuries.5 This assumption seems widely supported by the 
empirical evidence on the availability bias, optimism bias and accumu-
lation bias discussed in the third section. Given that we expect workers 
to respond to the risks that they perceive, the size of the compensating 
wage differential they demand will be based upon the perceived risk as 
opposed to the actual risk. Importantly, as long as the perceived risk of 
injury is positively related to the actual risk, the compensating wage 
differential will still be positive.
As discussed in Viscusi (1993), if workers systematically under-
estimate the level of occupational risk, then they will demand a lower 
compensating wage differential. To see how this can matter empirically, 
consider Equation (9.1) on p. 222. In this setting the true job risk vari-
able q serves as a proxy for the perceived job risk, and the estimated 
parameter α represents the compensating wage differential multiplied 
by the correlation between the actual and perceived job risk. If workers 
underestimate the risk of job injury then the correlation between the 
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true and perceived levels of risk will be less than 1, implying a lower 
observed compensating wage differential.
The underestimation of risk may lead to a lower compensating 
wage differential than the standard model would predict, but loss aver-
sion will tend to have the opposite effect. To see this, consider that, 
according to prospect theory, individuals choose between different op-
tions by comparing the gains and losses associated with each. In the 
case of choosing an occupation, this would suggest workers compare 
the “gain” of staying healthy and receiving wages against the “loss” of 
being injured and receiving workers’ compensation beneﬁts.6 If individ-
uals are loss averse, they will place additional weight on the loss from 
being injured relative to the gain from staying healthy and receiving the 
compensating wage differential. This suggests that if individuals are 
loss averse they will require extra compensation to accept higher levels 
of perceived risk than what is predicted by the standard model.
While the predictions of the behavioral model are fairly benign from 
a theoretical standpoint, they are problematic for the purposes of esti-
mation because they have opposite effects on the size of the differential. 
This makes it difﬁcult to interpret differences in the estimated coefﬁ-
cient (α) for different kinds of risk. For instance, the fact that past stud-
ies have had relatively more success estimating positive compensating 
wage differentials for fatal risks than nonfatal risks is consistent with 
two behavioral explanations: 1) that individuals underestimate the risk 
of nonfatal injuries more than fatal injuries (which perhaps are overes-
timated), or 2) that the impact of loss aversion will be more severe with 
respect to fatal injuries than nonfatal ones (because clearly it makes 
sense to think of fatal injuries as involving a greater loss). While these 
explanations need not be mutually exclusive, they complicate matters 
by adding two more to the (already long) laundry list of items that po-
tentially confound the estimation of compensating wage differentials.
In some ways, the issues raised by the behavioral model pose great-
er challenges to obtaining meaningful compensating wage differential 
estimates than the standard criticisms. Measurement error and selec-
tion bias are statistical problems that can be addressed using standard 
econometric techniques, at least if the proper instrumental variables can 
be obtained. However, disentangling the estimated compensating wage 
differential from the impact of subjective evaluations of risk and loss 
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can only be accomplished by eliciting additional information from in-
dividuals.
While our discussion in this section has focused on wage differ-
entials, disability beneﬁts represent an alternate means of compensat-
ing individuals for bearing risk. So, if we broaden our perspective to 
think about the implications of the behavioral model on the total injury 
compensation available to workers, we obtain similar results. Viscusi 
and Moore (1987) model the trade-off that workers implicitly accept 
between wages and workers’ compensation beneﬁts as an increasing 
function of the level of risk. Individual behavior should be governed 
by perceived risk, so if workers underestimate the true level of risk 
then they will be willing to trade off less wages in return for beneﬁts 
and thereby lower the optimal level of workers’ compensation beneﬁts. 
On the other hand, if individuals are loss averse then they will place 
a greater weight on the possibility of a loss, which will increase their 
willingness to trade off wages for beneﬁts at any given level of per-
ceived risk. Thus, elements of the behavioral model may lead to either a 
lower or higher optimal level of workers’ compensation beneﬁts when 
compared to the standard model.
Worker learning
Before moving on to discuss the optimal workers’ compensation 
policy, it is worth considering the possibility that individuals learn to 
overcome their subjective evaluations as they gain experience. Viscusi 
(1979) hypothesizes that workers may be poorly informed about the 
level of risk at the start of their careers, but gradually learn about the 
level of risk over time. This suggests that the differences between the 
perceived probability of injury and the true probability may diminish 
over time, with workers possibly becoming perfectly informed with 
sufﬁcient experience. If workers become more informed about risks, 
i.e., if they underestimate risk less, then workers with longer tenure in 
riskier jobs will demand higher compensating differentials or quit. Vari-
ous works broadly support this prediction, including Viscusi (1979) and 
Moore and Viscusi (1990).
Another possibility is that individuals become less loss averse over 
time, in the sense that their relative weights on gains and losses be-
come equalized as they gain experience. In a recent paper, List (2003) 
ﬁnds experimental evidence that individuals with more experience in 
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the market for trading cards tend to exhibit little or no evidence of loss 
aversion while those with less experience do. If this result held more 
generally to the case of workplace injuries it would suggest that work-
ers with longer tenure would place relatively less weight on the possible 
loss from injuries and therefore require less compensation. 
Thus, the effect of worker learning is to mitigate the impact of the 
behavioral model on the estimation of compensating wage differentials 
over time. Unfortunately, we know far too little about just how much 
workers actually learn over time to say with any certainty that this is 
the case. While the results of List (2003) are provocative, it is not clear 
ex ante whether or not individuals could learn to overcome aversion 
to health “losses” from injuries the same way they overcome aversion 
to income losses from trading goods. Additionally, while workers may 
become more informed about injury risk with experience, the availabil-
ity bias suggests that it is possible that as risks associated with familiar 
tasks become better understood, individuals may revise their risk per-
ceptions downward. Even if individuals do become more informed over 
time and their subjective risk assessments and loss valuations become 
“better,” the pace of learning may differ. This suggests that experience 
might have a nonmonotonic effect on the compensating differential, 
further complicating our ability to make predictions. Ultimately, a great 
deal of work needs to be done before we can understand the ways in 
which individuals learn about risk in the workplace.
Safety Incentives
The predictions of the behavioral model on the relationship be-
tween workers’ compensation beneﬁts and safety incentives are varied 
and complex. Workers’ compensation beneﬁts can affect the safety in-
centives of workers if, by reducing the ﬁnancial burden of an accident, 
they make workers less cautious about avoiding accidents. Obviously 
loss aversion matters in this sense, because if individuals are loss averse 
then they will have more incentives to take care for a given level of ben-
eﬁts, but they may also be more responsive to a change in beneﬁts. This 
suggests that under loss aversion, individuals may be more responsive 
to changes in beneﬁts than predicted by the standard model.
When talking about compensating wage differentials and workers’ 
compensation beneﬁts we focused on how individuals perceive the level 
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of risk, but when considering safety incentives it is important to consid-
er how individuals perceive the way risks change as safety precautions 
change. Past studies such as Rea (1981) and Viscusi (1990) have gener-
ally assumed that the effect of precautions on perceived risk is directly 
related to the impact of precautions on actual risk. This suggests that if 
individuals underestimate the risk associated with workplace injuries, 
they will undervalue the marginal beneﬁt of taking additional precau-
tions. If this is so, then individuals will underinvest in safety for any 
given level of workers’ compensation beneﬁts. By extension, if beneﬁts 
increase (decrease) then workers will generally respond by decreasing 
(increasing) precautions by more than what would be predicted in the 
standard model.
However, there are reasons to suspect that the relationship between 
safety precautions and perceived risk is not as straightforward as sug-
gested in the literature. The optimism bias and the aforementioned re-
sults of Weyman, Clarke, and Cox (2003) and Rushworth et al. (1986) 
suggest that individuals may overestimate their ability to control risks. 
This suggests that for any given level of beneﬁts individuals will tend 
to be more cautious than predicted by the standard model. This sug-
gests a result opposite of the case discussed above; a change in workers’ 
compensation beneﬁts would have less of an impact on worker safety 
precautions than the standard model predicts.7
The implications of individual perceptions of risk on safety are not 
exclusive to the safety precautions taken by individual workers. As we 
discuss later on, it is plausible to suppose that employers, at least large 
corporations, are less subject to some of the behavioral criticisms than 
individual agents. Nevertheless, worker perceptions of risk may have 
an impact on employer safety measures. Rea (1981) demonstrates that 
if individuals underestimate risk they will demand too few safety mea-
sures from employers. On the other hand, if workers place too much 
faith in protective technologies, as Linville, Fischer, and Fischhoff 
(1993) showed individuals tend to do with condoms, they may demand 
supraoptimal safety measures from employers.
Note that these different effects of the behavioral model on the 
level of safety measures taken assume that precautions are set as the 
result of an implicit cost–beneﬁt analysis made by workers, even if their 
subjective evaluations of probability and loss differ from the standard 
model. However, we discussed earlier how workplace injuries may suf-
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fer from the kinds of cognitive mismatches that Prelec (1991) argues 
can confound cost–beneﬁt analyses. If this is so, workers may respond 
by implementing decision rules that govern the level of safety precau-
tions they take. If workers operate under decision rules such as “always 
wear safety goggles,” it is quite possible that relatively small changes 
in disability beneﬁts will not be enough incentive to induce workers to 
change their safety precautions. Thus, in extreme cases the behavioral 
model may contend that there should be no relationship between safety 
levels and workers’ compensation beneﬁts.8
DOES THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL APPLY TO EMPLOYERS?
Until now, all of our discussion has focused on applying the mod-
els of behavioral economics to workers. One question we have not ad-
dressed, and to our knowledge has not been addressed in the literature, 
is whether or not employers behave as the perfectly rational, perfectly 
informed economic agents they are supposed to be in the standard mod-
el. In this section we provide a brief discussion of how the behavioral 
model could be applied to employers and how this would change our 
predictions.
It is typical in economics to view employers, or ﬁrms more general-
ly, as impersonal entities that are motivated solely by maximizing prof-
its and share few of the behavioral nuances of individuals. For example, 
it is common to view employers as risk neutral while individual work-
ers (or other agents) are typically assumed to be risk averse.9 Likewise, 
models of occupational safety that incorporate risk misperceptions by 
individual workers typically assume that ﬁrms are fully informed about 
the true injury risk. There are a number of reasons that employers may 
behave more like the rational economic agents than individual workers. 
First, employers may have access to better data on the actual risk of in-
jury to employees. Also, it is not clear the extent to which the personal 
nature or risk inﬂuences individual behavior, and it is possible that em-
ployers would have a more accurate perception of risk because it did 
not directly affect them.
On the other hand, there are reasons to suspect that employers may 
not perfectly ﬁt the rational economic model. In general, large employ-
ers are probably most likely to be able to accurately predict the risk 
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of injury to an individual worker, simply because of the law of large 
numbers.10 Small employers will simply not have enough observations 
to accurately formulate a probability. Even if employers as organiza-
tions understand the true risk of injury to workers, they are still driven 
by the decision making of individuals. It seems reasonable to suspect 
that individual managers might be poorly informed about the risk of 
injury to workers, or suffer similar cognitive biases about risk as those 
discussed above.
Another factor that might mitigate some of the impact of employers’ 
risk misperceptions that will likely not be available to workers (even 
unionized ones) is the presence of insurance companies. Presumably, 
insurance companies have the knowledge and expertise to construct 
the most accurate estimates of the actual risk of injury for individuals. 
Thus, even if an employer does not place the appropriate marginal ben-
eﬁt on safety precautions, the insurance company could provide ﬁnan-
cial incentives for safety through discounts in workers’ compensation 
premiums.11 
However, there are other ways that investment in workplace safety 
might enter a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function than through premiums, such as the 
direct cost of investment, the impact of workplace safety on the expect-
ed marginal productivity of labor, and reductions in the compensating 
wage differential. Even if insurance companies can mitigate some of 
the impact of risk misperceptions, they likely won’t have much effect 
on the wage negotiations between workers and employers unless they 
are able to communicate the appropriate risk levels. Also, the ability of 
insurance companies to convey accurate risk information will be less 
for smaller ﬁrms that are not perfectly experience rated. And ﬁnally, 
there are some risks for which even insurance companies likely have 
trouble assessing accurately, such as catastrophic risks. In these special 
cases, which involve extreme losses but have uncertain probability, em-
ployers and workers may over- or underreact in a similar fashion.
If employers as whole, or individual managers within ﬁrms, deviate 
from the perfectly rational model in ways that are similar to individual 
workers, then our model would predict different behavior for them as 
well. Consider the case of compensating wage differentials. If employ-
ers underestimate the risk of injury to individual workers, we might ex-
pect that this would make them less willing to negotiate compensating 
wage differentials. However, note that injuries will affect the expected 
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marginal productivity of labor, because injured workers are (at least 
temporarily) less productive than healthy ones. In this case, if employ-
ers underestimate the risk of injury it might lead them to overestimate 
the expected marginal productivity of labor (because more workers will 
be injured, and therefore be less productive, than expected by the em-
ployer). If employer misconceptions were positively correlated with the 
true injury risk, i.e., if they underestimated risk more in riskier jobs, this 
could lead to an upward bias of the compensating wage differential.12
Investment in workplace safety provisions will also be affected if 
employers deviate from the standard model. If employers underesti-
mate the risk of injury, they may thereby underestimate the marginal 
beneﬁt of safety measures. If this is the case, it will lead employers to 
underinvest in safety. On the other hand, suppose that employers over-
estimated their ability to inﬂuence workplace safety measures. This will 
lead employers to “oversupply” workplace safety, meaning they will 
invest beyond the point where the true marginal beneﬁt equals marginal 
cost. However, if employers underestimate their ability to inﬂuence risk 
they will tend to undersupply workplace safety provisions. Ultimately, 
the equilibrium level of safety will be a complex function depending on 
both the employer’s and the employee’s perceptions of risk as well as 
other fundamentals of the model.13
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The discussion in the previous two sections focused on the im-
plications of the behavioral model for research on the economics of 
workplace safety. However, just as this research has inﬂuenced public 
policy we believe that the issues we raise also have important policy 
implications. We focus our discussion on the two policy areas that are 
most closely related to our previous analysis: the use of compensating 
wage differentials to estimate the value of life, and policies designed to 
improve workplace safety.
Using Value-of-Life Estimates in Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis
Government policies and regulations can often reduce the risk of 
fatal and nonfatal injuries to individuals, but sometimes only at substan-
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tial cost. In order to determine which policies are most cost-effective, it 
is necessary to have some estimate of the willingness to pay for a reduc-
tion in the level of risk. Compensating wage differential estimates can 
be used to provide an estimate of the “value-of-life,” allowing a com-
putation of the expected beneﬁt of increased safety in terms of a dollar 
amount. The use of value-of-life estimates to evaluate public policies 
began in the 1980s and has become more widespread since (Viscusi 
1993). 
Obviously these estimates are only useful to the extent that we are 
able to identify them well empirically, and as we have discussed there 
are numerous problems to doing so. The criticisms that come from the 
behavioral model are different, however, in that they do not question the 
validity of the empirical predictions as much as they question how to 
use the predictions. Speciﬁcally, while the behavioral model does pre-
dict that the size of the estimated compensating wage differential may 
be different than predicted by the standard model, this is not the same 
as saying that the estimated differential is biased. Indeed, if we ignore 
the measurement error and selection issues, the estimated relationship 
between wages and actual job risk should be well identiﬁed. The com-
plication comes in interpreting the coefﬁcient, because it will implicitly 
reﬂect the relationship between the actual risk and the individuals’ sub-
jective risk perceptions and valuations. This is particularly troubling if 
the value-of-life estimate is used to assess the cost and beneﬁts of some 
policy designed to reduce a risk that is subject to different cognitive 
biases than job-related risk (such as a plane crash, the risk of which 
individuals overestimate).
In some sense, the key impact of the behavioral model on the use 
of value of life estimates is to highlight the need for additional data. 
We simply do not know enough about the ways workers (or employers) 
perceive, value, or respond to risk. Survey and experimental data that 
elicited this information for job-related health and income risks would 
not only increase our understanding of many of these issues, it would 
allow us to generalize and improve the policy usefulness of value-of-
life estimates based on labor market data.
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Promoting Safety in the Workplace
Workers’ compensation is generally thought to provide employers 
and workers with ﬁnancial incentives to improve safety. While this may 
be true, the behavioral model questions the effectiveness of both our 
ability to predict how strong the safety incentives are and whether or 
not they will have much effect at all. However, workers’ compensation 
is certainly not the only public policy that deals with workplace safety. 
The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
was founded in 1971 as a regulatory body to promote safer workplaces, 
and 24 states have their own health and safety plans that are approved 
and monitored by OSHA. Rather than rely (solely) on ﬁnancial incen-
tives, these organizations rely on traditional regulatory measures such 
as inspection and enforcement of safety programs.
However, it needs to be determined in light of the behavioral criti-
cisms exactly what kinds of safety programs are most likely to be ef-
fective. Rea (1981) demonstrated that if individuals misperceive the 
risk of injuries they might respond to employer precautions in ways 
that mitigate the beneﬁts of reduced risk. Moreover, if individual safety 
behavior is determined by rule-based decision making then it is difﬁcult 
to predict how (if at all) individuals will respond not only to ﬁnancial 
incentives but also to regulatory or programmatic incentives.
One important way to improve safety, or at least to improve the efﬁ-
ciency of safety decisions, may be to provide information to workers.14 
We discussed above how experience and learning by individuals may 
allow them to overcome some of their cognitive biases about risk and 
act more like the rational economic agent. Of course, it often requires a 
substantial investment of time and effort to obtain and process informa-
tion. If there are economies of scale in acquiring information then we 
might expect ﬁrms to have an advantage in this regard, which would 
make them a more efﬁcient mechanism to collect and process the rel-
evant data. More work needs to be done to say for sure, but it is possible 
that doing more to educate workers in risky positions, and perhaps the 
employers as well, would lead to more efﬁcient long-run employment 
contracts between workers and employers.15 
Even if information cannot fully overcome workers’ or employers’ 
biases, it may be helpful in other ways. Suppose worker safety precau-
tions were governed by rules, but those rules were based on suboptimal 
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perceptions about risk. Thus, information may be able to help individu-
als switch to “better” rules that make them choose more efﬁcient levels 
of precautions. All of this is highly speculative, but it does suggest that 
a better understanding of how individuals think about and respond to 
risk may allow us to come up with superior policies regarding work-
place safety. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter we have attempted to highlight some principles of 
behavioral economics and show how they can inﬂuence the economic 
analysis of occupational safety. Behavioral economics predicts that in 
some cases individuals will fail to perceive, value, or respond to risk as 
predicted in the standard economic model. We have shown that if the 
behavioral model holds it will at the very least greatly complicate the 
analysis of how individuals respond to the risk of workplace injuries, 
and in many cases the standard model might make misleading (if not 
actually false) predictions about behavior.
We fully acknowledge that our analysis raises many more questions 
than it answers. Economists generally make assumptions to simplify 
analysis, and the elements of behavioral economics we discuss add 
complication back to our model. Given this, it is probably not surpris-
ing that, when we consider the additional dimensions that might govern 
individual choices, we ﬁnd that these dimensions often work in differ-
ent directions and restrict our ability to make clear predictions. That 
said, in many cases the general predictions of standard economic model 
hold, particularly with regard to compensating wage differentials. The 
strongest effect of the behavioral model seems to be to change our inter-
pretation of the results we ﬁnd empirically, and often this interpretation 
cannot be made without more a priori information about how individu-
als actually perceive, value, or respond to risk.
Now we come to the place that many researchers arrive at—call-
ing for more research. In this case, it should be clear to the reader that 
we indeed know very little. Work is needed to disentangle the various 
behavioral predictions about the ways people cope with the risk of in-
juries and illnesses at work. Speciﬁcally, we need information not only 
on how individuals perceive the risk of injury in various occupations 
Roberts.indb   246 6/7/2005   9:29:42 AM
Behavioral Economics and Research on Workplace Injuries   247
but how these perceptions change over time and in response to worker 
and employer safety precautions. We need information about how in-
dividuals value the risk of injury relative to the way they value wages 
and higher compensation, and we also need to see how this valuation 
changes over time. We need to learn how individuals respond to per-
ceived risk, and how increased information changes those responses (if 
at all). This information is not readily available given current sources 
of data, but we feel that future experimental and observational studies 
that address these and related issues will greatly increase our ability to 
conduct research and inform meaningful policy pertaining to occupa-
tional safety.
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 1.  It is worth noting that this argument is not necessary to justify the use of par-
tial insurance coverage. Basic insurance theory tells us that the optimal level of 
insurance will equalize the marginal utility of income in the “good” and “bad” 
states. Viscusi and Moore (1987) and Viscusi and Evans (1990) argue that the 
marginal utility of income is lower for individuals with disabling injuries, pos-
sibly because working becomes more difﬁcult when one is disabled, and so the 
optimal insurance contract provides less than full coverage of economic losses.
 2.  The distinction between predictable and unpredictable errors in judgment is im-
portant. If individuals make predictable errors, this suggests that they (might) 
behave in a way different than that predicted by the standard economic model. 
If, on the other hand, errors are random, then the economic model should predict 
behavior accurately on average.
 3.  The difference is equal in absolute value to 0.25[U(3,000) − U(2,000)].
 4.  Note that in many cases these mismatches are related to the subjective assign-
ments of perception and value discussed previously. For example, the saliency 
mismatch is closely related to the availability bias, suggesting that individuals 
consistently place greater weight on situations or outcomes that are easily under-
stood. Likewise, a failure to place the appropriate weight on costs (or beneﬁts) 
that occur only after multiple actions is similar to the availability bias, in which 
individuals appreciate the cumulative risk resulting from multiple exposures.
 5.  In addition to suggesting the existence of compensating wage differentials, 
Adam Smith (1776) also proposed that individuals underestimate risk, noticing 
the relatively small number of individuals who purchased ﬁre insurance. Spence 
(1977) provided a formal model of how the underestimation of risk can lead in-
Roberts.indb   247 6/7/2005   9:29:42 AM
248 Seabury et al.
dividuals to underinsure against the risk of product failure, and Diamond (1977) 
and Rea, Jr. (1981) examined how underestimating risk affects optimal workers’ 
compensation insurance (which we discuss more later). 
 6.  Presumably, the gain and loss is measured relative to some benchmark utility 
level that is received with certainty, i.e., the “reservation” utility level.
 7. Note that we are implicitly assuming here that there is no ﬁxed safety level that 
workers are trying to obtain. If workers are maximizing expected utility with 
respect to safety precautions then they will set the marginal beneﬁt equal to the 
marginal cost, which will lead to more precautions taken if they perceive a higher 
marginal reduction in risk. If, on the other hand, workers are trying to attain some 
ﬁxed level of (perceived) safety then overestimating the productivity of safety 
precautions could lead to reduced precautions, because they can achieve this 
perceived level with fewer precautions.
 8.  As mentioned before, empirical evidence has demonstrated a relationship be-
tween workers’ compensation claims rates and workers’ compensation beneﬁts. 
However, as we cannot rule out the possibility that this relationship is driven 
either by fraud or simply the efﬁcient response by individuals to some unobserv-
able (to econometricians) costs of claim ﬁling instead of some change in actual 
safety behavior, we cannot dismiss the possibility that actual workplace safety is 
unresponsive to beneﬁt levels. 
 9.  The assumption of risk-neutral ﬁrms is generally justiﬁed by the notion that 
shareholders drive the behavior of ﬁrms. If this is true and shareholders are able 
to perfectly diversify assets, they will desire the managers of ﬁrms to maximize 
expected proﬁts. While this assumption of risk neutrality might be valid for large 
ﬁrms, the notion of perfectly diversiﬁed shareholders is probably less meaning-
ful for small ﬁrms.
 10.  On the other hand, it is not clear why a large union would not have access to 
similar information, so it seems less likely that there would be a divergence be-
tween the risk perceptions of employers and organized labor.
 11.  In the long run, insurance premiums should be completely “passed on” to work-
ers in a perfectly competitive market. If wages are sticky, however, there will be 
short run costs to premiums that will inﬂuence ﬁrm behavior.
 12.  Note that if workers underestimated risk in a similar fashion as employers, they 
would demand less of a compensating differential in the same occupations that 
ﬁrms would be willing to offer higher wages. Thus, the net effect on the compen-
sating differential estimate would be ambiguous.
 13.  These other model primitives include such factors as the complimentarity of 
worker and employer safety precautions and differences in utility and marginal 
utility of income in the injured and health states.
 14.  It is important to distinguish efforts to increase safety from efforts to make the 
level of safety more efﬁcient. Some of the predictions of the standard model ac-
tually predict that there might be too much safety relative to the standard model. 
In this case, it could be efﬁcient to make people less careful.
 15.  Of course, we recognize that it is difﬁcult to communicate risk information so 
that it is perceived accurately. 
Roberts.indb   248 6/7/2005   9:29:42 AM
Behavioral Economics and Research on Workplace Injuries   249
References
Azaroff, Lenore S., Charles Levenstein, and David H. Wegman. 2002. “Occu-
pational Injury and Illness Surveillance: Conceptual Filters Explain Under-
reporting.” American Journal of Public Health 92(9): 1421–1429.
Bateman, I., A. Munro, B. Rhodes, C. Starmer, and R. Sugden. 1997. “A The-
ory of Reference-Dependent Preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 
112(2): 479–505.
Black, D.A., and T.J. Kniesner. 2003. “On the Measurement of Job Risk in 
Hedonic Wage Models.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 27(3): 205–220.
Brown, C. 1980. “Equalizing Differences in the Labor Market.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 94(1): 113–134.
Butler, R.J. 1994. “Economic Determinants of Workers’ Compensation 
Trends.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 61(3): 383–401.
Chelius, James R., and K. Kavanaugh. 1988. “Workers’ Compensation and 
the Level of Occupational Injuries.” Journal of Risk and Insurance 55(2): 
315–323.
Cree, T., and E.K. Kelloway. 1997. “Response to Occupational Hazards: Exit 
and Participation.” Journal of Occupational Health Psychology 2(4): 304–
311.
Diamond, Peter. 1977. “Insurance Theoretic Aspects of Workers’ Compensa-
tion.” In Natural Resources, Uncertainty, and General Equilibrium Systems, 
Alan S. Blinder and Philip Friedman, eds. New York: Academic Press, pp. 
67–89.
Doyle, J. 1997. “Judging Cumulative Risks.” Journal of Applied Social Psy-
chology 27(6): 500–524.
Garen, J. 1988. “Compensating Wage Differentials and the Endogeneity of Job 
Riskiness.” Review of Economics and Statistics 70(1): 9–16.
Kahneman, D., J.L. Knetsch, and R.H. Thaler. 1990. “Experimental Tests of 
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem.” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 98(6): 1325–1348.
Kahneman, D., and A. Tversky. 1979. “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Deci-
sions under Risk.” Econometrica 47(2): 263–291.
Knetsch, J.L. 1989. “The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible 
Indifference Curves.” American Economic Review 79(5): 1277–1284.
Krueger, A.B. (1990). “Incentive Effects of Workers’ Compensation Insur-
ance.” Journal of Public Economics. 41(1): 73–99.
Linville, P., G. Fischer, and B. Fischhoff. 1993. “AIDS Risk Perceptions and 
Decision Biases.” In The Social Psychology of HIV Infection, J. Pryor and 
G. Reeder, eds. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 421–432. 
Roberts.indb   249 6/7/2005   9:29:43 AM
250 Seabury et al.
List, J.A. 2003. “Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomolies?” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1): 41–71.
McFadden, D. 1999. “Rationality for Economists?” Journal of Risk and Un-
certainty 19(1–3): 73–105.
Mearns, K., and R. Flin. 1996. “Risk Perception in Hazardous Industries.” Psy-
chologist 9(9): 401–404. 
Moore, M.J., and W.K. Viscusi. 1990. Compensation Mechanisms for Job 
Risks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Ostberg, O. 1980. “Risk Perception and Work Behavior in Forestry—Implica-
tions for Accident Prevention Policy.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 12: 
189–200. Cited in Weyman, A and D. Clarke. 2003. “Investigating the Inﬂu-
ence of Organizational Role on Perceptions of Risk in Deep Coal Mines.” 
Journal of Applied Psychology 88(3): 404–412.
Prelec, D. 1991. “Values and Principles: Some Limitations on Traditional 
Economic Analysis.” In Perspectives on Socioeconomics, A. Etzioni and P. 
Lawrence, eds. London: M.E. Sharpe. 
Rabin, M. 2003. “The Nobel Memorial Prize for Daniel Kahneman.” The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105(2): 157–180.
Rea Jr., Samuel. A. 1981. “Workmen’s Compensation and Occupational Safety 
under Imperfect Information.” American Economic Review 71(1): 80–93.
Roberts, K. 2005. “The Structure of and Incentives from Workers’ Compensa-
tion Pricing.” In Workplace Injuries and Diseases: Prevention and Compen-
sation, Essays in Honor of Terry Thomason, Karen Roberts, John F. Burton, 
and Matthew M. Bodah, eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, pp. 171–197. 
Rosen, S. 1974. “Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation 
in Pure Competition.” Journal of Political Economy 82(1): 34–55.
Rundmo, T. 1992. “Risk Perception and Safety on Offshore Petroleum Plat-
forms—Part I: Perception of Risk.” Safety Science 15: 39–52.
Ruser, J.W. 1993. “Workers’ Compensation and the Distribution of Occupa-
tional Injuries.” Journal of Human Resources 28(3): 593–617. 
Rushworth, A., C. Best, G. Coleman, and S. Mason. 1986. Study of Ergonomic 
Principles Involved in Accident Prevention for Bunkers. Bretby, UK: Brit-
ish Coal Report. Cited in Weyman, A., D. Clarke and T. Cox. 2003. “Devel-
oping a Factor Model of Coal Miners’ Attributions on Risk-taking at Work.” 
Work and Stress 17(4): 306–320. 
Singleton, W., C. Hicks, and A. Hirsch. 1981. Safety in Agriculture and Related 
Industries. Department of Applied Psychology Report No. AP 106, Uni-
versity of Aston. Cited in Fleming, M., R. Flin, K. Mearns, and R. Gordon. 
1998. “Risk Perceptions of Offshore Workers on U.K. Oil and Gas Plat-
forms.” Risk Analysis 18(1): 103–110.
Roberts.indb   250 6/7/2005   9:29:43 AM
Behavioral Economics and Research on Workplace Injuries   251
Slovic, P., B. Fischoff, and S. Lichtenstein. 1978. Accident Probabilities and 
Seat Belt Usage: A Psychological Perspective.” Accident Analysis and Pre-
vention 10: 281–285. Cited in Doyle, J. 1997. “Judging Cumulative Risks.” 
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 27(6): 500–524.
Smith, Adam. 1937. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations. New York: Modern Library. 
Smith, Robert S. 1992. “Have OSHA and Workers’ Compensation Made the 
Workplace Safer?” In Research Frontiers In Industrial Relations And Hu-
man Resources, David Lewin, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Peter D. Sherer, eds. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 557–587.
Spence, M. 1977. “Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer 
Liability.” Review of Economic Studies 44(3): 561–572.
Thaler, R., and S. Rosen. 1976. “The Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from 
the Labor Market.” In Household Production and Consumption, Nestor 
Terleckyj, ed. New York: NBER and Columbia University Press, pp. 265–
298.
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman. 1974. “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuris-
tics and Biases.” Science 185: 1124–1131.
———. 1991. “Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent 
Model.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4): 1039–1061.
van der Velde, F., J. van der Pligt, and C. Hooykaas. 1994. “Perceiving AIDS-
Related Risk: Accuracy as a Function of Difference in Actual Risk.” Health 
Psychology 13(1): 25–33. 
Viscusi, W.K. 1979. Employment Hazards. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
———. 1990. “Sources of Inconsistency in Societal Responses to Health 
Risks.” American Economic Review 80(2): 257–261.
———. 1993. “The Value of Risks to Life and Health.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 31(4): 1912–1946.
Viscusi, W.K., and William N. Evans. 1990. “Utility Functions That Depend 
on Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implications.” American Eco-
nomic Review 80(3): 353–374.
Viscusi, W.K., and M.J. Moore. 1987. “Workers’ Compensation: Wage Effects, 
Beneﬁt Inadequacies, and the Value of Health Losses.” Review of Econom-
ics and Statistics 69(2): 249–261.
Weyman, A., D. Clarke, and T. Cox. 2003. “Developing a Factor Model of 
Coal Miners’ Attributions on Risk-Taking at Work.” Work and Stress 17(4): 
306–320. 
Zimolong, B. 1985. “Hazard Perceptions and Risk Estimation in Accident 
Causation.” In Trends in Ergonomics/Human Factors II, R.E. Eberts and 
C.G. Eberts, eds. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 463–470.
Roberts.indb   251 6/7/2005   9:29:43 AM
252 Seabury et al.
———. 1991. “Risikoeinschätzung und Gefährdung Beim Rangieren.” 
Zeitschrift fr Verkehrssicherheit 25: 109–114. Cited in Fleming, M., R. Flin, 
K. Mearns, and R. Gordon. 1998. “Risk Perceptions of Offshore Workers on 
U.K. Oil and Gas Platforms.” Risk Analysis 18(1): 103–110.
Roberts.indb   252 6/7/2005   9:29:43 AM
253
10
Revisiting Black Lung
Can the Feds Deliver Workers’ 
Compensation for Occupational Disease?
Peter S. Barth
University of Connecticut
With only a few exceptions, American workers are protected from 
work-caused injuries and diseases under state—not federal—workers’ 
compensation laws. As a result, it is an oddity to ﬁnd a speciﬁed cat-
egory of private sector workers covered under a federal workers’ com-
pensation program, and solely for one grouping of diseases. Since there 
are strongly held positions on the desirability of having the federal gov-
ernment play a dominant role in compensation for other occupational 
diseases, the track record of such a program can serve as an indicator 
of how successful such a new approach might be. The central focus of 
this chapter is the Black Lung Program, created to compensate workers 
for occupational disease due to coal dust exposure. In this chapter I ﬁrst 
describe the history and the development of the law, and then give some 
emphasis to the beneﬁts that the program has delivered. I also consider 
the challenges of federalizing a program that had been administered 
previously, solely by the states. I conclude by attempting to lay out 
some lessons that the program has provided us. 
The origins of my interest in this subject can be traced to the early 
1970s. Although the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act that created the 
Black Lung Program was enacted in 1969, it was actually the passage 
of the Occupation Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970 that led me to 
this subject area. Section 27 of the 1970 law created the National Com-
mission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws to evaluate and make 
recommendations on a host of issues related to those laws. While the 
commission’s ﬁnal report assessed a variety of issues, including those 
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that the OSHA statute expressly mandated, one issue that was barely 
considered was that of compensation for occupational disease. As a re-
sult, I considered that a necessary trail to follow.
The second factor that led in this direction also followed from the 
work of the commission. One of the central themes in the life of the 
commission was the future role, if any, of the federal government in 
workers’ compensation programs. A steady drumbeat of those opposed 
to federal involvement was that the three programs for which the fed-
eral government had responsibility were, at best, no better than the state 
programs. Like so much in this ﬁeld, it was difﬁcult to separate fact 
from self-interest, conventional wisdom, and rumor. 
I conducted several studies relating to occupational disease that led 
me to conclude that the states were doing an ineffective job of compen-
sating afﬂicted workers, or their survivors, for most diseases.1 While the 
temptation was strong to suggest that this be left to the federal govern-
ment to remedy, it seemed irresponsible to do so without ﬁrst examining 
an existing federal program to compensate victims of occupational dis-
ease. The result of that was my examination of the federal Black Lung 
Program, which left me wary of recommending that the state programs 
for occupational disease be scrapped.2 If neither the state programs nor 
the federal Black Lung Program were delivering beneﬁts well to work-
ers with occupational diseases, what other alternatives existed? Several 
things about the tort experience as found in the asbestos debacle or in 
the Federal Employers Liability Act as it applied to railroad employees 
offered little hope that this was the appropriate route to take in place of 
workers’ compensation. In the absence of any more general approaches 
to occupational disease compensation, it may be that the various state 
and federal programs should be reexamined to determine whether the 
more recent experience appears to be more promising.
The Black Lung experience is not the only source of learning on 
federal involvement in occupational disease compensation. A new fed-
eral program for occupational disease compensation recently has been 
created, the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 
Program Act of 2000. As its name indicates, this legislation targets a 
highly speciﬁc group of workers. However, it is probably too soon to 
evaluate at this point, particularly since the portion assigned to the De-
partment of Energy (subsection D) has experienced some serious delays 
in its implementation. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAW 
On November 20, 1968, an explosion occurred in a large mine 
in Farmington, West Virginia. After an extraordinary amount of me-
dia coverage of the attempt to rescue miners trapped therein, the mine 
was sealed 10 days after the blast, entombing 78 men. This tragedy led 
Congress to pass the Coal Mine Health and Safety legislation, which 
President Nixon signed 13 months later. The law aimed to improve the 
safety conditions in America’s coal mines, and the bulk of the law is 
directed that way. However, at the urging of some powerful members 
of Congress from the coal-producing states, particularly West Virginia 
and Kentucky, a Title IV was inserted to provide “black lung beneﬁts” 
to miners with the disease.
As the statute was initially enacted, it can be separated into three 
distinct portions. First, claims for old cases that met certain criteria 
were to be paid. In some instances, these cases emanated from miners 
or survivors of miners who had stopped working in coal mining many 
years before. These claims were to be paid out of U.S. Treasury funds. 
Secondly, compensation was to be paid for persons who became dis-
abled or died more recently, and where claims were to be ﬁled in the pe-
riod after the old cases had had time to make their claims. These claims 
were to be paid initially by the U.S. government, with their liability to 
be shifted to coal mine operators. Finally, eligibility for beneﬁts under 
the federal law would expire in several years, subject to certiﬁcation 
by the U.S. Department of Labor that the state programs met speciﬁed 
standards, allowing the states to again assume sole responsibility to ad-
minister their workers’ compensation programs. Table 10.1 provides a 
summary of the most signiﬁcant developments under the law.
The case for a federal black lung beneﬁts program partially rested 
on the argument that the states were not providing compensation ben-
eﬁts to coal miners who suffered from this condition. At the time, there 
was little evidence to demonstrate how frequently states were grant-
ing compensation beneﬁts to miners disabled by respiratory illnesses 
caused by their employment. Supporters of a federal black lung beneﬁts 
program did not differentiate between the states as to those that were 
doing a more conscientious job of providing compensation in a manner 
consistent with their laws. The case for a federal program clearly left 
unresolved a number of questions, including whether the states were 
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Table 10.1  Historic Developments, Black Lung Program
Year Measure Signiﬁcance
1969 CMHSA enacted.
Part B established in SSA.
Part C established in USDOL.
Creates Black Lung Program.
1972 Law amended. Extends Part B program by 18 months.
Part C program life extended from 
1976 to 1981.
Federally funded beneﬁts under Part C 
to end in 1973.
1977 Law amended and Black Lung 
Revenue Act enacted.
Interim standards imposed on Part C 
program.
Termination of Part C program is 
dropped.
Creates Superfund-like arrangement.
1980 Ronald Reagan elected. New administration.
1981 Black Lung Beneﬁts Act and 
Black Lung Beneﬁts Revenue Act 
of 1981 enacted.
Beneﬁt standards tightened. Coal 
excise tax increased. Insurers escape 
potentially high liabilities.
1985 COBRA enacted. Excise tax increased as a temporary 
measure.
1987 PL100-203. Period of temporary excise tax 
increase extended to 2013.
1988 Pittston Coal Group et al. v. 
Sebben et al. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
Trust fund and employers dodge 
potentially large liability.
1997 USDOL propounds new 
regulations.
Proposes tighter administration and 
relaxation of some standards.
2000 New regulations promulgated.
NOTE: CMHSA = Coal Mine Health and Safety Act; SSA = Social Security 
Administration; USDOL = U.S. Department of Labor; COBRA = Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act.
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enabling workers with other forms of occupational diseases to receive 
compensation beneﬁts. And the case in favor of enactment of Title IV 
was advanced vigorously on the grounds that it would be a very inex-
pensive draw on the federal budget. Advocates for enactment argued 
that it would likely be a relatively inexpensive program for the coal 
mine companies, who found themselves in an industry that was in secu-
lar and very serious decline, particularly in the underground sector.
Title IV largely consisted of two parts. For claims ﬁled on or before 
December 31, 1971, the program, Part B, was to be administered by the 
Social Security Administration (SSA). The goal was straightforward 
enough: beneﬁts, funded by the U.S. Treasury, were to be provided for 
persons who were totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis, or to depen-
dent survivors of miners who had died from that disease. The hope was 
that in the ﬁrst two years of the program, all the old cases would be 
compensated, leaving the newly developing cases for Part C of the pro-
gram. The latter was to be the U.S. Department of Labor’s (USDOL’s) 
responsibility beginning in 1973. That agency was to certify that the 
states were meeting certain minimum standards, and that the new cases 
of sickened miners then would be administered by the states. As such, 
the Part B portion of the program would fade out of existence, as beneﬁt 
determinations would cease after the initial two years, and as a result of 
the attrition of beneﬁciaries through aging and passing on. The expec-
tation was that through attrition, Part C would become superﬂuous as 
states would administer their workers’ compensation law and accept the 
coverage of mine workers with pneumoconiosis. 
This phasing out of a federal role was linked to a timetable that 
proved to be wholly unrealistic. The hope was that the “old” claims 
would be dealt with under Part B, and that all of those claims would 
have been ﬁled by Dec. 31, 1971. The transition year, 1972, was to have 
claims paid by SSA only until the end of the year and then handed over 
to USDOL. After December 31, 1972, the beneﬁts were to be paid by 
coal mine operators under the USDOL’s Part C program, or through the 
federally certiﬁed state workers’ compensation programs. In essence, 
the plan was for those who ﬁled a claim in the transition year to be paid 
after Dec. 31, 1972, in the same manner as were those who ﬁled a claim 
after that date.
For those “new” claims ﬁled in 1972 and later, where beneﬁts were 
not paid under a federally certiﬁed state law or by a coal mine operator, 
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federal general revenues were to be used to pay beneﬁts. The expec-
tation by some was that the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act would 
lead to a sharp reduction in the incidence of black lung disease. That 
expectation relied upon the various health and safety provisions that 
were the raison d’être of the 1969 law. The hope was that this would 
enable federal involvement in these cases to cease by the end of 1976, 
aside from simply continuing to pay beneﬁts under the Part B program. 
Indeed, beneﬁt payments made under the Part C program, whether from 
a mine operator or paid by USDOL, would no longer be required after 
that time. Thus, the plan was that the liability of mine operators was to 
be a temporary one, aside from any state law beneﬁts. 
Some critics charged that Part B was not a workers’ compensation 
program because it had characteristics that were different from all the 
state programs. For example, beneﬁts for living miners was paid solely 
for total disability (comparable to Social Security Disability Insurance), 
once beneﬁts began, they were expected to be paid for a lifetime, and 
beneﬁt amounts were not linked to the worker’s earnings. By contrast, 
all workers’ compensation programs in the states (and all other jurisdic-
tions that I know), pay beneﬁts also for partial disability, compensation 
for temporary disability appears to be the cornerstone of all other pro-
grams, and beneﬁts are almost always linked to the worker’s preinjury 
earnings level.
Another feature that seemed to differentiate the federal program 
was that beneﬁts were awarded based on the date that the claim was 
ﬁled, not on the date when total disability or death occurred. Since the 
payments were considered to be workers’ compensation beneﬁts, any 
Social Security disability beneﬁts were offset against the Part B pay-
ments, as were unemployment insurance, state workers’ compensation, 
and temporary disability insurance beneﬁts. Beneﬁt levels were tied to 
the federal employee pay scale so that beneﬁt payments (new and con-
tinuing) were adjusted (upward) annually in line with the federal pay 
schedule.
Upon enactment of the law, claims for beneﬁts from workers or 
survivors poured into local SSA ofﬁces. A variety of coal worker orga-
nizations worked at spurring the submission of claims, and since ben-
eﬁts were to begin for successful claimants from the date of ﬁling, any 
delays meant foregone income. In the ﬁrst year of the program, about 
one-quarter of a million claims were ﬁled. Although 350,000 claims 
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were ﬁled by the end of December 1971, new claims continued to ﬂow 
in at the rate of about 1,500 per week. Clearly, coal mine operators 
could foresee a massive liability awaiting them. Moreover, despite the 
unexpectedly large volume of claims by Dec. 31, 1971, it was also ap-
parent that not all of the “old” cases had been ﬁled; indeed, some were 
for death or disability that had occurred many years previously. SSA 
moved with extraordinary speed on the claims submitted, but much 
to the disappointment of the program’s supporters, about half of the 
claims were denied compensation. These three factors, the potentially 
ruinous outlook for some mine operators, the continuing inﬂow of old 
cases—many of which were based on employment in the mines that 
ended before 1970—and SSA’s denial rate led those who supported the 
1969 enactment to push to amend the law in 1972. 
The 1972 amendments extended the Part B program for an addi-
tional 18 months. This would enable more of those with “old cases” to 
ﬁle claims under the Part B program. The Part C program, which was 
to have ceased at the end of 1976, was to be maintained until Decem-
ber 31, 1981. This gave the states more time to amend their laws and 
change their practices so as to achieve certiﬁcation by USDOL. It would 
also extend the period for which claims for newly developed illnesses 
or fatalities would be eligible for beneﬁts that would be paid out of 
federal funds. After December 31, 1981, it was envisioned that the pay-
ments under Part C were to end. A new transition period was mandated, 
from July 1, 1973, to December 31, 1974. Under the 1972 amendments, 
claims ﬁled prior to July 1, 1973, that were approved would receive 
lifetime beneﬁts; those ﬁled from July 1, 1973, to December 31, 1973, 
were to receive federally funded beneﬁts till December 31, 1973, and 
then become the responsibility of the mine operators. Any claims ﬁled 
after December 31, 1973, were to be the responsibility of the employ-
ers. 
The hearings that led to the 1972 amendments along with the modi-
ﬁcations caused SSA to grasp the message that Congress was convey-
ing and substantially liberalize the standards for compensability. How-
ever, when USDOL was handed the administrative baton on July 1, 
1973, a variety of disasters befell the agency. First, the agency was 
overwhelmed by large numbers of old claims from the transition period 
and from post-July 1. Second, the states did not respond as had been 
forecast with the result that successful state certiﬁcation never material-
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ized. The states did not enact legislation to enable them to be certiﬁed 
by USDOL, absolving the federal government from turning over the 
administration and funding to the states. Additionally, unlike the Part 
B program which used federal funds, USDOL was now responsible for 
identifying responsible payers, a litigious and lengthy process. Indeed, 
in most cases no responsible operator could be identiﬁed and made li-
able, so USDOL was the payer of last resort. 
USDOL was not the only party that found the law difﬁcult, and it 
received considerable heat for the way it carried out its responsibilities. 
The law’s most ardent supporters were frustrated with the Labor De-
partment as well, eventually resulting in amending the law again, this 
time in 1977. For a number of reasons, delays of several years in adjudi-
cating claims meant that applicants were not learning of the resolution 
of their claims. Worse, for the law’s advocates, fewer than 8 percent of 
claims were approved for beneﬁts where a decision had been rendered. 
By the time of the 1977 amendments to the law, about 125,000 claims 
had been ﬁled with USDOL, 6,000 received awards, and 70,000 claims 
were denied.3 In sharp contrast, to that date SSA had achieved an ap-
proval rate of 70 percent. The difference was that the standards USDOL 
used for compensability were based on the agency’s best efforts at com-
pliance with a statute that was vague at best. 
The 1977 amendments enabled USDOL to set its own medical stan-
dards for determining compensability. Until those standards were ﬁnal-
ized, however, temporary standards were to be used and here the amend-
ments imposed very strict guidance. The labor department’s interim 
standards were to be no more restrictive than the ones used by SSA un-
der the Part B program after the 1972 amendments (which achieved the 
nearly 80 percent acceptance rate). In addition to lowering the standards 
for ﬁnding the presence of the disease, evidentiary requirements on the 
claimants were reduced, the notion of total disability was broadened, 
and the occupational qualiﬁcations were expanded. Previously denied 
claims were to be reviewed once again for entitlement by USDOL, as 
were previously denied Part B claims, and claimants could provide new 
evidence if they chose to do so.
In addition to greatly expanding the opportunity to obtain beneﬁts, 
the termination date for the Part C program was dropped, essentially 
making the program a permanent one. Further, Congress needed to ﬁx 
the ﬁnancing problem that had resulted from the huge inﬂow of claims 
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under Part C, along with USDOL’s inability to successfully assess li-
ability against private coal companies in so many of the successful 
claims. The result was a separate piece of legislation, the Black Lung 
Revenue Act of 1977, which took a Superfund-like approach to ﬁnanc-
ing beneﬁts.4 A tonnage tax was levied on coal extracting companies 
to support a federal trust fund that would pay beneﬁts in one of three 
instances. First, for a compensable claim where a responsible operator 
could not be identiﬁed, the fund would pay the appropriate beneﬁts. 
Second, the fund would pay if the successful claimant had last worked 
in the mines prior to January 1, 1970. Finally, the fund would pay ben-
eﬁts in cases where a responsible operator did not begin to make pay-
ments in a timely manner, though the fund would then seek reimburse-
ment from the business. 
Despite the issuance and application of the more liberal, interim 
rules, many claims were denied. While USDOL promulgated its interim 
rules in a manner that it believed was no more strict than those it was 
obliged not to exceed, this led to court challenges by claimants denied 
beneﬁts under the interim rules. A critical issue was one of the presump-
tions in USDOL rules that could be invoked by a claimant if the worker 
had at least 10 years of employment in coal mining. Four separate U.S. 
Circuit Courts found the requirement that there must be at least 10 years 
of employment before the presumption in the claimant’s favor could 
be invoked to be unacceptably restrictive, and ordered that USDOL re-
open over 94,000 cases. Had these cases been found to be successful, 
the costs could have exceeded $13 billion, imposing a burden both on 
the trust fund and on employers and their insurers. Strikingly, the Su-
preme Court found that the application of this key presumption had 
been more restrictive than the interim standards were to allow, but that 
the 94,000 cases would not have to be reopened.5 Instead, the decision 
required reconsideration only of the small number of denied applica-
tions (6,000–7,000 claims) that had sought a judicial review at the time 
of the denial. 
Three things led to another major turning point in the program in 
1980–1981. First, USDOL issued the new regulations for the program, 
no longer tied to the liberal standards of the interim rules. Second, a new 
administration was elected in 1980. It was evident that it would not con-
tinue the more inclusive type of program that had evolved under both 
the SSA standards and the interim ones that USDOL employed after the 
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1977 amendments. Third, by 1981 many claims had been determined 
to be compensable. The new administration sought to tighten standards 
under the law. The law’s most ardent supporters could consider that 
their war had been won and that few older miners with respiratory ill-
nesses (or survivors) had not received compensation. In 1981, the laws 
were amended by enactment of the Black Lung Beneﬁts Revenue Act 
of 1981 and the Black Lung Beneﬁts Amendments of 1981. The result 
was legislation that emerged from compromises between the law’s de-
fenders and those who believed that it had been overly generous in the 
awarding of beneﬁts. Reﬂecting this compromise, while some standards 
for beneﬁt eligibility were toughened, claims that had been ﬁled before 
the effective date were to be evaluated under the criteria that were in 
place previously. 
The new amendments also made accommodations to most of the 
interested parties, including the insurance industry, which was relieved 
of having to pay beneﬁts for some of about 10,000 cases that would 
now become the responsibility of the trust fund. At the time the 1981 
amendments were passed, the trust fund was already indebted to the 
U.S. Treasury by over $1.5 billion. To remedy that, the amendments in-
creased the excise tax on the coal extraction industry. The tax was again 
increased (as a temporary, 10-year measure) in 1985 in the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, which also placed a 
5-year moratorium on the interest charges due to the Treasury. In 1987, 
PL 100-203 extended the temporary tax rates that had been set in 1985 
through 2013. 
In 1997, USDOL announced changes that it sought to make in its 
regulations. One of the goals was to improve the efﬁciency of claims 
adjudication. Another aim was to reduce some of the difﬁculty that 
some applicants faced in having their claims found to be compensable. 
The ﬁnal regulations were announced in December 2000 and then were 
subjected to serious challenge in the court. Widely varying estimates 
were made about the impact of the changes on employer and trust fund 
costs and on the incidence of successful claiming that would be ex-
pected to occur. 
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BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARIES
Compensation for beneﬁts under the federal program varies only 
with the presence of and number, if any, of dependents. As of 2003, the 
compensation of a primary beneﬁciary was $534 per month, or $801 per 
month for a primary beneﬁciary and one dependent. (The amounts are 
the same in the Part B and Part C programs.) The maximum monthly 
beneﬁt was $1,069 for a primary beneﬁciary and three dependents. Fed-
eral black lung beneﬁts are considerably lower than those payable in 
state workers’ compensation programs, though the state claims appear 
to be more difﬁcult to win. A sample of state workers’ compensation 
beneﬁts is shown here for illustrative purposes, drawing on those states 
that have had the largest number of federal claimants. The following 
were the maximum weekly beneﬁts under state workers’ compensation 
laws for total disability in 2003:
Alabama $569
Illinois $1,004
Kentucky $571
Pennsylvania $675
Virginia $681
West Virginia   $527
The state beneﬁts rates assume total disability, and unlike the fed-
eral beneﬁts, are not payable for a lifetime, typically. Moreover, the 
monthly federal beneﬁt rates are adjusted annually to reﬂect changes in 
average price levels. Medical beneﬁts for treatment of the compensable 
condition are paid fully, theoretically, in each system. 
USDOL is not able to provide a single estimate of the number of 
successful miner claimants over the life of the program. It can report, 
however, the number of beneﬁciaries with “active claims” in a year. 
Active claims (under Part C) include any of the following: those being 
paid from the trust fund or by responsible mine operators, cases in in-
terim pay status, those where offsets are taken and those that have been 
suspended temporarily. In terms of the number of beneﬁciaries, both 
primary and total (where total includes both primary and dependent 
beneﬁciaries), the program is rapidly receding. Table 10.2 shows that 
the Part C program has contracted from its high point in 1983, when 
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over 64,000 miners were receiving beneﬁts.6 Not surprisingly, the Part 
B program has had a very substantial decline in the number of its ben-
eﬁciaries, particularly miners, as can be seen in Table 10.3. The data 
demonstrate how much the Part B beneﬁts provided ﬁnancial support to 
an older miner population, many of whom had stopped working before 
the law was enacted. SSA estimates that 97 percent of the miners and 
widows were age 65 and over in 2001.
One of the more contentious issues over the life of the program has 
been its utilization. When the law was ﬁrst proposed, and in its early 
years, the numbers of potential (successful) applicants for beneﬁts were 
greatly underestimated. In 1970, the ﬁrst full year of the program, coal 
mining employed only 132,000 workers. While that number had been 
declining for several decades, 15 years earlier, only 169,000 persons 
were employed in coal mining. (Clearly, a number of those employed in 
1955 were also employed in 1970.) About 350,000 claims (some from 
survivors) were ﬁled within the ﬁrst two years of the Part B program. It 
appears that more (former) miners were drawing Part B beneﬁts in 1974 
Table 10.2  Black Lung Beneﬁciaries, Part C Program, Selective Years
1980 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
Miners 52,922 64,181 54,920 40,866 27,340 14,733
Widows 26,739 35,178 41,607 44,103 41,585 32,615
Totala 139,073 166,043 150,123 123,213 94,488 61,162
a Total includes all primary and dependent beneﬁciaries and excludes medical-beneﬁt-
only claims.
SOURCE: Unpublished and published annual reports, USDOL. 
Table 10.3  Black Lung Beneﬁciaries, Part B Program, Selective Years
1974 1979 1985 1990 1995 2001
Miners 169,097 129,558 77,836 45,643 24,573 9,779
Widows 134,700 146,527 138,328 118,705 91,517 55,412
Totala 487,216 419,948 294,846 210,678 143,011 79,518
a Total includes all primary and dependent beneﬁciaries.
SOURCE: SSA (2002). 
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than were employed in the mines at the time or within any recent years. 
It is evident that a very large proportion of persons who ever worked in 
coal mining applied for and in many cases received beneﬁts from either 
the Part B or the Part C programs. While this attests to the liberality of 
the compensability standards of the law, at least during its ﬁrst decade, 
it also suggests that respiratory illness in coal miners was widespread.
Table 10.4 shows the results of Part C claims decided in ﬁscal year 
2001, the most recent year for which these data are available from the 
Labor Department. While almost 4,300 Part C claims were decided that 
year, only 363 (8.3 percent) were approved that year. Clearly, the level 
of activity in terms of new claims has slowed down substantially from 
earlier years. It seems likely that the most recent changes in regulations 
will lead to a higher rate of claim acceptances, and this in turn may 
generate some increase in claiming.
TRUST FUND EXPENSES
Though the volume of new claims decisions and acceptances is 
small relative to previous years, the program’s continuing expenses are 
not trivial. As shown in Table 10.5, expenditures by the trust fund for 
the Part C program in ﬁscal year 2001 were approximately $1 billion, 
Table 10.4  Part C Claims, Adjudication, Initial Level, FY 2001a
Findings Number decided Approval rate (%)
Trust fund approved 80 9.6
Trust fund denied 757
Responsible operator
approved
283 8.0
Responsible operator
denied
3,269
Total approved 363 8.3
Total denied 4,026
Total ﬁndings 4,389
a Includes reconsidered claims.
SOURCE: USDOL (2001).
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including the interest charges to the fund for current and previous bor-
rowing from the Treasury Department. Strikingly, though the number 
of recipients has been declining over the previous 10 years, obligations 
have increased, albeit slowly. The reason for this is that despite the de-
cline (in nominal dollars) in expenditures for indemnity and medical 
beneﬁts, the increase in interest charges has more than offset this. Since 
tax revenue from coal mining was about one-half of that amount, the 
fund needed to borrow another $500 million in FY 2001. The result is 
that the fund is indebted to the Treasury by about $7.3 billion. Note that 
this does not include payments made during the year by mine operators 
under the Part C program for new and continuing beneﬁciaries. Expen-
ditures for the Part B program in 2001 continued to decline, falling to 
$470 million for the year (SSA 2002). Note also the relatively small 
proportion of total beneﬁts that went for medical beneﬁts. It reﬂects 
several things, including the limited ability to treat such respiratory 
conditions, and the absence of certain costly medical procedures that 
other illnesses and injuries would require. 
Table 10.5  Black Lung Beneﬁts Program Obligations, FY 2001, 
 Part C ($, 000)
Total obligations 1,016,994
Total beneﬁts 396,928
Income beneﬁts 336,813
Medical beneﬁts 60,116
Administrative costs 52,252
Interest charges 567,814
Coal tax revenues 522,200
Repayable advances from the Treasury Department 505,000
Cumulative trust fund debt 7,253,557
SOURCE: USDOL (2001). 
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SOME LESSONS IN RETROSPECT FROM THE BLACK LUNG 
EXPERIENCE
What lessons can be drawn from the experience of a program that is 
almost 35 years old? The issue may be more than one of academic in-
terest. The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Pro-
gram Act (EEOICPA) is a new federal, occupational disease program. It 
may not be the last time that the federal government seeks to replace or 
augment portions of the states’ workers’ compensation laws.
Breadth versus Depth in Beneﬁts
The Black Lung Program is a prototype of those transfer payment 
programs where government opts for extremely broad coverage (in this 
instance with respect to the nature of the health condition), but very 
modest amounts for beneﬁciaries. Though state workers’ compensa-
tion programs can scarcely be characterized as generous in their ben-
eﬁts, they appear to be absolutely muniﬁcent compared to the federal 
standard.7 Any new transfer payment program may face some trade-off 
between coverage and beneﬁt adequacy that is the result of implicit 
budget constraints. At the birth of this program, its supporters under-
stated the potential number of beneﬁts applicants. Once the legislation 
was enacted, a widespread effort to generate applications began, and 
the numbers of applicants—and eventually beneﬁciaries—swelled. Yet 
despite the changes enacted during the program, little effort was made 
by program advocates to increase the basic level of beneﬁt.
Problems with Multiple Agency Delivery
The Black Lung Program can be analyzed as two distinct ones. 
Though the Part B (SSA) and Part C (USDOL) components of the law 
were quite clearly delineated, they both were responsible for providing 
beneﬁts for black lung disease to coal mine workers or their survivors. 
As a result, for several years the standards for compensability were 
markedly different in the two agencies. This created enormous prob-
lems for those responsible for the less liberally administered program, 
in seeking to mollify those who were denied beneﬁts. Thereafter, the 
more liberal standards applied by one agency were essentially imposed 
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on the other, only to change again. The observation that multiple agen-
cy administration was problematic is hardly one that required over 30 
years of program experience. However, it may have been lost on those 
who created the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation 
Program Act of 2000. A few years into the life of that program, a vari-
ety of groups called for the Department of Energy to relinquish its role 
under Part D and transfer the administration of that portion of the law to 
the Department of Labor. Recall also that in 1997 the administration of 
the Part B program was transferred from SSA to USDOL.
State Workers’ Compensation Programs Still Have Difﬁculty with 
Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis
The original plan for this law was to turn it over to the states after 
the federal government certiﬁed the adequacy of the state laws. That 
proved to be one of the many missteps taken by the law. For all pur-
poses, the states did not rush in to do so as had been forecast. The result 
is that USDOL is still responsible for determining both compensability 
and liability under the law. There does not appear to be any statutory 
bar on a worker’s successfully winning compensation in the state sys-
tems. And since beneﬁt levels tend to be higher in the state programs, 
one would expect that most applicants would seek beneﬁts there. Data 
are lacking on the numbers of workers who have successfully gained 
beneﬁts in the states, but there are reasons to believe that gaining them 
is difﬁcult. First, the number of workers with federally derived beneﬁts 
who are also obtaining state beneﬁts appears to be minuscule. USDOL 
has reported that only 4 percent of the total cohort of Black Lung Pro-
gram beneﬁciaries have an offset of their federal awards. Additionally, 
USDOL provides SSA with a listing of Part C beneﬁciaries in order to 
apply the SSDI offset.8 The annual amount of the offset savings to SSA 
was less than $400,000. Data from the states reinforces the view that 
the states are not paying many new black lung claims. In at least one 
state, Kentucky, the law was tightened in 1996, and although it appears 
to have been liberalized in 2002, for all purposes, virtually no new ben-
eﬁciaries are being compensated. Until 1996, Kentucky may have been 
the most liberal of the states with regard to compensating this disease.
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Deﬁning the Disease
Historically, many jurisdictions worldwide and in the various states 
have “scheduled” diseases that would be compensable in their systems. 
By deﬁning the conditions that would be compensable, at least under 
certain conditions, these laws reduced the difﬁculty in administer-
ing them. The Coal Mine Health and Safety Act followed that model, 
though it did so inadequately. Prior to its enactment in 1969, there was 
no disease known as black lung. (History now has it that this was a leg-
islatively created disease.) The law’s supporters and their representa-
tives led the miners to expect federal compensation for any respiratory 
ailment. Clearly, that magniﬁed the potential scope of coverage and in-
cluded a wide range of medical conditions. Certainly, the proponents 
of the law aimed to cover as broad a range of conditions as they could. 
Those who sought to limit the range of compensable conditions deﬁned 
the disease as disabling or even “complicated” coal workers’ pneumo-
coniosis. Those who administered the law had to determine its intent 
in the absence of a well-deﬁned, legislative-targeted disease condition. 
The various measures to amend the law and to force SSA and USDOL 
to review claims that had been denied were a product of this differ-
ence in perception about the coverage of the law. The issue continues 
to characterize the program. Two weeks before the close of the Clinton 
administration, USDOL promulgated ﬁnal rules to revise its regulations 
of the law. (The original proposed rules changes were put forward in 
1997.) Among other changes, the regulations expanded the deﬁnition 
of the disease. 
The “Desk Book” of the administrative law judges points out that 
the disease is both medical and legal, with the former being “merely a 
small subset of the afﬂictions compensable under the Act.”9 It contin-
ues, “a medical diagnosis of no pneumoconiosis is not equivalent to a 
legal ﬁnding of no pneumoconiosis.”10 
Presumptions Carry Both Advantages and Disadvantages
The statute and the regulations for Black Lung Program beneﬁts in-
clude a number of presumptions. Presumptions are placed into laws as 
a way to ease or shift the burden of proof in a claim for beneﬁts. There 
are several reasons why the use of presumptions can be helpful to all 
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parties in adjudicating workers’ compensation claims for nontraumatic 
conditions. The major virtue of using them is that it eliminates the need 
to litigate the same (or broadly similar) issues repeatedly. As a result, 
outcomes are more predictable, and they can be derived more expedi-
tiously and with lower transaction costs. For example, expert witnesses 
need not be used repeatedly in disputes over the same set of questions. 
Large numbers of claims can be moved through the adjudication process 
more rapidly in the presence of presumptions. Additionally, they reduce 
the likelihood that “individual justice” will result in opposite outcomes 
in cases with the same or similar fact conditions. The party to whom 
the burden of proof has been shifted can overcome rebuttable presump-
tions. Irrebuttable presumptions cannot be overcome and, therefore, af-
fect more than the matter of who bears the burden of proof. 
The use of presumptions for occupational disease is more com-
monly found in other jurisdictions than in the U.S. states, where indi-
vidual justice seems to be the norm and where litigation and attorney 
representation are not unusual. The major downside with the use of 
presumptions is that they can be used as a device to manipulate the ease 
or difﬁculty in receiving compensation. Perhaps this is simply to note 
the obvious, i.e., presumptions that are consistent with the overall intent 
of the law, that are in line with medical science, and that bring greater 
equity are to be preferred to those that do not. 
 The Black Lung Law, originally and in amendments and in regula-
tions, made extensive use of presumptions. As an example, the 1969 
statute established that “if a miner who is suffering or suffered from 
pneumoconiosis was employed for 10 years or more in one or more coal 
mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis 
arose out of such employment.”11 Since the worker still had to prove 
that there had been 10 years’ employment in coal mines and that he had 
pneumoconiosis, those burdens of proof remained with the claimant. 
However, if the worker was able to establish those arguments, it became 
the defense’s burden to prove that the illness arose out of any other 
employment or nonemployment exposure. And if the worker could not 
show that 10 years had been worked in coal mining, it did not prevent 
the worker from seeking to establish that his condition arose out of his 
exposure in coal mining. Clearly, that would have made it more difﬁcult 
to win compensation beneﬁts. Perhaps this is simply to note the very 
obvious, that is, presumptions that are consistent with the overall intent 
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of the law, that are in line with medical science, and that bring greater 
equity are to be preferred to those that do not. 
As much as anything else, presumptions were used to raise or lower 
rates of successful ﬁling under the law, and they remain most suscepti-
ble to being used to loosen or tighten eligibility, regardless of the scien-
tiﬁc merits. Congress, in particular, was responsible for this continuing 
effort to tweak the standards, at least for the ﬁrst dozen years of the law. 
However, we can ﬁnd a similar type of manipulation that has occurred 
in the states. Kentucky has witnessed a number of law changes that 
aimed to raise or lower the success rate in the ﬁling of state black lung 
claims. In 1996, eligibility under the law was tightened in response to a 
concern about the cost of such claims. In 2002, the law was liberalized 
because the 1996 amendments were found to be excessively restric-
tive. The 2002 amendments have been reported to still leave virtually 
no claimants eligible for beneﬁts and consideration is being given to 
loosening the standards further. As was the case in the federal arena, the 
standard does not appear to be motivated by science and medicine as it 
is for the number or the rate of successful claim ﬁling.
Inconsistent Offsets of Beneﬁts
This entire chapter could be written around the issue of offsets under 
the law. Sufﬁce it to say that there have been a host of complications, 
indicating that a simple generalization of the treatment of the issue is 
not possible. Over time, the law regarding offsets has been changed 
several times. The Part B program operates with different rules than 
does Part C. Further, offsets have and have not been applied to earnings 
(for the totally disabled miners but not for widows), or depending upon 
the date that a claim was ﬁled, to SSDI, and to state workers’ compen-
sation beneﬁts (for respiratory diseases and/or for occupational injuries 
or illnesses). As an example of a further complication, at least one state 
(Pennsylvania) paid beneﬁts to miners with dust diseases out of gen-
eral revenues, raising the issue of whether or not this was a (offsetable) 
workers’ compensation beneﬁt.12 It is difﬁcult to establish how well the 
offsets are monitored, though they are likely most carefully monitored 
where a mine operator or insurer would be able to reduce payments due 
to the presence of multiple income sources. USDOL provides SSA with 
information on Part C beneﬁciaries on a monthly basis, and SSA reports 
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that it offsets less than $400,000 a month from its SSDI payments. As 
noted earlier, fewer than 4 percent of Part C beneﬁciaries are affected 
by the offset taken by USDOL for the payment of state workers’ com-
pensation beneﬁts. The “offset story” reveals how difﬁcult it can be to 
overlay a federal program onto an existing state program, made more 
complex by an attempt to legislate different criteria for conditions aris-
ing in previous years (Part B-SSA) and for current and future ones (Part 
C-USDOL). 
The Challenge of Finding Responsible Operators
About one in ﬁve approved claims become the responsibility of the 
trust fund. Unlike the earliest years of the program, when some miners 
had not worked for several years, there is less of a catch-up now, and 
less reason for the mine operator to have disappeared from the scene. 
There is little doubt that USDOL is aiming to have successful claimants 
become the responsibility of the employers or their insurers, and not 
that of the already indebted trust fund. Here are simply two kinds of 
problems that emerge when the responsible operator approach is used. 
Consider a claim where a miner submits a successful claim for ben-
eﬁts. Suppose that subsequently, the mine operator who was initially 
liable for beneﬁts is shown to be not responsible and another operator is 
then identiﬁed as “responsible.” The timing is likely to be such that no 
defense of the claim by the subsequently identiﬁed operator is practi-
cally possible. (The courts have held that once a claimant is successful 
in claiming a beneﬁt, USDOL cannot assess liability against a newly 
named mine operator.)13 That would lead to a potential liability of the 
trust fund. To prevent that, USDOL might name several employers as a 
“potentially liable operator.” That can result in multiple defenses being 
prepared to defeat the claim, including the need for multiple, duplicative 
medical examinations. Or consider the requirement that mine operators 
are required to be insured for federal black lung claims. (Approval for 
self-insurance is permitted under the law.) But not all responsible op-
erators are coal mine operators—the law provides considerable latitude 
over coverage, occupationally. Thus, some employers may be found to 
be “responsible operators,” yet uninsured for federal beneﬁts, though 
they are in compliance with respect to coverage under state workers’ 
compensation laws. 
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Can a Federal Workers’ Compensation Program Be Shut Down?
Although some people argue that a federal government program is 
not likely ever to shut down, the Black Lung Program appears headed 
in that direction. Clearly, the Part B portion has experienced a huge 
decline in numbers of beneﬁciaries, and the Part C section is far smaller 
today than it has been. Moreover, there is no evidence that all the states 
have stepped up efforts to ﬁnd and compensate victims of coal workers’ 
pneumoconiosis. Some may argue that 31 years after the enactment of 
the Black Lung provisions, the federal government has decided that it 
is prepared to tackle another situation where it appeared that the states 
were not compensating victims of occupational disease. Again, the law 
creates separate, though less parallel responsibilities for two agencies in 
the EEOICPA of 2000. Again, it has picked a speciﬁc group of workers, 
and identiﬁed certain diseases to receive special treatment and beneﬁts. 
As was the case with black lung, supporters of the EEOICPA of 2000 
argued that state workers’ compensation laws had not been providing 
justiﬁable beneﬁts to a speciﬁc group of workers. And as was the case 
with black lung three decades ago, it has not taken long for bipartisan 
criticisms of the administration of the law to emerge, requiring amend-
ments because of a lack of movement on beneﬁts being delivered to 
workers or survivors.14 
Notes
 1.  In particular, see Barth and Hunt (1980).
 2.  Barth (1987). Sources for some of the history that follows can be found in this 
study.
 3.  The Black Lung Beneﬁts Reform Act of 1977 (PL 95-239) was actually signed 
into law on March 1, 1978.
 4.  PL95-227 was signed into law early in 1978.
 5.  Pittston Coal Group et al. v. Sebben et al. 488 U.S. 105 (1988).
 6.  The highest year for the number of all beneﬁciaries was 1982, but the high point 
for the number of miners receiving Part C beneﬁts was 1983.
 7.  The basic, no dependent beneﬁt was set at 50 percent of the entitlement due to 
a totally disabled federal employee at the GS-2, step 1 level, under the Federal 
Employees’ Compensation Act.
 8.  Offsets are discussed later in the chapter. Such provisions exist in laws to limit 
the degree to which recipients might receive beneﬁts from multiple sources. Off-
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sets can have several aims including limiting payer costs and limiting excessive 
beneﬁt amounts.
 9.  USDOL, Ofﬁce of Administrative Law Judges, “Judges Benchbook of the Black 
Lung Beneﬁts Act, August 2001,” Chap. 16, Sec III a (1). Also, see Richardson 
v. Director, OWCP, 94 F. 3d 164 (1996).
 10.  From Hobbs v. Clinchﬁeld Coal Co., 45 F.3d 819 (4th Cir. 1995).
 11.  Section 411 (c)(1).
 12.  Director v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 54 F. 3d 141 (1995).
 13.  Director, OWCP v. Trace Fork Coal Co., 67 F. 3d 503 (1995).
 14.  See Congressional Record–Senate, June 16, 2004, pp. 6837–6847, and S. 2400 
June 7, 2004, Amendments to Title XXXVI of the Floyd D. Spence National 
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2001 (Bunning Amendments).
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Workers’ Compensation 
in Rhode Island 
Reform through Business/Labor Cooperation
Matthew Carey
Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training
A major legislative overhaul of the Rhode Island workers’ com-
pensation system took place between 1990 and 1992. However, it is 
important to note that prior efforts laid the groundwork for this success-
ful reform. Continually, throughout the 1970s and 1980s both labor and 
management tried, usually separately, to ﬁx a system that was serving 
neither well. Despite attempts at reform, premiums continued to rise 
while claims’ administration worsened. Injured workers were not re-
ceiving timely beneﬁts, and little effort was put into getting people back 
to work. Further, the adjudication processes of the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Commission were terribly inefﬁcient, with cases often taking years 
to be settled.
In 1985, the legislature made a major attempt at reform. The Depart-
ment of Workers’ Compensation was created, and an informal hearing 
process—with the goal of quick dispute settlements—was established. 
An employer or injured worker could request a hearing, which was stat-
utorily required to be held within 14 days. At the end of a 30-minute 
hearing, the parties were supposed to have received a determination 
as to whether beneﬁts were granted, denied, terminated, or continued. 
Either party could appeal the determination to the commission, which 
would hear the case de novo. Under this system, representation by at-
torneys was not required during the hearing at the department. Instead, 
the legislation created positions for “employee assistants” who helped 
injured workers through the process by answering questions, helping 
workers assemble evidence, etc. Insurers were required to accept or 
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deny a claim within 45 days under a “memorandum of payment” or 
“notice of controversy.”
Unfortunately, soon after it was established, the system began to 
bog down. Separate hearings were required for matters such as the de-
termination of wages, and occasionally hearings would have to be con-
tinued because of incomplete medical information. The 14-day require-
ment was, by necessity, ignored, and stretched ﬁrst to 21 days, then 30 
days and beyond.
A further ﬂaw in the system was the role played by the employee as-
sistants. The Rhode Island Bar Association brought a successful action 
against the department claiming the illegal practice of law by the em-
ployee assistants. In response, the department curtailed the assistants’ 
duties, opening the door for greater attorney involvement.
Within a couple of years, the system broke down completely. Virtu-
ally every decision of the department was appealed to the commission 
for a de novo hearing. The losing parties always wanted “another bite 
at the apple,” plus there was a strong ﬁnancial incentive for attorneys 
to appeal: their allowable fee was higher at the commission than at 
the department level. Hence, some attorneys appealed even success-
ful cases—citing one or another technicality—to take advantage of this 
perverse incentive.
It is signiﬁcant that the 1986 reform had the support of business and 
insurance interests but lacked labor’s backing. Further, the legislation 
did little or nothing to coordinate the work of the department of Work-
ers’ Compensation and the Workers’ Compensation Commission. 
By the late 1980s, insurers were requesting double- and even triple-
digit premium rate increases. A 32 percent increase was approved by 
the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation, and a further 123 
percent increase was sought by the National Council on Compensation 
Insurance, but was denied. The latter move resulted in an open protest 
by employers at the state capitol. In 1990, the informal hearing pro-
cess—the centerpiece of the 1986 reforms—was scrapped.
However, in 1989, the business and labor communities had come 
together to discuss the severe problems with the system. That reform ef-
fort, which thus far has proven very successful, led to major legislative 
actions in 1990 and 1992, and some more minor reforms since. Although 
a number of labor, business, and government leaders deserve credit for 
the reforms, George Nee, Secretary-Treasurer of the RI AFL-CIO, and 
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Sheldon Sollosy, the (now-retired) owner of the Rhode Island division 
of Manpower, Inc., were the principal negotiators of the reforms. The 
extraordinary trust and cooperation between labor and business set the 
tone for the further involvement of the legal and medical communities, 
and, in turn, the support of the legislative and executive branches. 
THE 1990 REFORMS
The Workers’ Compensation Court
Prior to 1990, the Workers’ Compensation Commission was the 
principal adjudicator of workers’ compensation disputes. The 1990 leg-
islation elevated the status of the commission to that of a court with 
bona ﬁde judicial appointments. With the elimination of the informal 
hearing process, the court became the initial forum for resolving dis-
putes. Judges are required by statute to hold a pretrial hearing within 
21 days of request. While the parties may still request a trial, the case 
remains with the judge who rendered the pretrial decision. As a result, 
consistency has been brought to decisions, and appeals have been re-
duced. Under the leadership of Chief Judge Robert Arrigan, who re-
cently retired from the bench, the pretrial conference proved to be a 
highly effective means of resolving disputes and avoiding costly litiga-
tion. The court has become a model of efﬁciency and a key ingredient 
in the system’s success.
Changes in Administration
With the 1990 reforms, insurers are allowed to ﬁle “nonprejudicial 
agreements,” which allow claims to be paid for up to 13 weeks with 
no acceptance of liability by the insurer. Hence, the injured worker re-
ceives a beneﬁt immediately while the case is investigated. If the in-
surer determines that it is not liable, the worker receives notice and has 
two years to ﬁle a petition to establish liability. Alternatively, the insurer 
may voluntarily accept liability by ﬁling a memorandum of agreement. 
As well, the 1990 legislation allows for a “deny and dismiss settle-
ment,” which the parties can submit to the court. If accepted, the matter 
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is considered a “compromised payment” and the insurer is freed from 
further liability.
Controls on Fraud
Despite the high levels of trust and cooperation, employee fraud 
proved a contentious issue for labor and business negotiators. Nonethe-
less, the parties agreed that workers who misrepresent injuries or fail to 
report income should not beneﬁt from the system. Therefore, insurers 
are allowed to request periodic reports of income from injured workers 
and to recover money from overpayments. Further, workers’ compen-
sation fraud was made a felony. However, the harassment of injured 
workers or a delay in the payment of beneﬁts carry ﬁnancial penalties 
for insurers.
Changes in Beneﬁts
The 1990 reform package included major changes in partial disabil-
ity beneﬁts. Both the amount an individual may collect and the length 
of time that beneﬁts may be received were changed. For injuries occur-
ring after the effective date of the legislation, the insurer may reduce 
beneﬁts to 70 percent of the weekly beneﬁt paid once a worker has 
achieved “maximum medical improvement.” However, a reduction is 
not allowed if a worker can demonstrate a good faith, but unsuccessful, 
effort at obtaining work. The length of time that partial beneﬁts may be 
collected was limited by the legislation to 312 weeks. However, this 
limit may be extended if the individual can establish that the injury or 
illness continues to pose a material hindrance to obtaining work. For 
collection beyond the 312 weeks, annual cost-of-living adjustments are 
required.
The Creation of a State Fund
By the late 1980s—and owing to the difﬁculties in the system—90 
percent of Rhode Island employers were in a residual risk pool. The 
leaders of the reform effort determined, therefore, that the creation of 
a state fund to be the insurer of last resort would allow for greater lo-
cal control over premium rates. Legislation created a private, domes-
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tic, mutual insurance company with a $5 million government loan. The 
company is now called Beacon Mutual and is the state’s largest work-
ers’ compensation insurer. The loan was repaid and the company now 
functions completely independent of state government.
The Creation of an Advisory Council
Another key element of the success of the 1990 reform effort was 
the creation of an 11-member advisory council comprised of represen-
tatives of the state legislature, the executive branch, the Workers’ Com-
pensation Court, business, labor, and the general public. The council 
is required to make quarterly reports designed to identify and possibly 
head off small problems before they can grow. The creation of the ad-
visory council was, in a sense, an attempt to codify and formalize the 
cooperative relationships that were formed at the time of the reform 
effort. The council has been very successful and has served as forum 
where problems, ideas, and legislative proposals can be discussed and 
analyzed in a nonpartisan and rational manner. The result is that solu-
tions reﬂect the desires of all of the stakeholders rather than simply 
those with the most political power.
THE 1992 REFORMS
Evidence of the success of the advisory council and the cooperative 
approach came with the 1992 reforms. A legislative package was pre-
sented that built upon the measures taken in 1990. Today, many view the 
1992 reforms as the ﬁnal touches that truly turned the system around. 
Medical Reforms
Mirroring the advisory council itself, an 11-member medical advi-
sory board was established. The duties of the board include advising the 
chief judge of the court of medical protocols for the treatment of com-
pensable illness and injuries, preparing standards to guide the court’s 
consideration of medical evidence (particularly standards to determine 
the extent of an injury or illness and the achievement of maximum med-
ical improvement), and reviewing and approving the Preferred Provider 
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Network lists submitted by insurers and self-insured employers. The 
medical advisory board may also disqualify or suspend a medical pro-
vider for certain legislated infractions.
Employee Choice and Preferred Provider Networks
Under the 1992 legislation, injured workers are allowed to choose 
their primary medical provider. However, if the worker wishes to change 
physicians he or she must select a physician from the network list or ob-
tain prior approval from the insurer. The purpose of the reform was to 
reduce “doctor shopping” by individuals intent on ﬁnding a favorable 
medical opinion.
Fee Schedules
The legislation mandated that the Department of Labor and Train-
ing in consultation with the court develop a workers’ compensation 
medical fee schedule. Prior attempts to set schedules had failed, since 
physician reimbursement rates were set at Medicaid levels, which were 
considered too low by doctors. This led to good doctors leaving the 
system or challenging the fees in court. In consultation with the medi-
cal advisory board, fees were set that were generous when compared to 
other states, but were designed to keep highly regarded physicians on 
board. The success of the effort again showed the beneﬁts of coopera-
tive decision making, which took into account the needs of important 
stakeholders—in this case, the medical community.
Beneﬁts
The 1992 legislation recognized that workers’ compensation ben-
eﬁts should, in most cases, be a temporary replacement of income, 
but not at levels that would provide a rational disincentive to return to 
work. Hence, weekly compensation was set at 75 percent of average 
weekly spendable base earnings (or after-tax income excluding over-
time). Earlier, the beneﬁt rate was 66.66 percent of gross earning in-
cluding overtime. An offset was established for retirement income, so 
that employees would not receive both full workers’ compensation and 
retirement beneﬁts. The offset can take place for injuries received or 
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illnesses occurring less than ﬁve years before retirement or after age 55. 
However, if the problem occurs less than two years before retirement, 
indemnity beneﬁts are due.
The 1992 legislation adopted a chart, based on the American Medi-
cal Association’s (AMA’s) Guides to the Value of Permanent Impair-
ment, to reduce partial beneﬁts upon maximum medical improvement. 
This reduction was in addition to the ability to reduce beneﬁts 70 per-
cent per the 1990 legislation. The 1992 statute also deﬁned material 
hindrance as a greater than 65 percent degree of functional impairment 
per the AMA Guides. Therefore, a partially incapacitated employee 
could not collect beneﬁts past 312 weeks unless the disability surpassed 
the 65 percent degree of functional impairment.
Not all beneﬁts were reduced by the legislation. For example, de-
pendency beneﬁts for totally disabled workers were actually increased, 
and a cost-of-living adjustment for individuals totally disabled for at 
least 52 weeks was also added.
Reinstatement
The 1992 legislation gave an injured worker the right to be reinstat-
ed to his or her former position with reasonable accommodation by the 
employer within a year of injury (or 18 months of injury if the worker 
had spent time in an approved rehabilitation program). This right ap-
plies only to workers injured after May 18, 1992, only to ﬁrms with 10 
or more workers, and not to seasonal or temporary workers. However, 
the reinstatement right is signiﬁcant and is another example of a com-
promise between labor and business. The right is a clear victory for in-
jured workers, but it also provides an incentive to return to work before 
exhausting beneﬁts.
MORE RECENT REFORMS
The cooperative system of reform, which began in the late 1980s, 
remains intact today, and in fact many of the same individuals are in-
volved. Sheldon Sollosy is now the chairman of the board of Beacon 
Mutual, and George Nee chairs the Workers Compensation Advisory 
Council. Since 1992, all legislative proposals have been referred by the 
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house and senate labor committees for consideration by the council. 
While there have been no large-scale changes since 1992, a number of 
smaller modiﬁcations have been made.
Material Hindrance
Enforcement of the 1992 statute’s deﬁnition of material hindrance 
has been postponed several times. Labor prefers that the determination 
be left to a judge rather than be based on the automatic application of 
an arbitrary ﬁgure. Thus far, business and insurers have agreed to the 
postponement, and, in exchange, labor has not sought a total repeal of 
the deﬁnition.
The Workers’ Compensation Administration Fund
Prior to the 1992 reforms, assessments on insurers to support the 
Workers’ Compensation Administration Fund were based on educated 
guesses about prospective gross premium levels. This resulted in sur-
pluses in the fund, which were raided on a couple of occasions by the 
Department of Administration and the legislature to ﬁll gaps in the state 
budget. This was clearly not what the fund was intended for, and was in 
a sense an additional tax on insurers. In 1998, the council and the court 
supported legislation to move the date of assessment to a time when the 
gross premium ﬁgure was known. This has allowed for a more accurate 
assessment and has prevented funds from being used for purposes other 
than funding the workers’ compensation systems.
Adjustments to Fee Schedules
Since 1992, the collaborative model has been extended with the 
establishment of a fee schedule task force composed of representatives 
of the Department of Labor and Training, the Medical Advisory Board, 
and medical and insurance communities. A couple of amendments to 
the fee schedule have been made, but only after a consensus has been 
reached by the task force. In 1998, the task force agreed to the reduction 
of several fees, but also to a general annual escalation of fees based on 
the consumer price index.
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Employer Compliance
The collaborative model was also used to address employer compli-
ance issues that came to light after the tragic ﬁre at the Station nightclub 
in Rhode Island in February 2003. One hundred people, including a 
number of club employees, died and many were injured. After the ﬁre, 
it was discovered that the club lacked workers’ compensation insur-
ance. Department of Labor and Training ofﬁcials, along with business, 
labor, and insurance industry representatives, revisited the statute and 
methods to ensure compliance, including sanctions against delinquent 
employers. The legislature approved a package to increase ﬁnes and 
penalties, move serious case hearings from the department to the court, 
and allow for the closing of businesses that do not secure insurance 
promptly. These measures have proven extremely successful in increas-
ing the rate of compliance.
CONCLUSIONS
By almost any measure, the reforms that began in 1990 have proven 
successful. By way of illustration, let us consider the achievements of 
the court, the number of self-insured employers, and trend in insurance 
premium rates.
The Court
Unlike the former informal hearing process, the court’s pretrial 
hearing program continues to be successful. Nearly all cases receive a 
hearing within 21 days and are disposed of promptly. Although credit 
for much of the early success rightly belongs to Chief Judge Robert F. 
Arrigan, his replacement, Chief Judge George Healy, has a great deal 
of experience both as an insurance company advocate and jurist, and is 
equally committed to the success of the program.
Self-Insured Employers
In the early 1990s, before the reforms began to take effect, there 
were 185 certiﬁed, self-insured employers in Rhode Island. Most were 
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self-insured because they could not afford the high premium rates at 
the time, even though, in general, they had low loss rates. Today, there 
are only 47 self-insured employers in the state. Since 1991, only two 
employers have applied for self-insurance certiﬁcation, and both are af-
ﬁliated with ﬁrms that have national self-insurance programs.
Premium Rates
Beacon Mutual, which, as mentioned earlier, is today the largest 
workers’ compensation insurer in the state, has proven that it can, un-
der the current system, operate proﬁtably without the large premium 
increases sought by companies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 
fact, Beacon Mutual has many discount programs for employers and 
has decreased rates three times since 1994.
In short, the collaborative efforts at workers’ compensation reform 
have proven very successful in Rhode Island. The system now provides 
adequate and timely beneﬁts for injured workers, reasonable premium 
rates for employers, fair reimbursements for physicians, and a reason-
able rate of return for insurance companies. The essential ingredient in 
all of this success was the ability of business and labor to come together, 
work out their problems cooperatively, and then spread the same spirit 
of goodwill and common endeavor to other essential stakeholders. 
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